

A CHILD IS BEING CAGED: RESIGNATION SYNDROME AND THE PSYCHOPOLITICS OF PETRIFICATION

Uppgivenhetssyndrom, or resignation syndrome (RS), is a disorder that until recently was thought to affect the children of refugees in Sweden alone. The heuristic of psychopolitics is used to theorize RS as a form of abjection (Bataille, Kristeva) and petrification (Fanon, Marriott), and the movement from petrification to *petrification in hallucinosis* (Fanon, Bion) is delineated: first these children are petrified by persecutory and culturally specific stereotypes that precede and exceed them symbolically, and then, through a succession of shocks, they enter a post-traumatic stupor in which the faltering symbolization of the stereotype gives way to the (dis)embodiment of abject thinghood. Marriott's distinction between mirror as mask and mask as mirror allows the attribution of RS not only to sociocultural mimesis and the psychosocial impact of stereotypes (mirror as mask) but also to a socially imposed absence that the stereotype simultaneously conceals and reveals (mask as mirror). RS (*petrification in hallucinosis*) is considered the (dis)embodiment of this socially imposed absence.

Keywords: trauma, unconscious, violence, refugees, petrification, Fanon, Bion

I see nothing: that is neither visible nor palpable. That makes you sad and heavy-hearted at not dying. . . . What is there is wholly fitting to the experience of fright.

—GEORGES BATAILLE (in Bident 2019)

Doctoral candidate, History of Consciousness Program, University of California, Santa Cruz; faculty, Access Institute for Psychological Services; 2018 recipient, Alexandra and Martin Symonds Prize and Peter Loewenberg Essay Prize in Psychoanalysis and Culture.

Submitted for publication April 19, 2019.

In a 2005 paper, the Swedish psychoanalyst and child psychiatrist Gören Bodegård documented a level of pediatric symptomatology unlike any he had previously encountered. He describes what came to be known as *uppgivenhetssyndrom*, or resignation syndrome, a mysterious psychiatric disorder that until recently was thought to affect the children of refugees in Sweden alone.¹ Labeled *de apatiska*, or the apathetic, in the Swedish media,² these children undergo a massive psychic retreat to the point of catatonia. Incontinent, tube-fed, and almost entirely unresponsive to stimuli of any kind, these children exhibit an abject dependence that appears to be the consequence of a total resignation from life. In his paper Bodegård discusses five apathetic children from the Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Clinic of Karolinska Hospital in Stockholm, a site that became ground zero for the syndrome. All five of the families had fled erstwhile Soviet Republics. Three of the families belonged to Central Asian ethnic minorities, and all five were reeling from severe traumas suffered in their homelands. While Bodegård highlights trauma in his formulation, he is circumspect about the events that might produce such an extreme clinical picture, noting “there was no single form of violation that all the children had experienced” (p. 339). Initially Bodegård attributes the condition to what he calls “lethal mothering,” but in a later paper (2010) the lethal effects of cultural apathy diagnostically distinguish his sample: all of the children on Bodegård’s unit were from refugee families, none of whom had psychiatric histories to explain the current state of their children, but all of whom had recently been denied asylum.

Bodegård’s psychoanalytic formulation was succeeded by more recent explanations that deemphasize psychodynamics in favor of a kind of mimetic catatonia (Hacking 2010; Sallin et al. 2016; Kirmayer and Gómez-Carrillo 2019). According to this view, medicalization of the syndrome and the prevalence of resignation among specific refugee populations leave certain children especially susceptible to developing the condition. The coma-like sleep into which *de apatiska* fall thus becomes

¹Just recently a rash of cases were reported in Australia (see O’Grady 2018).

²I use *de apatiska* to refer to children with resignation syndrome, but I occasionally use “apathetic child” in a general sense, since I do not think childhood apathy/resignation is restricted to Sweden. Despite the prevalence of this moniker for children with resignation syndrome, many Swedes insist that “apathic” rather than “apathetic” is a more proper translation. According to Hacking (2010, p. 315), however, *apathic* does not have a clearly defined presence in clinical lexicography, a definition from an 1836 OED (“without sensation”) being as close to any clinical meaning as he could get.

a social contagion or mirroring largely devoid of metapsychological significance. While children with RS seemingly relinquish their will to live, succumbing to stupor and descending into a state of abject dependence, much of the recent scholarship on *de apatiska* turns to some variant of biopsychosocial theory that downplays if not dismisses the social and metapsychological implications of these children's infantile helplessness. Contra such tendencies, I will attempt here to offer a psychoanalytic and psychopolitical theory of RS. Invoking the concept of abjection (Bataille 1993; Kristeva 1982), I argue that the helpless, apathetic child functions as an *abject thing* adjacent to which the *object world* of individual and nation is produced. I rely on Marriott's Fanonian distinction (2018) between mirror as mask (of stereotypes) and mask as mirror (of absence and abjection) to argue that much of the literature on RS grasps the former at the expense of the latter.³ Falling ill, the child joins a host of sacrificial figures or surplus populations that potentiate the nation's group unconscious, and yet this sacrifice, due to abjection, is of an object that ironically never was—or of an o/object that exists only as an alien or specter haunting the borders of psychic and political life.

My argument follows a line of psychoanalytically informed critical theory that considers how certain phenomena come to represent that which psychically and politically exceeds representation. Lacan's Real, Bion's O, Kristeva's abject, Leclaire's *infans*, Aulagnier's pictogram, and Green's negative are psychoanalytic exemplars of the critical-theoretical move I am trying to make. Within critical theory, Mbembe (2003) captures this type of paradox when he writes, following Kojève (1980), that "politics is . . . death that lives a human life" (p. 15). What Mbembe means is that the sovereign, governmental right to kill abject peoples, either psychically or physically, is what founds civil society as the site of politics; and yet this instrumentalized death is representable within civil society only as an absence, or as that which *it is not*. Mbembe's necropolitics troubles the notion that violence is irrational and therefore pre-political, suggesting instead that violence is the foundation of the political as such. In what follows, children with RS might be thought of as necropo-

³While I am concerned with *de apatiska*, my theoretical exegesis is hopefully applicable to the cross-cultural production of apathetic children in general, particularly in situations of forced migration, and to the role such children may play in the unconscious life of individuals and nations.

litical casualties, or as the (dis)embodiments⁴ of a social abjection without which the social is inconceivable.

Like other socially abject figures, children with RS threaten to expose the enigmatic and contingent in social and political life. This makes them a target for stereotypes that would dispel their enigmatic quality. The apathetic child embodies this enigma, the internal world of which remains uncertain. A grotesque embodiment of the *infans*, the one who cannot speak, the child with RS ambivalently attracts/incorporates and repels/expels socially repressed affects and stereotyped imagoes, many of which constellate around racialized forms of citizenship and national identity. Stereotypes petrify subjects in an effectively fetishistic manner (Fanon 1952, 1963; Marriott 2018), and such petrification is an attempt to harness the enigmatic and ambivalent by masking the *abject* as *object*, or by making death live a human life. Linking Fanon (1952, 1963) and Bion (1965), I use the term *petrification in hallucinosis* to capture the child's confounding (dis)embodiment of abjection: first the child is petrified by persecutory and culturally specific stereotypes that precede and exceed them symbolically,⁵ and then, through a succession of shocks, the child enters a psychotic post-traumatic stupor in which the faltering symbolization of the stereotype gives way to the (dis)embodiment of an abject, non-processual thinghood. The child essentially confronts the death that the stereotype had more or less contained.

I turn to the framework of psychopolitics to account for psychical and political dynamics underpinning *petrification in hallucinosis*. While psychopolitics is a heterogeneous field, my use of it is fairly specific to Fanon's critical psychoanalysis and to commentaries on Fanon's work

⁴The "dis" in (dis)embodiment signals that to embody the abject is to simultaneously be disembodied. The abject is the *excess* of individual or social bodies, which means that RS can "embody" the abject only in a confounding or seemingly impossible way. The paradox (dis)embodiment poses is how one can embody what exceeds the body's limits; or, to put it crudely, how one can embody a kind of excrement if excrement is something the body expels.

⁵Here I am associating Fanon's stereotype with other social-psychoanalytic concepts like Lacan's Symbolic (1966, 1973), Bleger's setting (1967), or Castoriadis's social imaginary (1987). Bleger's setting is always already continuous with social institutions that exceed the analytic context; Castoriadis's social imaginary refers to irreducible notions of social organization (e.g., myths of phylogenesis) that arise *ex nihilo* and so exceed and precede both society and subject; and, lastly, Lacan's Symbolic awaits and exceeds the subject, both because the signifier is transindividual and because the sign fails to contain a slippage or absence that emerges from the unstable relationship of signifier to signified. While for Lacan this absence is related to castration and the Law of the Father, Kristeva recasts it in relation to abjection as an archaic, presymbolic law that expels the infant from the maternal body.

(Marriott 2018; Lebeau 1998; Pandolfo 2010; Sexton 2010). For Lebeau (1998), psychopolitics refers to the recursion between politics and the psyche, the way in which fantasy structures the real of politics, and the way the real exerts pressure on fantasy. With reference to colonialist fantasies of the “black man,” Lebeau writes:

Fanon is also uncovering a fantasmatic image of the black man structuring the reality—the real conflict, the racist violence—of European culture. . . . this is an analysis of the black man, of blackness, as a (phobic) fantasy, certainly, but it is also a reading of the psychoanalytic concept of fantasy as a “real event,” a presence or a pressure, within and on the real [p. 114].

While racialized blackness is foundational to my understanding of psychopolitics, and while I query the role of (anti)blackness in the psychopolitics of RS, here I foreground the apathetic child as a figure through which “the reality—the real conflict . . . —of European culture” unfolds. Such conflict besets humanitarian efforts to treat RS, specifically insofar as they advocate a holding environment in the form of asylum (attraction), which can double as a lethality immanent in the state (repulsion). The case of *de apatiska* compellingly illustrates how fantasies of the apathetic *infans*, the child who cannot speak, shape research agendas and modes of state intervention, but it also illustrates how this governmentality—despite the undecidability of who or what *de apatiska* are—emends and often bolsters the fantasies through which *de apatiska* are produced.

Translating metapsychological constructs like the drive, the thing, and primal repression into psychosocial processes and vice versa is a move indebted to psychopolitical thought and specifically Fanon’s concept of sociogeny. A sociogeny of the refugee child considers how the production of a nation as a “natural,” a priori phenomenon in fact relies on the necropolitical exclusion of refugees, as well as on fantasies of a national future that the child as a politicized object represents (Edelman 2004; Rose 1992; Bernstein 2011). The child with RS, however, cannot perform the work of such representation. This is a child who does not smile or speak, a child who cannot represent the nation, let alone any future. Such a child both masks and reveals absence: we might see the child as one who suffers from an unspeakability that we do not, and so it masks the *infans* within; but the child also reveals unspeakability by neither identifying nor disidentifying with any of our projections. This child is not an object but is an *infans* or abject who, rather than symbolically

promising some group, familial, or national future, uncannily demands a reckoning with the limits of psyche, soma, and existence itself.⁶

REFUSAL AND LETHALITY

In 1991 the British psychiatrist Bryan Lask identified pervasive refusal syndrome (PRS), which became a blueprint for Bodegård and others in their early research on *de apatiska*.⁷ An eating disorder specialist, Lask formulated PRS as a diagnosis after working with children whose anorexic behavior would take an inordinately extreme turn, going from an initial refusal to eat, to a refusal to speak, walk, or function at all. Sclerotic and inured to most stimuli, these children embodied a learned helplessness and hopelessness (Seligman 1972), their passivity and withdrawal a response to the trials of post-traumatic life. In his early writing, Bodegård

⁶One of these representations is of Sweden as a humanitarian country without a colonial past. Commonly thought to be a liberal and extraordinarily welcoming country, Sweden's history reveals a more complicated picture. Swedish colonialism and capitalization on the slave trade is less well known than its historically very liberal immigration policies, but Sweden has long propagated its own brand of ethno-nationalism and white supremacy, a forerunner of which was doubtlessly Carolus Linnaeus (1707–1778), the Swedish botanist whose taxonomy of *Homo sapiens* into geographically different variants—white (*Homo europaeus*), red (*Homo americanus*), yellow (*Homo asiaticus*), and black (*Homo africanus*) proved integral to the development of racial science. The establishment of the Swedish Africa Company in 1650 saw the first premodern instances of African slavery in colonial Sweden, with the company trading slaves in addition to the gold, sugar, and ivory that those slaves produced. Swedish colonialism dates back to the eleventh century, as does the slave trade, yet there is a disjuncture between colonialist Sweden's premodern ethnic slavery and a modern racial slavery more heavily based on phenotype; like other colonial powers, Sweden's ideology of expansionism paralleled the development of a racial science according to which blackness was the most primitive and debased form of the human. From the Swedish Africa Company, which lasted eleven years, Sweden graduated to an almost century-long colonization of St. Barthélemy (1784–1878), an Afro-Caribbean island whose trading port of Gustavia (renamed after Sweden's King Gustav III), became one of the most active “slave ports” of the early nineteenth century (McEachrane 2018). Numerous psychoanalytic concepts are pertinent here, not least of which is Green's negative hallucination as “the representation of the absence of representation” (1999, p. 276).

⁷Lask's introduction of PRS provided him a pioneering diagnostician of the most extreme eating-disordered behavior in children. Since his 1991 article (Lask et al. 1991), reports of the condition remain rare, with only eleven more cases documented in the clinical literature as of 2012 (see McNicholas, Prior, and Bates 2012). Lask, Nunn, and Owen (2014) revisited the concept of PRS, noting that while few cases of PRS itself have appeared since 1991, similar symptom profiles have been reported in “large numbers” (p. 163). Such a claim no doubt bolsters their appeal to include PRS in future editions of the DSM and the ICD, as well as their reformulation of PRS as Pervasive Arousal-Withdrawal Syndrome, which relies less on clinical data and more on the etiological purchase of interpersonal neurobiology.

(2005) builds on Lask's work by recounting the decline of five children and their families, all hospitalized at Karolinska Hospital. Ranging in age from seven to ten, the children were either only children or the eldest child in their family. Upon their arrival in Sweden, all of the children exhibited severe psychiatric symptoms, from eating disorders to attempted suicide. Additionally, "all five . . . had expressed a wish to die" (p. 339). Coinciding with the children's advance toward resignation syndrome, many of the parents suffered psychiatric and/or physical incapacitation (e.g., generalized paranoia, psychotic depression, lumbago). Bodegård observed that the child's decline was often hastened by the mother's "attitude, mood, and behavior," which resembled "that of a mother caring for a dying child" (p. 340). The parents were convinced their child was dying of a physical disease, and the mothers kept watch over the child, conjuring "the atmosphere of a 'wake' around the child" (p. 340).

Bodegård offers psychoanalytic conceptualizations of this mise-en-scène, one of which he terms "depressive devitalization." Resembling Bettelheim's *musselman* (1974)⁸ or Spitz's hospitalism (1945), depressive devitalization is a degenerative process or inverse becoming that is characterized by "stuporous withdrawal and a total lack of purposive behavior" (Bodegård 2005, p. 343). For Bodegård, the etiology of resignation syndrome could be understood as the incorporation of bad objects via a normative-turned-malignant projective identification: what appeared to be expectable maternal care by the mothers of *de apatiska*—a fear and sadness over losing their children—reverses into a negative container-contained dynamic of "lethal mothering."⁹ "At first glance the mother's

⁸*Musselman* was a term commonly used in concentration camps, but its literal meaning derives from the Arabic, which Agamben (1999) translates as "the one who submits unconditionally to the will of God" (p. 45). In Agamben's reading, Bettelheim's autistic child ignores reality while the musselman contorts reality with delusions, but both are responding to trauma, which is a moral-political concept for Bettelheim and therefore separate from the clinical. For Agamben (1999), the musselman designates "the threshold," or the point at which "man passed into non-man" (1999), his spirit utterly destroyed.

⁹While the apathetic child may traumatically incorporate bad "death objects" (Durban 2017) through violent projective identification, this formulation accents a *process* whereby the child functions, in a more or less clear manner, as a vestibule for death-driven impulses in an individual or group unconscious. By contrast, I argue that the child may also embody the abject or *non-processual* thing of primal repression, without which drives, be they of individuals or groups, are potentially inconceivable. In other words, rather than a representable figure or object *within* the setting, be it national or clinical, the child becomes abject or undifferentiated as part of the non-process of the clinical-cum-national setting itself (Bleger 1967; Butler 2019a,b).

attitude appeared completely adequate and fully understandable in relation to the distressing state of the child,” but then, in a twist that Bodegård likens to Munchausen by proxy,

the refugee mother in her own desperate life situation concretizes and channels her own need for consolation by projecting the need for care outside herself and onto the child. Her ‘ill’ child demands her maternal concern but this turns into a kind of ‘lethal mothering’. We understand this ‘lethal mothering’ as having a role not only in maintaining the devitalization of the child, but also . . . in causing it” [Bodegård 2005, p. 343].

In addition to verging on a depoliticized, object-relational kind of reasoning, Bodegård’s formulation risks a curious patho- and mythologizing of mothers and ethnically “other” women.¹⁰ But to be fair, Bodegård does emphasize contextual explanations for why lethal mothering might emerge in refugee families. Such explanations dovetail with Fanon’s understanding of “reactionary psychoses” as “the direct product of oppression” (1952, p. 251). For example, in three of the cases in Bodegård’s study, the mothers had been sexually and physically abused in the child’s presence over a protracted period, not to mention the other forms of violence the families witnessed (“cruelty, intimidation, persecution of the family and relatives, and threats of kidnapping” [Bodegård 2005, p. 347]). Moreover, none of the families had any relatives in Sweden, which only exacerbated intrafamilial tensions and the desperation of their attachments. To broaden Bodegård’s formulation, it is not only the mother’s but the entire family’s “desperate life situation” that renders their psychic lives unbearable, yet it is the mother and the child who contain the tension and desperation, leaving them more vulnerable to becoming depositaries for the family’s deepest existential anxieties. When maternal containment fails, the container/contained relationship is inverted, and the child becomes the sole depositary.

ABSENCE AND ABJECTION

By foregrounding the family’s “limbo” as an etiological factor in depressive devitalization—limbo meaning the time endured before applications

¹⁰By invoking the *pietà*, Bodegård risks petrifying the ethnic other through ascribing an uncanny, witching effect to the mothers, which in turn lends them an hysterical character despite the sociogeny or pathogenic context (e.g., an hysterically xenophobic social climate) in which this hysteria arises.

for asylum are accepted or rejected, or even reviewed, by the Swedish Migration Board—Bodegård charts a path to considering the state’s “care” as an example of lethal mothering:

The time between the ending of the traumatic experiences and the child’s falling ill before the onset of the ‘devitalization’ syndrome—i.e. the time in Sweden—varied greatly. . . . In two families, the period was considerable, 40 and 29 months respectively, during which time the families were ‘in limbo’, without residence permits. They had their applications for asylum repeatedly refused . . . [Bodegård 2005, p. 339].

Although Bodegård does not arrive at the following conclusion, it is as if these children **incorporate the state’s lethality**, which in turn devitalizes them into resignation. Such force would suggest that the maternal object’s lethality is an epiphenomenon of a lethality already immanent in the state. The state’s disposition, however, is not simply lethal; indeed, up until 2015, when border regulations became more restrictive (European Migration Network report, 2015), Sweden had one of the most generous immigration policies in the EU. Still, even when refugees are granted permanent asylum, a petrifying and psychically (if not literally) lethal stigma remains. Such lethality is evident in myriad ways, not least of which is the increasingly common practice, at least in Stockholm, of placing sometimes large refugee families in single-room occupancy buildings where guards inspect residents’ bags every time they return to their temporary housing (Mikaela Lindström, personal communication 2019). Thus, in Sweden, tendencies toward care and lethality, attraction and repulsion, gather around the refugee, and this alternately centripetal and centrifugal ambivalence is what characterizes the affective response that Bataille (1993) and Kristeva (1982) link to one’s encounter with the object. Such ambivalence impedes signification, let alone any stable meaning, for it bewilderingly confronts us with a Real toward which we are repulsed and attracted at once.

Georges Bataille, who theorized abjection *avant la lettre*, advanced a notion of the object (1993) that relies on psychoanalysis to a degree. But unlike Kristeva, for whom the *object* is specifically a rejoinder to Lacanian conceptualizations of the mother-child dyad as an imaginary *object* relation, Bataille’s object transcends mother-child relations to encompass socially “miserable forms,” “the wretched population,” and “the dregs of the people” (p. 6). Such “miserable forms” attract both sympathy and disgust,

and they orient the subject's desire in one moment only to disorient it in another. In Bataille's words, "the abjection of a human being . . . is negative in the formal meaning of the word, because *it has at its origin an absence*: it is simply the inability to assume with sufficient force the imperative act of excluding abject things (which constitutes the foundation of collective existence)" (p. 10; emphasis added). If refugees are abject by virtue of being alien and lacking citizenship, they are not capacitated or enfranchised enough to "exclude abject things," and so they embody the abject or the thing itself; and if the social contract of collective existence is founded on such exclusion—"abjection" being "the primer of . . . culture"—it cannot simply be lethal, nor could it simply exclude: "what is abject, on the contrary, the jettisoned object, is [both] radically excluded and draws me toward the place where meaning collapses" (Kristeva 1982, p. 2). I exclude the abject only to be drawn back into it or to draw it back into me. The antisocial and nonhuman are excluded from the social contract, but they also constitute that contract—and its ruination—by virtue of their exclusion. *De apatiska* are among the antisocial and nonhuman, in that their capacity for contractual relations—or the self who complies and the subject to and of that compliance—has lapsed. Clinical and/or state-driven attempts to reintroduce the child into collective existence are thus confounded by a collectively unconscious need for an abject remainder, that of the apathetic child. But this does not mean that the apathetic child is merely a pawn of the state: "from its place of banishment the abject does not cease challenging its master" (Kristeva 1982, p. 2), which is to say that the state—that is, the materialization of law and the *nom-du-père*—forever subjects and is subjected to an apathetic and antinomian *infans*, the thing that it can never quite get to speak; thus, collective life relies not only on the repressive production of stereotypes (e.g., the apathetic child) but also on the repressive production of an absence within the stereotype, or a "real fantasy" (Marriott 2010, 2018) that ultimately eludes any symbolic redress by the individual or collective.

Akin to Freud's *das Ding*, "the thing" (1915a,b, 1025), the abject is a "pseudo-object" "inseparable from drives" or is "*the 'object' of primal repression*" (Kristeva 1982, p. 12). For Freud (1915a), secondary repression or "*repression proper*" (p. 148) relies on an attraction to the trace of the primally repressed, as well on a repulsion toward the trace as it coalesces in unconscious derivatives that threaten to penetrate consciousness. Primal repression, recast in sociogenic terms, is synonymous with

abjection as the basis of a social unconscious; abject surplus populations are not only subject to productive/repressive biopolitics that exercise the power to name, but are subject to becoming the unnameable base material on which the power to name is founded. Bataille, Kristeva, and Fanon all share an interest in the superego as a symbolic force that demands the abjection of a primordial non-ego as a precondition for the ego's imaginary coherence. Ego, group, and nation cohere as object-forms only to the extent that they defer to symbolic law, which means their borders are first erected through abjection. Abjection thus precedes the body ego of primary narcissism, and it also exceeds that body as an ever remaining thing that haunts the ego, demarcating its borders and yet attracting it toward its own dissolution.

PETRIFICATION, TRANSGRESSION, AND THE MIRROR AS MASK

A question raised by the genealogy of the resignation syndrome involves the role of refusal in the condition's etiology. If one is abject and so cannot marshal any "imperative force," to use Bataille's term (1993), how is refusal even possible? Is there a way in which the impossibility of refusal, and the child's descent into apathy or resignation, serves to mimetically communicate "this is how you look" (Ferenczi 1988) when you try to expel the abject thing—the thing that you most intimately are—from your borders? The concept of petrification in Fanon and Ferenczi offers possible answers to these questions, and revisiting Bodegård reveals how the egoic refusal he identifies in *de apatiska* and their families obscures the non-egoic abjection from which that paradoxically impossible refusal springs.

In Ferenczi, petrification is largely regarded as a psychic defense, while for Fanon it is explicitly a form of psychic and political subjectivation. In both, mimesis is at play. Raped in the house of Athena and victim-blamed by being transformed into a Gorgon, Medusa receives a sympathetic reading in Ferenczi's posthumously published *Clinical Diary*, her petrifying gaze "holding up a mirror to the bestial attacker, as though she were saying: this is how you look" (Ferenczi 1988, p. 177; see also Butler and Hartman 2017). Transmogrified into an abject thing, Medusa is animated to become a petrifying "it" whose gaze indicts a "you" undifferentiated from a chain of phallic signifiers (aggressor,

father, superego, sovereign, state, nation). The mirror of her petrification exposes the aggressor's mask or persona whose primary task is to negate the beast in the self by projecting it into the other. Medusa is thus an Orphic figure for Ferenczi (Gurevich 2015), her petrifying gaze protecting the "actual child" (Ferenczi 1988, p. 7) under attack by the aggressor. Ferenczi never champions this counteridentification with the aggressor as a successful psychical or interpersonal strategy in the face of real social violence, which suggests that he grasps the utter abjection of the child in relation to the adult.¹¹ It also suggests that he grasps how abjection is a corrective to simple projection, for it underscores how "the beast" is symbolically preordained as such by stereotypes that precede the self's emergence. The human infant is *born into* abjection, which is perhaps why the adult often has to survive the child's petrified suspicion, proving through "maternal friendliness" (Ferenczi 1949, p. 228) that not all adults are beasts.

While petrification appears by name only in Fanon's later work, *The Wretched of the Earth* (1963), the concept of masking in *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952) might be thought of as petrification's conceptual precursor. For Fanon, the colonized subject undergoes a "corporeal malediction" (1952, p. 84) due to the very imago of blackness being suffused with "erosive stereotypes" of savagery and primitivism (p. 99). Such stereotypes assign black skin to "a past that was never . . . [its] own" (Weate 2001). Referencing a Tarzan film, Fanon (1952) writes, "the Negro who sees this documentary is virtually petrified. There he has no more hope of flight: he is at once Antillean, Bushman, and Zulu" (p. 118). Here petrification is a reification of blackness or a symbolic fixing of black skin into an imaginary deadlock whereby the colonized subject can partake of history or "flight" only by donning a white mask. Thus, blackness is historical, let alone existent, only insofar as it appears white. Petrification is the condemnation of blackness as a thing, but unlike that of Ferenczi's child, this condemnation is explicitly understood sociogenically or at the level of the stereotype.

¹¹Gutiérrez-Peláez argues for Ferenczi's anticipation of the Lacanian registers by turning to Ferenczi's *Thalassa*, specifically its assertion of a "pre-primal-trauma" that for Gutiérrez-Peláez is the trauma of language. In *Thalassa*, this trauma is presented as a kind of forced movement from oceanic or amniotic formlessness to a postnatal containment or symbolization. Throughout his oeuvre, Ferenczi nods to language's failure to harness the *infans* and the infant's inborn glossolalia, and Gutiérrez-Peláez links this failure to Lacan's *la langue* or the idiosyncratic use of language that accesses the Real and so cannot be controlled by "the symbolic substrate of language" (Gutiérrez-Peláez 2015, p. 146).

In Fanon's initial formulation, petrification is treatable through the colonized's self-analysis. Such "corrective self-seeing" (Marriott 2018, p. 62) is an analysis of colonialism's anti-blackness as it is unconsciously lived by the colonized. To borrow Marriott's distinction (2018), Fanon ultimately pivots from this earlier emphasis on the "mirror as mask" by introducing the "mask as mirror" (p. 62). This distinction aligns with the namable object of secondary repression (mirror as mask) and the abject or unnameable thing of primal repression (mask as mirror). The former is tied to a referent (dehumanized black skin), and insofar as the black subject affirms itself beyond the referent (the repression of their humanity having lifted), the mirror potentiates a critique of the symbolic order through which the subject is petrified. The "mask as mirror," however, does not reflect a stereotyped object or other, but instead issues a "deathliness" and a "vertiginous absence between the 'I' and the 'it'"':

consequently, the object here refers to a deep, often circuitous fall or descent whose lapsus is received by the subject as a mirroring without content, in which the subject is not reflected back to itself as a diminished or distanced whiteness but as a no-thing, or non-being [Marriott 2018, p. 64].

While the relationships between the refugee, the colonized, and the enslaved are fraught and require careful attention to their respective social-structural positions (Sexton 2010), Marriott's distinction between the mirror as mask and the mask as mirror may nonetheless apply to *de apatiska's* progression from the refusal of an object to an apathy, resignation, and ultimate (dis)embodiment of an abject thing ("a no-thing, or non-being," to use Marriott's words).¹² To return to the Ferenczian refrain, "this is how you look," such (dis)embodiment might also mirror back a vertiginous contingency in the state: how to treat a non-being—and how a non-being can refuse—is a conundrum that disturbs without necessarily overturning both individual and collective claims to sovereignty.

Stereotypes nominate and interpellate, obliging the subject's response, and yet they also conceal an absence in the subject that easily recalls Lacan's Real. According to Marriott (2018, p. 373), Fanon's real centralizes absence, but unlike Lacan's Real, Fanon understands such absence as a sociogenic imposition rather than a metapsychological

¹²Marriott's no-thing and Bion's no-thing are quite different, the former signaling the collapse of meaning and the latter signaling meaning's inchoate potential.

given. (In this regard, Fanon draws closer to Bataille's social abjection and to Ferenczi's emphasis on the actuality of trauma.) By extension, one's stereotyped position—white, black, refugee, migrant—affects whatever psychopolitical relationship¹³ to such absence one will have. Some stereotypes might contain that absence more effectively than others. Thus, an understanding of the refugee as stereotype is necessary for delineating how *de apatiska* eventually come to (dis)embody the abject. Given their marginality, refugees may be unable to contest or refuse the imposition of stereotypes. Similar to the black colonial subject, even in the refugee's "utterances it is not necessarily an *I* that is speaking, but a *colonial thing* under the command of some other" (Marriott 2018, p. 60). Thus, if *de apatiska*'s refusal gives way to resignation, perhaps it is because of a social abjection that always already dictates the futility of their refusal.

Despite any similarities between refugees and the colonized, there are also considerable differences. Unlike the black colonial subject, whose skin is the sign of transgression par excellence, the refugee who seeks asylum is condemned to thinghood for having *committed* a transgression, namely migration. For Khanna (2005), "the asylum seeker . . . should be understood as a pirate and criminal when in passage. He or she is exiled from one site and without rights in another. Like the pirate, he or she has no rights, and no status as friend or enemy of anyone in particular" (p. 373). Invoking Schmitt (2003), Khanna argues that asylum seekers exceed the category of the human because they are not justifiably friend (*justus filias*) or enemy (*justus hostes*) of the state, and so exist outside the political and therefore human order: if man is a political animal, to borrow Aristotle's locution, asylum seekers are mere "objects to be rendered harmless and prosecuted as criminals" (Schmitt 2003, p. 153). Regardless of whether the status of friend or enemy is eventually attained, the asylum seeker perpetually carries "the trace of . . . criminality" (Khanna, p. 372).

If the conflation of blackness with transgression is an essential feature of modernity, as Fanon (1952, 1963) and others argue (Hartman 1997; Marriott 2000, 2010, 2018; Wilderson 2010), the black asylum seeker would not carry a trace of criminality so much as incarnate the criminal as such. It does not matter what blackness does or is, in other words, if blackness is reduced to mere phenotypical markers or

¹³This "relationship" is more of a nonrelation or "impossible" relation insofar as its "object" is absence.

“ungendered flesh” (Spillers 2003). Blackness is always already cast into an ahistorical, non-processual abjection, and the only self that can be born of abjection is a no-self, or a self that has been effaced by its condemnation to thinghood. For the black child to undergo breakdown or loss of self, to become apathetic or even to refuse, would thus seem more logically impossible than refusal from an apathetic child already does. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is a conspicuous dearth of black children among the demographics of *de apatiska*, which may flag an important structural distinction between black and non-black asylum seekers and the potential for RS to disproportionately serve the latter as a psychic solution, however tragic that “solution” may be. If a self is to resign, there has to be a social (i.e., clinical and/or political) structure there to receive it, but as Fanon and others argue (Hartman 1997; Wilderson 2010; Marriott 2018), blackness is essentially unrecognizable to those structures due to the object stereotypes, the “real fantasies” (Lebeau 1998; Marriott 2018), on which they depend.

The notion of asylum seeking as transgressive also signals a racialization of geopolitical space whereby the stereotype of asylum seekers is object only insofar as their migration bears the stain of a condemned blackness. Like the asylum seeker at a juridical level, the thing has no ties (or a negative tie) to the object psychically. If blackness is the thing that says no before the law (both temporally and juridically), it is not only that blackness is essentially transgressive, but that transgression is somehow inherently black. For Fanon, blackness is transgressive not because of anything it has done, but because modernity—the epoch of racial science, colonialism, enslavement, and the afterlife of those institutions—regards it as the epitome of thinghood and the transgressive (non)origin of humanity (Wynter 2003). Migrants therefore transgress only insofar as they approximate blackness, which suggests that migration is itself a vehicle for such approximation, a point implicit in both Schmitt and Khanna.

To make such a claim is not to suggest that the refugee becomes black, but that asylum seeking (if not simply migration) is a racialized and racializing process that carries the trace of blackness. In his critique of Agamben (1998, 1999, 2000), Sexton (2010) notes that the refugee’s (im)mobility necessarily partakes of geopolitical divisions already overdetermined by the anti-black institutions of slavery and colonialism. Sexton’s point is an important historical reminder that transnational migration will never be the same after protracted atrocities like the Middle

Passage. Seeking rights that attend asylum is different from being divested of rights by virtue of one's black non-being itself, and this is why the question of rights is not just juridical or global-economic but in fact ontological and sociogenic: for the avowal of one's rights is contingent on a body that is recognized as capable and capacious enough to judiciously exercise them (*habeas corpus*).

PETRIFICATION IN HALLUCINOSIS

For Bion (1965), hallucinosis is a state sometimes "approximating stupor" (p. 82) in which symbols no longer stand for something but are the thing itself. An unsymbolized thing in the subject is ideally metabolized through reverie or the representational systems of its environment, but those systems sometimes falter in a way that leads to a collapse of symbolic functioning and the risk of nameless dread. The hope generated in the refugee child creates an as-if situation, wherein the thing the child was in migration is granted provisional selfhood by way of the potential for asylum. But after repeated rejections of the application for asylum, and after surviving a torturous limbo as the migration board's decision is awaited, that selfhood or symbolization of the thing falters, and the child embodies the thing itself. Not only does the child confront the indelible stain of stereotypes like *svartskalle* (blackhead) or *invandrare* (immigrant),¹⁴ but those stereotypes "become a provocation to substitute . . . the thing itself as an instrument to take the place of representations. . . . Thus actual murder is sought instead of the thought represented by the word 'murder'. . . . Such procedures . . . contribute to states approximating stupor, fear of stupor, and fear of megalomania" (Bion 1965, p. 82). Encountering absence in the stereotype is tantamount to substituting the child as representation for the child as the thing itself.

Petrification in hallucinosis is meant to denote such substitution. The child petrified in hallucinosis comes to (dis)embody the abject, the thing,

¹⁴Pred (2000, 2004) nods to how the racial epithet *svartskalle*, or "blackhead," is inextricable from *invandrare*, or "in-migrant," a juridical category introduced in the early 1990s by the Swedish Immigration Board. The former fixes migrants according to racial and ethnic difference that the latter, having replaced the term "foreigner," disavows, albeit under the pretense of liberal progressivism. Pred quotes Luciano Estudillo, a Social Democratic politician from Malmö, who states: "The average Swede *sees* me as an immigrant; it makes no difference that I speak perfect Swedish. Let's tell it the way it is: immigrants are blackheads. My children are going to be immigrants" (quoted in Pred 2004, p. 78).

the primally repressed element of culture. It is not as if the child is like a *svartskalle*; the child is blackness itself, a color that is not a color, a negation of color and of form, an amorphousness. Listless yet frightened is how *de apatiska* physically appear: limbs drooping from a seemingly atrophied bodily core, bodies becoming autistic shapes undifferentiated from the setting (Bleger 1967; Ogden 1992; Goldberg 2012). What cannot be contained symbolically, *de apatiska* (dis)embody abjectly. Here hallucinosis is the failure of the container-contained relation, the latter being an intersubjective process that does not reflect back the thing or beta element exactly as it is, but that adds some cultural form to the thing so as to bring the child's subjectivity into being. Such reverie and containment are necessarily psychopolitical, since containment is a social ontological or subjectivizing process that struggles with (and sometimes against) ideology.

Container-contained dynamics are, on this view, always already inflected by stereotypes. Most accounts concur that RS is partly the consequence of witnessing trauma, but such witnessing is complicated in light of the stereotype as an inherently traumatizing force. Like Fanon's "affective ankyloses (a state of arrest or statue-like transformation)," but unlike the aspect of petrification that animates the subject it defends, "the stereotype . . . gives death and nonbeing, or rather—for this is what it means to encounter real fantasy, the rapid emptying out of symbolization that also involves a loss of metaphor and likeness . . . a moment that is in the strictest sense traumatic" (Marriott 2010, p. 228; see also Chamberlin 2018). As *de apatiska* resign, their consciousness dimming in a timeless moment of somnolent terror, it is as if they confront their social and cultural function as a fetish, hypnotically realizing that *they are that (black) thing*, that "death and nonbeing," that is not representable as a being who suffers, even though it catalyzes being and representation as such.¹⁵

According to the documentary filmmaker Dea Gjinojci (personal communication), many of these children undergo a series of shocks before their resignation, the rejection letter from the migration board often delivering the final blow. But perhaps this finality is not in response to the

¹⁵The Bionian move from thing to no-thing offers a way of thinking about such a being. The no-thing enables one to think about stereotypes as real fantasies without promising any deliverance from the Real itself. In other words, because Bion's no-thing is a purely abstract carrier of meaning, it might explain how the Lacanian Real can be discussed and written about if by definition it exceeds signification. No-thing is irreducible to any single object or concept, which means it can carry the meaning of the Real as the limit beyond which meaning itself collapses.

decision letter as much as it is to the real fantasy, the fetishized stereotype, that the children “see” in the board’s rejection. What they “see” is an abjection, a thinghood, from which they are psychopolitically undifferentiated and into which they psychically collapse. Gjinovci filmed a now well-known family with two sisters suffering from resignation syndrome (see Aviv 2017), and their story illustrates something of this all-consuming thinghood. The sisters formed an extremely close bond with their family in response to the stereotype-driven violence they endured first in Kosovo and then in Sweden. In Kosovo, persecution of the family eventuated in two men beating the mother and the aunt in front of the girls and their younger brother. The children did not see the rape that followed the beating, but they could hear it. Their witnessing without seeing the rape imbued it with an enigmatic feel; it was, quite literally, the violent imposition of an absence. After the 2007 attacks in Kosovo, the family fled to Sweden, staying three years before being deported back. The girls kept being picked on in school—“it was daily bullying”—and then

one day they were in the garden and a man came into the garden and started to choke [the younger boy], who was five years old at the time, and [one of the girls] saw the attack and just fainted. . . . for a few months they took her to different hospitals. . . . She was so weak, she couldn’t walk, she couldn’t stand. . . . That was like the trigger moment for her, the attack. . . . *Witnessing this maybe brought back the previous attack [on her mother and aunt].* . . . She shut down from then on. . . . They spent a year in Kosovo bringing her to different hospitals and she wasn’t getting better. . . . The mom came back to Sweden with her daughter and hospitalized her right away. . . . *And it’s in Sweden that she withdrew completely.* . . . And then a few months later the rest of the family came to Sweden. . . . And so, for a year and half after that, it was the oldest girl who took on the responsible role. . . . She knew Swedish and she would translate administrative letters that the family would receive, and she was the one who would give hope to the family. . . . She was holding everybody together. . . . And when they received the last rejection, when it stated that this is the last appeal, you will be deported, she couldn’t handle that and she just fell on the ground and started crying, saying “my sister is never going to wake up.” . . . And that was like the second trigger. . . . it took eight or nine months before she [the older sister] fell into a coma too [Gjinovci, personal communication 2019; emphasis added].

According to this account, there is initially an absence *of* the visual, but then that absence returns *in* the visual itself: the sisters aurally witness a very violent primal scene in the rape of the two women, and later this violence returns in the image of the brother being choked. Both events are

the consequence of a political persecution, which is why their traumatic effects invite consideration at the level of the stereotype. *Petrification in hallucinosis* thus unfolds in a succession of shocks in which the stereotype is first a mirror that calls the other, naming them from some beyond that cannot be fully captured in any particular image; and, *après coup*, that beyond issues forth in the impossible image of a void at the heart of a stereotype, a void that totally petrifies the subject because it confirms one's condemnation. In the case Gjinovci describes, initially there is no image to absorb the sonic violence of the rape, so it remains an acoustic fragment dissociated from any particular scene. The fragment functions as a stereotype that calls to the children *as if* they too are *things* to be raped, and later the chokehold confirms, at least for the younger girl, that *they indeed are those things*. In effect, the stereotype's violence is not simply a hailing or interpellation that induces the compulsory self-recognition of the "I" in some mirror of culture; it is an acoustic fragment, a scream of violent *jouissance*, that traumatically reveals an unrepresentable void or absence in the eye/"I" of the stereotype. The chokehold, a proverbial scream, could thus be thought to stage this disorganizing revelation. Upon seeing her brother choked, the girl hears the formerly dissociated acoustic fragment for what it is: a condemnation. In a reversal of Lacan's mirror stage, where a fragmented body is contained by an acoustic and stereotyped image of wholeness, here the fetish/stereotype that contained an absence breaks apart, and an absence spills from the mirror, condemning the child to abject thinghood.

A phobia of the stereotyped maternal body, that monstrous and cavernous thing that impossibly begets life, arguably precipitates *physical* rape as an enactment of violent omnipotence. If, as Kristeva suggests, the maternal body is indeed a container for the abject, the rape violently deposits abjection into and yet punctures that body as a psychic container for the children. Abjection leaks from the body-container, first as a dissociated scream and then as an impossible vision. That violent omnipotence and consequent leakage from the maternal container foment the children's psychotic anxieties. For Kristeva, the primal scene—or the "scene of scenes"—"resists any representation" and is underpinned by a "vision of the abject" or "the sign of the impossible object," which is principally the mother's body giving birth (Kristeva 1982, pp. 154–155). Perhaps this vision can only be *witnessed rather than seen*, which is why

the girl is not *seeing* the chokehold-*cum*-rape as much as she is *witnessing* abjection as it leaks from a punctured container.

A depositary for social abjection, the maternal body is linkable (yet irreducible) to stereotypes of blackness in Fanon and to the asylum-seeking refugee as approximating blackness through the act of migration. If petrification is partly an abjection of the other according to stereotypes, and if this abjection makes the other vulnerable to psychic and physical violence due to the inability to muster any “imperative force” (Bataille 1993), then there is a symbolic dimension to the attacks the girls and their family suffered, preemptively marking them as abject things and so wounding them with an absence that paradoxically attracts and repels ultimately futile attempts at symbolization. Rape thus becomes the reiteration of necro- and psychopolitical violence already perpetrated by a stereotype that fails to contain an absence at its core. In a more colloquial sense, the stereotype gives meaning, translating in part the otherwise annihilating absence into which one is born; but in another sense, the stereotype is a real fantasy, or the issuance of an absence that becomes tethered to oppressive and murderous social ontologies (black, woman, refugee, child, and so on). When witnessed, such absence brooks the power to induce breakdown and to propagate psyche-somatic death (see Winnicott 1949, 1974).

Witnessing without seeing—or beholding the impossible or noumenal without reducing it to the possible or phenomenal—is an essential part of RS or *petrification in hallucinosis*, but it can also apply to the clinician’s encounter with O (see Civitarese 2015). Such clinicians embrace “a diminution of the light, a penetrating beam of darkness,” which dims the mind until “only the net is visible” (Bion 1990, pp. 20–21). “If we can do this,” Bion continues, “it is possible to see that the only important thing visible to us is a lot of holes collected together in a net” (p. 21). If RS somehow parallels the intuition of O (at least formally), then perhaps the negative capability of such intuition offers a way of *witnessing* RS, a way that transcends what mimetic theories can only *see*. In the scene of scenes, it is as if the girls witnessed without seeing a socially intrusive absence that precipitated and overdetermined the rape itself (mask as mirror), and yet the mimetic theory does not go beyond the mirror as stereotype or cultural mask through which trauma is an empirical, representable, and culture-bound event (mirror as mask). While such seeing is no doubt important, RS beseeches us to witness an absence that is both occluded

and illuminated by the stereotype. This witnessing requires going beyond the knowable and perceivable to the spectral or speculative, or to what for the clinician-researcher is a luminous sliver in abject darkness.

Clearly, the girls had hope of being granted asylum; first for the three years before their deportation, and then for another year before the eldest's complete resignation. It is tempting to interpret the younger girl's fainting as a traumatic afterwardness in which she protected her brother and her mother by substituting herself as the actual victim of the attacks. But her collapse while witnessing her brother being choked may also represent petrification as a form of psychopolitical asphyxiation. The stereotype has a choking effect—an absence obscured by the signifier even before the terrorism of choking or any forcible intrusion of that absence. What had been a stereotype amenable to some symbolization, a being “picked on” by bullies, morphed into a symbolic equation whereby the sisters were no longer treated as if they were *svartskalles*, but in which they became *svartskalles*, the dregs or detritus of society themselves. For those who have no hope of being anything other than *svartskalles*, there is little to no hope of possessing a self that could one day resign. Because the children and the family once possessed provisional selfhood, albeit threatened by the trace of blackness acquired in migration, they are primed for hallucinosis in which there is no longer a self that transgressed, but a self that becomes transgression or blackness incarnate. This faltering of the stereotype through a succession of shocks gives way to a catatonic reaction and mimesis that does not, however, mirror a stereotype that is shared, but that mirrors an absence not unlike the impossible vision in Kristeva's “scene of scenes.” Like RS, this “scene of scenes” is undecidable, unnameable, and unknowable. It is the (non)appearance of the *infans*, which is in turn attached to certain child figures around whom socially unconscious group processes, and psychically and politically polarizing affects of attraction and repulsion, often constellate.

Perhaps the child with RS is the *infans* that indexes an absence, a hole in being, which, as Bion (1962, 1970) reminds us, demands a high degree of patience and not-knowing lest we foreclose it with a choking or petrifying knowledge. From a certain psychopolitical perspective, tarrying with this absence means weathering undecidability and sometimes risking our own immersion into petrification as a kind of dark night. Hallucinosis invites this dark night in the manner of a *pharmakon*, an object with the power to heal, kill, and/or expiate: for the clinician,

hallucinosis can precipitate the intuition of O; but for *de apatiska*, it is a lethal, immobilizing experience through which the child functions as a scapegoat or depositary for national anxieties. To invoke Georgi, a boy who describes RS as being “trapped in a glass cage . . . where any move can kill” (Aviv 2017), it is as if the lethality of RS paradoxically protects or quarantines the child, not through a mimetic defense that mirrors a stereotypical sameness or difference from others, but through a Medusa-like mirroring of an abjection at the heart of every social and political form.

REFERENCES

- AGAMBEN, G. (1998). *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, transl. D. Heller-Roazen. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- AGAMBEN, G. (1999). *Remnants of Auschwitz*, transl. D. Heller-Roazen. New York: Zone Books.
- AGAMBEN, G. (2000). *Means without Ends: Notes on Politics*, transl. V. Binetti & C. Cesarino. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- AVIV, R. (2017). The trauma of facing deportation. *The New Yorker*, April 3.
- BATAILLE, G. (1993). *Abjection and miserable forms*, transl. Y. Shafir. In *More & Less*, ed. S. Lotringer. Pasadena, CA: Semiotext(e), 1999, pp. 8–14.
- BERNSTEIN, R. (2011). *Racial Innocence: Performing American Childhood from Slavery to Civil Rights*. New York: NYU Press.
- BETTELHEIM, B. (1974). *Surviving and Other Essays*. New York: Knopf.
- BIDENT, C. (2019). *Maurice Blanchot: A Critical Biography*, transl. J. McKeane. New York: Fordham University Press.
- BION, W.R. (1962). *Learning from Experience*. London: Heinemann.
- BION, W.R. (1965). *Transformations*. London: Heinemann.
- BION, W.R. (1970). *Attention and Interpretation*. London: Tavistock Publications.
- BION, W.R. (1990). *Brazilian Lectures*. London: Karnac Books.
- BLEGER, J. (1967). Psychoanalysis of the psychoanalytic frame. *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* 48:511–519.
- BODEGÅRD, G. (2005). Life-threatening loss of function in refugee children: Another expression of pervasive refusal syndrome? *Clinical Child Psychology & Psychiatry* 10:337–350.
- BODEGÅRD, G. (2010). The apathetic children: Mass-medial infection and medical ethics. *Lakartidningen* 107(12):843–844.
- BUTLER, D.G. (2019a). Racialized bodies and the violence of the setting. *Studies in Gender & Sexuality* 20:146–158.

- BUTLER, D.G. (2019b). Riding instincts, even to die. *Studies in Gender & Sexuality* 20:106–118.
- BUTLER, D.G., & HARTMAN, S. (2017). “This is how you look”: Mimicry as defense of the actual (or hidden) child in Sandor Ferenczi’s psychoanalysis. In *Misfit Children: An Inquiry into Childhood Belongings*, ed. M. Bohlmann. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, pp. 53–70.
- CASTORIADIS, C. (1987). *The Imaginary Institution of Society*, transl. K. Blamey. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- CHAMBERLIN, C. (2018). Affective ankylosis and the body in Fanon and Capécia. *Studies in Gender & Sexuality* 19:120–132.
- CIVITARESE, G. (2015). Transformations in hallucinosis and the receptivity of the analyst. *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* 96:1091–1116.
- DURBAN, J. (2017). From *The Scream* to *The Pieta*: Murderous mourning and evil. In *Talking about Evil: Psychoanalytic, Social, and Cultural Perspectives*, ed. R. Lazar. New York: Routledge, pp. 87–105.
- EDELMAN, L. (2004). *No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- FANON, F. (1952). *Black Skin, White Masks*, transl. R. Philcox. New York: Grove Press, 2008.
- FANON, F. (1963). *The Wretched of the Earth*, transl. R. Philcox. New York: Grove Press, 2004.
- FERENCZI, S. (1949). Confusion of the tongues between the adults and the child (the language of tenderness and of passion). *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* 30:225–230.
- FERENCZI, S. (1988). *Clinical Diary*, ed. J. Dupont, transl. M. Balint & N.B. Jackson. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- FREUD, S. (1915a). Repression. *Standard Edition* 14:141–158.
- FREUD, S. (1915b). The unconscious. *Standard Edition* 14:159–215.
- FREUD, S. (1925). Negation. *Standard Edition* 19:235–239.
- GOLDBERG, P. (2012). Active perception and the search for sensory symbiosis. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 60:791–812.
- GREEN, A. (1999). *The Work of the Negative*, transl. A. Weller. London: Free Association Press.
- GUREVICH, H. (2015). The language of absence and the language of tenderness: Therapeutic transformation of early psychic trauma and dissociation as resolution of ‘identification with the aggressor.’ *Fort Da* 21: 45–65.
- GUTIÉRREZ-PELÁEZ, M. (2015). Ferenczi’s anticipation of the traumatic dimension of language: A meeting with Lacan. *Contemporary Psychoanalysis* 51:137–154.

- HACKING, I. (2010). Pathological withdrawal of refugee children seeking asylum in Sweden. *Studies in Philosophy, History, Biology, & Biomedical Sciences* 41:309–317.
- HARTMAN, S. (1997). *Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- KHANNA, R. (2005). On asylum and genealogy. *South Atlantic Quarterly* 104:371–380.
- KIRMAYER, L.J., & GÓMEZ-CARRILLO, A. (2019). Agency, embodiment and enactment in psychosomatic theory and practice. *Medical Humanities* 45:169–182.
- KOJÈVE, A. (1980). *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- KRISTEVA, J. (1982). *Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection*, transl. L.S. Roudiez. New York: Columbia University Press.
- LACAN, J. (1973). *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*, transl. A. Sheridan. New York: Norton, 1977.
- LACAN, J. (1966). *Écrits*, transl. B. Fink. New York: Norton, 2007.
- LASK, B., BRITTEN, C., KROLL, L., MAGAGNA, J., & TRANTER, M. (1991). Children with pervasive refusal. *Archives of Disease in Childhood* 66:866–869.
- LASK, B., NUNN, K., & OWEN, I. (2014). Pervasive refusal syndrome 21 years on: A reconceptualization and a renaming. *European Journal of Adolescent Psychiatry* 23:163–172.
- LEBEAU, V. (1998). Psychopolitics: Frantz Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks*. In *Psychopolitics and Cultural Desire*, ed. J. Campbell & J. Harbord. London: UCL Press, pp. 107–117.
- MARRIOTT, D. (2000). *On Black Men*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- MARRIOTT, D. (2010). On racial fetishism. *Qui Parle* 18:215–248.
- MARRIOTT, D. (2018). *Whither Fanon: Studies in the Blackness of Being*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- MBEMBE, A. (2003). Necropolitics, transl. L. Meintjes. *Public Culture* 15:11–40.
- MCEACHRANE, M. (2018). Universal human rights and the colonality of race in Sweden. *Human Rights Review* 19:471–493.
- McNICHOLAS, F., PRIOR, C., & BATES, G. (2012). A case of Pervasive Refusal Syndrome: A diagnostic conundrum. *Clinical Child Psychology & Psychiatry* 18:137–150.
- OGDEN, T.H. (1992). *The Primitive Edge of Experience*. Northvale, NJ: Aronson.
- O'GRADY, S. (2018). Children in Australia's migrant offshore detention center are so distraught, some have attempted suicide. *Washington Post*, September 20.

- PANDOLFO, S. (2010). Clad in mourning: Violence, subjugation, and the struggle of the soul. *Review of Women's Studies: An Annual Review of Women's & Gender Studies*, ed. P. Johnson & S. Wadi. Birzeit, Palestine: Institute of Women's Studies, Birzeit University, pp. 25–39.
- PRED, A. (2000). *Even in Sweden: Racisms, Racialized Spaces, and the Popular Geographical Imagination*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- PRED, A. (2004). *The Past Is Not Dead: Facts, Fictions, and Enduring Racial Stereotypes*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- ROSE, J. (1992). *The Case of Peter Pan: Or, the Impossibility of Children's Fiction*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- SALLIN, K., LAGERCRANTZ, H., EVERS, K., ENGSTRÖM, I., HJERN, A., & PETROVIC, P. (2016). Resignation syndrome: Catatonia? Culture-bound? *Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience* 10:1–18.
- SCHMITT, C. (2003). *The Nomos of the Earth*, transl. G.L. Ulmen. New York: Telos Press.
- SELIGMAN, M.E.P. (1972). Learned helplessness. *Annual Medical Review* 23:407–412.
- SEXTON, J. (2010). People-of-color-blindness: Notes on the afterlife of slavery. *Social Text* 103:28:31–56.
- SPILLERS, H. (2003). Mama's baby, Papa's maybe: An American grammar book. In *Black, White, and in Color: Essays on American Literature and Culture*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 203–229.
- SPITZ, R. (1945). Hospitalism: An inquiry into the genesis of psychiatric conditions in early childhood. *Psychoanalytic Study of the Child* 1:53–74.
- WEATE, J. (2001). Fanon, Merleau-Ponty, and the difference of phenomenology. In *Race*, ed. R. Bernasconi. Malden, MA: Blackwell, pp. 169–183.
- WILDERSON, F. III. (2010). *Red, White, and Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- WINNICOTT, D.W. (1949). Mind and its relation to the psyche-soma. In *Through Paediatrics to Psycho-Analysis*. New York: Basic Books, pp. 243–254.
- WINNICOTT, D.W. (1974). Fear of breakdown. *International Review of Psychoanalysis* 1:103–107.
- WYNTER, S. (2003). Unsettling the coloniality of being/power/truth/freedom: Towards the human, after man, its overrepresentation—an argument. *CR: The New Centennial Review* 3:257–337.

110 Gough Street, #403
 San Francisco, CA 94102
 Email: danielbutlermft@gmail.com