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Anthropology And The Cold War Mediterranean

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ABSTRACT: In the early 1950s, several anthropologists departed from fieldwork in colonial possessions to study the peasants of large "complex societies." Exemplifying this shift, Julian Pitt-Rivers made an opening foray into the Mediterranean area, theretofore of interest mainly to archaeologists, historians and literary scholars, with an ethnography of a village in Andalusia, published as THE PEOPLE OF THE SIERRA in 1954. Subsequent anthropologists of the Mediterranean, most from Britain and the United States, similarly steered clear of cities, documenting family and kinship relations, subsistence practices, informal relationships, and moral values in remote and small communities. American political scientist Edward Banfield belongs to this tradition as well. His THE MORAL BASIS OF A BACKWARD SOCIETY of 1958 was based on fieldwork in a rural town in Southern Italy and advanced the argument that the town's, and region's, lack of "development" was attributable to a local cultural ethos in which the interests of the nuclear family were paramount. This essay analyzes two tropes of Mediterranean anthropology during the 1960s: "honor and shame," to which Pitt-Rivers contributed, and "amoral familism," Banfield's gatekeeping concept. Both are considered in relation to America's Cold War hegemony in Italy and the Mediterranean, a hegemony that was being consolidated at that time.

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In the early 1950s, American anthropology, taking stock of community studies from Asia and Latin America, attempted to theorize a new subject matter, the peasantry. Robert Redfield's exploration of Mexican villages pointed to a defining characteristic: peasants, as distinct from "tribesmen," are integrated into the "wider society" (the cities, markets, and state institutions) of which their communities are "a part." Around the same time, a few anthropologists in Britain and France departed from fieldwork in colonial possessions to study the peasants of large "complex societies." With his ethnography of a village in Andalusia, published as THE PEOPLE OF THE SIERRA in 1954, British anthropologist Julian Pitt-Rivers made the opening foray into the Mediterranean area, long of interest to archaeologists, historians and literary scholars, but not to "social" anthropologists.

Pitt-Rivers was initially defensive about doing "real" anthropology in Spain, fieldwork having theretofore been defined, at least in Oxford, by hardship. The die was cast, it seems, for anthropologists of the Mediterranean to steer clear of cities, documenting family and kinship relations, subsistence practices, informal relationships, and moral values in remote and small communities. The question addressed below is how this research articulated with, bypassed, or challenged the Cold War hegemony of the United States, whose naval presence and investments in anti-communist development began to expand around the same time. Two tropes of Mediterranean anthropology during the 1960s, "honor and shame" and "amoral familism," point to somewhat inconsistent and very provisional answers.

From Community Studies to Honor and Shame

In 1959, at the initiative of Pitt-Rivers, the Wenner-Gren Foundation sponsored a conference to compare community studies taking place around the Mediterranean. The participating anthropologists included one American, five British, four French, two Greek, one Spanish, one Italian and one Libyan; a handful of classicists and literary scholars also took part. MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRYMEN, edited by Pitt-Rivers (1963), covers the social structures of rural communities in Spain, Egypt, Algeria, Greece, Corsica, Morocco, Lebanon, Turkey, and France. Pitt-Rivers laid out the following generalizations in his introduction: The Romans had built their empire around this sea for the good reason that its restricted distances and "kindly" waters enabled conquest, colonization, trade and piracy. Continuous maritime contact over subsequent centuries meant "a high degree of technological homogeneity" and exposure of the entire littoral to not one but two great religions, Islam and Christianity. Overarching ecological conditions, highlighted by Braudel in the 1940s, were also noted. Later summarized by Louise Sweet and T. J. O'Leary (1969), these included "an urban character of peasant life (in agrotowns), the predominance of large estates for the production of grains, and transhumant pastoralism of sheep and goats," all underpinned by "a similar climate, mountain topography, flora and fauna in which vines, figs and olives, wheat, barley and beans, found a place" (quoted in Albera and Blok 2000: 18).

Nevertheless, Pitt-Rivers emphasized, although Mediterranean geography had a certain coherence, and was favorable to "unification by military force, settlement and, as soon as the commanding power relaxe(d), rebellion," it was not supportive of "integration into a homogenous culture." Political and religious hierarchies replaced one another but left local communities more or less "faithful" to their traditions; nor had these communities been effectively absorbed, in modern times, under their national flags. Rather, they "possess both more similarities between different countries and more diversities within their national frontiers than the tenets of modern nationalism would have us believe." The goal of MEDI-

TERRANEAN COUNTRYMEN was, in effect, to subvert the stereotypes of national "cultures," and "discover continuities which run counter to the varying political hegemonies, observing the exigencies of the ecology or the entrenched conservatism of the local settlement" (Pitt-Rivers 1963: 9-10).

Contrary to what many have thought, the theme of "honor and shame" was addressed on only one of the six days of the Wenner-Gren conference, and only appeared within a discussion of cultural practices surrounding friendship and hospitality. Land tenure, inheritance, kinship, local economics and demography took precedence, along with the relationships of communities to cities and states as mediated by networks, brokers, and patron-client relations.

In the end, however, participants found the "greatest homogeneity" to be in "conceptions of the self and in values relating to the sexes" (Silverman 2000: 46-47). One of the collaborators, Greek anthropologist J. G. Peristiany, garnered support for continued discussions in 1961 and 1963 from the Social Sciences Centre of Athens and the Greek Ministry to the Press and Information Department of the Prime Minister's Office, with an additional subsidy, in 1963, from UNESCO. (One presumes that Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis knew about the project.) The result was the famed 1965 volume which Peristiany edited, HONOUR AND SHAME: THE VALUES OF MEDITERRANEAN SOCIETY. The Mediterranean peoples discussed in this book (Spanish, Greek, Cypriot, Kabylian, and Egyptian Bedouin) were, Peristiany proposed, "constantly called upon to use the concepts of honour and shame in order to assess their own conduct and that of their fellows" (Peristiany 1966: 10). Additionally, the concepts were intensely salient for a reason: Mediterranean societies offered up "an insecure, individualist, world where nothing is accepted on credit, the individual is constantly forced to prove and assert himself ... he is forever courting the public opinion of his 'equals' so that they may pronounce him worthy" (Peristiany 1965: 11). The insecurity and instability of status hierarchies meant that vindication of one's honor was constantly required, not unlike medieval chivalry in Western Europe or street-corner gangs of the time.

A follow up "series of seminars," supported by the Social Research Centre of Cyprus, resulted in Peristiany's editing of another collection, MEDITERRANEAN FAMILY STRUCTURES, in 1976. Covering an even wider range of "cases," the 20 chapters of this book describe kinship and family dynamics among Maronites in Lebanon, Arabs in Israel, several communities in Tunisia, Morocco, Turkey, Spain, Italy and Greece, and one in Albania. The variety notwithstanding, the theme of honor constitutes a thread of continuity, resonating with the struggles of both nuclear and bilaterial families to express their "moral heritage" and "social achievement."

Peristiany characterizes these struggles as agonistic: "a contest before a chorus, a commenting and evaluating audience" (1976: 23). Contributions to the collection from Greece, in particular, give "the stark impression of a society in which every family is a self-contained moral entity defending its honour against all comers, when not actively engaged in replenishing its anti-reputation armory for future use." As in the earlier volume, Peristiany concludes that "the putting to the test of a person's worth is a sign of status insecurity in a society where all may claim to be equal; the lack of a clear gradation between ideals, and thus of a clear hierarchy of prescriptive rules, is a reflection of this type of egalitarian, unclearly structured and thus 'anarchic' social order" (Peristiany 1976: 23-25).

The index of FAMILY STRUCTURES includes roughly 30 entries on "honour" scattered throughout the text, and a half dozen on chastity or virginity, also widely distributed. In the Mediterranean, it seemed, the male-female relationship rendered male honor dependent upon, and vulnerable to, the behavior of close female relatives. By this time a number of ethnographers had shown "Mediterranean modes of thought" to include the ideas that women be excluded from public space, that brides be tested for virginity on their wedding night, and that adulterous wives be murdered (Peristiany 1965: 9). Whether intended or not, a sexualized understanding of "honor and shame" had risen to the top of a Mediterranean "trait list."

The Cold War as Context

It could be significant that "honor and shame" came to define the Mediterranean as a "culture area" just as the United States and NATO were defining the Sea as an important arena in which to deter and contain Soviet expansion. The Sixth Fleet of aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, and submarines, headquartered in Naples, projected maritime power while, on the diplomatic front, development assistance flowed to anti-communist regimes whose allegiance was considered central to America's foreign policy goals. There has been, as yet, no research project documenting honor and shame's resonance with U.S. funding bodies, media outlets, and publishing houses in the 1960s and 1970s, and in the absence of this kind of precision, one can only speculate. However, it does seem that, by assimilating the rural populations of Southern Europe to North Africa and the Middle East, the honor and shame emphasis of Mediterranean ethnography was congenial to U.S. policymakers, obsessed as they were with the vulnerability of southern European peasants to communist ideology. No wonder that, in the 1980s, a new generation of Mediterraneanist anthropologists detected, and deconstructed, the Orientalist implications of dwelling on honor and shame, thereby tying these concepts to an intellectual mainstay of Western, if not specifically American, imperial power.

Already in 1980, Michael Herzfeld, a leader of this turn, undertook to challenge the privileged association between Mediterranean societies and honor and shame. Troubled by a picture so "ahistoric and essentialized," from which differences and flux had been eliminated, he questioned the very notion of the region as a "culture area" (see Herzfeld 1980; Albera and Blok 2000: 19). Moreover, notwithstanding the initial role of a Greek anthropologist, Peristiany, in drawing attention to honor and shame, he argued that subsequent repetition and emphasis betrayed the ethnocentrism of Anglo- and American Orientalist traditions. Most telling, the honor and shame "complex," now qualified as "alleged" or "so-called," exocitized Mediterranean peoples, exaggerating their differences from northern Europeans while tying them to an even more distant Middle Eastern Other (see also Pina-Cabral 1989).

Today, after more than three decades of self-reflexive criticism, most anthropologists would agree with Frank Stewart that "not all peoples living on the shores of the Mediterranean have been affected to the same degree by their proximity to it; and even if we take groups like the Catalans and the Lebanese, who have been deeply affected, this fact does not entail that they should resemble each other more than they resemble their inland neighbors to the north and the east, respectively" (Stewart 1994: 78). At the least nothing remains of Mediterranean "modes of thought." In 1992, none other than Peristiany and Pitt-Rivers co-edited a collection on "honor and grace," not "shame." Although the introduction and several of the chapters evoke competition for rank among men and women's threat to honor through illicit sexual activity, some of the examples derive from non-Mediterranean societies and, moreover, other themes are given equal weight. If anything, the emphasis is on variation, the editors having absorbed some of the criticisms of their earlier attempts to identify a "Mediterranean concept of honor" (see Peristiany and Pitt-Rivers 1992).

And yet, the case is not closed. In their monumental volume of 2000, THE CORRUPTING SEA; A STUDY OF MEDITERRANEAN HISTORY, Perigrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, respectively a medievalist and ancient historian, criticize but then redeem the Mediterraneanist anthropologists of the 1960s and 1970s. True, too little attention was paid to variability, and none to comparisons that might have been made to places outside the region. At the same time, however, the authors carefully analyze several monographs (from Greece, Italy, Spain, Morocco, Lebanon, and Egypt, among others) and conclude that patterns do, indeed, exist. Honor is consistently represented as the measure of social worth for individuals and family groups; it is both embraced by those who struggle to be in good standing, and validated by wider publics. Consistently, too, the ideals of honor are gendered: (a) for men: autonomy, wealth in material and human resources, integrity, self-control, protectiveness, readiness to respond to insults; (b) for women: values tied to sexual behavior, in particular deference, modesty, concealment, and shame. The seduced woman is always shamed but the seducer may be honored. Her fall, moreover, tarnishes her entire family. In all the studies examined, unmarried women are supposed to be virgins while married women are supposed to be chaste. Both should be secluded in the public arena lest they put their family or patriline at risk (Horden and Purcell 2000: 492-506).

Although acknowledging that the ethnographers of the 1960s and 1970s could have paid greater attention to the dynamics of unequal power, Horden and Purcell nevertheless disagree that the privileged position of Anglo- and American ethnographers, bent on constructing an archaic Mediterranean and thus serving imperialist ends, is a relevant issue; there are simply too many native ethnographers reporting on similar values and practices to make this so. Nor is aristocratic power at stake. Rather, the ethnographies point to a decidedly non-aristocratic honor and shame complex. Indeed, as multiple references to life's agonistic qualities suggest, there is something close to a rough equality among those who compete for honor in the Mediterranean. For Horden and Purcell, this is in part because, in the many "micro-ecologies" of the region, people of roughly equal status must constantly maneuver for position, thanks to the "unpredictability and perceived scarcity of ... resources," including the symbolic resource, honor. More than in other places, people experience as fraught the need to balance the contradictory demands of autonomy and cooperation in managing what resources are available. The kind of unequal power that should have been examined, however, is the kind that feminist anthropologists eventually brought to everyone's attention: men's power over women, so fundamental to the formation of masculine identities (Horden and Purcell 2000: 522; see also Lindesfarne 1994).

In assessing the anthropological contributions of the 1960s and 1970s, Horden and Purcell, like other historians, point out that the ethnographers of the time, steeped in structure-functional models of society a la Radcliffe-Brown, ignored Evans-Pritchard's historically grounded THE SANUSI OF CYRENAICA. Making history relevant to ethnography, this groundbreaking text of 1949 overturned the "seductive rhetorical device" of the ethnographic present tense, a device that rendered ethnographic observations timeless, immune to great movements of history as if these movements were confined to somewhere else (Horden and Purcell 2000: 467-468). Horden and Purcell seem puzzled, too, that several anthropologists, their discipline's disinterest in history notwithstanding, invested time and energy in a misguided search for the honor complex's Mediterranean origins. (I take myself as a case in point; see Schneider 1971). Here, they put their finger on, although they do not pursue, another difficulty: the devotion of so much energy to theorizing problems surrounding women's seclusion went hand in hand with sidestepping other issues, among them such Cold War issues as the resonance for peasants of left political parties and ideologies, or the urgency of land reform. Arjun Appadurai's observation is apt. In the context of the development of well-funded area studies programs of the high Cold War, "a few simple theoretical handles become metonyms and surrogates for the civilization or society as a whole: hierarchy in India, honor-and-shame in the circum-Mediterranean, filial piety in China ... all ... gate-keeping concepts ... that seem to limit anthropological theorizing about the place in question ... that define the quintessential and dominant questions of interest in the region" (Appadurai 1986: 357).

George Collier's 1980s revisit to the Andalusian town, Los Olivos, addresses this argument. In an earlier study in 1963, the same pueblo had seemed very similar to the one that Pitt-Rivers enshrined in PEOPLE OF THE SIERRA (pseudonym Alcalá). Social stratification was not pronounced, asymmetrical patronage relationships appeared to benefit clients as well as patrons, and no one wanted to talk about the Spanish Civil War. Villagers remembered churches being burned but shunned political discussion because politics "is why people kill one another." Who could have imagined, then, what a complicated history of revolution and repression there was to excavate (Collier 1987: 6)?

Reflecting on his early 1960s inability to appreciate that "class struggle had been fundamental to the history of Los Olivos," Collier allows that the pueblo of those years could, indeed, have manifested less social inequality than it had in the 1930s, but faults himself for failing to "comprehend silence (the refusal of enemies to talk to one another) as the idiom of bitter resentments" dating from that earlier time. Alas, the theoretical paradigm of early 1960s anthropology was heavily shaped by structural functionalism, privileging consensus over conflict; exchange over exploitation; boundaries, solidarity, internal coherence and "consistency of values" over internal complexity. "Our naivetè," he writes, "stemmed at least in part from the questions not asked, the problem not posed by the theoretical precepts of our discipline" (Collier 1987: 5-7). Until Jerome Mintz's THE ANARCHISTS OF CASAS VIEJAS (1984), which pulled back the curtain on bloody events surrounding an aborted labor action of 1933, only Lison-Tolosana's BEL-

MONTE DE LOS CABALLEROS (1966), presented a different picture, notwithstanding most ethnographers' exposure to Brenan's 1943 THE SPANISH LABYRINTH; AN ACCOUNT OF THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CIVIL WAR.

For me, Neni Panourgiá's DANGEROUS CITIZENS: THE GREEK LEFT AND THE TERROR OF THE STATE (2009) addresses the gatekeeping issue in an especially compelling way. Early ethnographers of Greece ignored that country's Civil War, and the repression of the left that it entailed. Remarkably, Panourgiá argues, this repression involved a truly insidious form of rightist maneuver: detaining "leftists" in camps, located on several islands, for supposed rehabilitation. Nor was this practice confined to the pre-war dictatorial regime that wanted to model itself on fascism (Metaxas, 1936-1941). The Junta installed by the colonels in 1967-1974 used it, too, as did preceding democratic governments, center-right, to be sure, and wedded to preemptive, hyperlegalistic measures, modeled on 19th century laws against brigandage in defense of public order. Nazi occupiers had aided and abetted such repressive measures during World War II, but so had anti-communist Britain in the course of the liberation, and, in the 1950s and 1960s, so had the robustly anti-communist American CIA.

DANGEROUS CITIZENS, however, reminds us that Marxist anthropologists of the 1960s and 1970s, generally working in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and not in the Mediterranean, had their blind spots too and might not have been much help in exploring this tragic past. Governed by a paradigm that reduced class relations and the consciousness of class to the material conditions of production, these scholars strained to distinguish among kinds of peasant (petty commodity producers, middle peasants, worker-peasants, proletarianized peasants, peasants on a path of differentiation into better-off and poor) so as to engage the question of their revolutionary potential. Panourgiá reviews the histories of major strikes in pre-war Greece, in which agricultural workers participated along with many other kinds of worker; energized socialist and communist parties, unions, and a youth association also lent support. Communist victories in local elections after World War II, and the unrest of strikers, peace activists, and sympathetic students in the 1960s and 1970s, further contributed to the ranks of "leftists," demonized for being dangerous, subversive citizens who had to be pushed to the margins.

All told, the leftists we meet through Panourgiá's ethnographic and oral historical reconstructions are not immediately understandable in terms of the above-noted categories of political economy. The ideas and commitments of many of them have more to do with their moral sensibilities regarding what workers and peasants deserve in a just society than with their being themselves workers or peasants, a point well made by a photograph of perhaps 60 island exiles, taken in 1950, in which we see a random mix of men in suits and ties, military attire, lower middle class jackets, and obvious peasant garb (Panourgiá 2009: 120). Most interesting, the experiences of activism and repression, defense against repression and intensified repression, are shown to have produced patterns of remembering and forgetting within families and communities. Although labile, left and right political identities are intergenerational, passed on within families for decades. Indeed, they mark particular families rather strongly, for example, the family encountered by Panourgiá in 1981 whose members were horrified that their young son had fallen in love with a communist. Having lost four members to a leftist initiative to protect local citizens from paramilitaries a generation earlier, anticommunism was virtually in that family's "DNA."

Greece is paradigmatic of countries whose modern histories revolved for a while around labor organizing, general strikes, agrarian strikes, international communist inspiration and encouragement, and, at the same time, the severe repression of striking workers and communist-appearing organizations, in turn encouraged by U.S. foreign policy and sometimes interventions, for example, Chile and Colombia in Latin America, and Malaysia and Indonesia in Southeast Asia. Mediterranean Europe gives us Portugal and Spain; in the years since Collier's restudy, Spanish activists have initiated efforts to expose long-buried atrocities, inspired by postcolonial "truth and justice commissions." Certainly, Italy, to which I now turn, had a parallel Cold War history; witness how its recent prime minister, Silvio Berlusconi, sought to hold onto power amidst explosive sex scandals and ongoing prosecution for bribery and fraud. He accuses "the left," or "the Communist left" of cooking up all the charges against him.

In Italy, as in Greece and Spain, the right views the left as treacherous, bent on wrecking their own country in order to gain control of it. As we will see, however, the ethnography of Cold War Italy, although touching base with the pan-Mediterranean theme of honor and shame (see, especially, Davis 1970, 1977), did not allow this "gatekeeping concept" to obliterate other themes. I think this is because of the influence of an American anthropologist sympathetic to Marixism, Eric Wolf, who shaped the field with his trenchant critique of an essentialist analysis of Southern Italians' "folkways," or "ethos," put forth by political scientist Edward Banfield, in 1958. In the end, Banfield's "amoral familism" is not all that dissimilar to "honor and shame;" it captures the same agonistic competition for status among roughly equal family groups that Peristiany sought to highlight. But field workers who had studied with Wolf, or were swayed by him, were skeptical from the outset, as discussed below.

The Second Strand: Amoral Familism

In 1963, anthropologists from the University of Michigan, together with colleagues from Seville, Paris and London, met at a conference in Ann Arbor on "The Village and its Setting in the Mediterranean Area." The conveners of this meeting, Eric Wolf and William Schorger, who had conducted fieldwork in the South Tyrol and Morocco, respectively, subsequently obtained a grant from the Ford Foundation, paving the way for several Michigan students to undertake ethnographic fieldwork in Sicily, Spain, and Morocco and to attend (along with students and scholars from the L.S.E., University of Kent, and University of Amsterdam) two Mediterranean Studies workshops in Aix-en-Provence and Canterbury, in 1966 and 1967, respectively (Schorger and Wolf 1969). Among the topics discussed at the conference and workshops was Banfield's (1958) THE MORAL BASIS OF A BACKWARD SOCIETY published five years earlier. Drawing on fieldwork assisted by his Italian-speaking psychologist wife in her community of origin (the small rural town of Montegrano in the Province of Potenza), the book attributed Southern Italian poverty and "backwardness" to a cultural ethos of "amoral familism" according to which people "maximize the short-run advantage of the nuclear family and assume that all others will do likewise." Thus the peasants of Montegrano seemed unable to delay individual gratification for the sake of long-term collective goals, a result of attitudes that had been culturally transmitted over many generations.

Skepticism toward Banfield's thesis, unabashedly biased toward Protestant values, was nurtured by participation in the anti-Vietnam war movement, strongly present on the Michigan campus in the early 1960s, and by Wolf's contributions to the new field of peasant studies (see Wolf 1966). Appreciative of Marxism, and shaped by his personal experience as an Austrian Jew escaping the Holocaust, Wolf resisted determinative culturalist explanations of human behavior. Praising Anthony Wallace's 1961 call to think of culture as "the organization of diversity" rather than "the replication of uniformity," he departed from the "Culture and Personality" orientation of his former teacher, Ruth Benedict, which presumed that whole societies (the Kwakiutl, the Zuni, the Dobu) and even whole nation states (Japan or Russia) could be characterized by discrete clusters of traits reproduced through time as a consequence of child socialization. Wolf also weighed in on the peasant concept in the 1950s, arguing against Redfield's culturalist emphasis on peasants as carriers of folkways, defined as value-saturated, timeless and homogeneous. A book entitled ANTHROPOLOGY (Wolf 1964) explored the history of the lay understanding of culture as something interior, down home, and "ours" as opposed to "civilization," which was outside and cosmopolitan. Here, and in later work, Wolf traced how this notion of culture came to the fore in Europe at a time when some nations were contending for dominance while others were struggling to achieve separate identities and political independence. An ardent opponent of nationalism's excesses, he feared the misuse of a culture concept more attuned to emotion than to reason. Theories of culture such as Banfield's that postulate a supposed inner unity, and continuity from primordial beginnings, are, he believed, close to racism and politically dangerous.

Myths of the Mediterranean, A Sicilian Case

I count Peter Schneider and myself as among the Banfield-bashers, having been sensitized to the "amoral familism" debate before beginning our fieldwork in Sicily in 1965. Since Italian Unification, outside observers had represented Sicily as a timeless island whose inhabitants, although buffeted by foreign tides, clung to their homegrown passions, homegrown habits of crime and corruption, and a homegrown pessimism about change. Many Sicilians rendered the same stereotype, giving it even greater weight. The resulting "myth of Sicily" evoked a more or less racialized past, outside of history, that was argued to account for the existence of Sicily's renowned institution, the Mafia. The myth also furthered the mistaken assumption that Sicilian movements for social and political change (peasants' struggles for land reform or, more recently, the urban movement against the Mafia and political corruption) depend for their coherence on ideologies of modernity imported from outside.

In effect the stereotype depicted Sicilians as unable to solve problems, organized crime among them, because, like the Montegranesi studied by the Banfields, they lacked the cultural capacity to organize themselves to promote the common good. Tapping a very different vein, in the 1980s and 1990s, we followed the impressive collective action of the *antimafia* social movement which, it turns out, had to confront both a cultural milieu conditioned by organized crime, and the equally conditioned political institutions of the regional and national state. Greatly advancing our analysis was the growing historiography clarifying the role the Cold War played in this political corruption, for example: Allied support for mafia-protected landowners at the end of World War II; American support for postwar governments that marginalized the Italian Communist Party, even if this meant that Christian Democrats and later Socialists used mafiosi to "make elections;" the 1970s strategy of virulently anticommunist plotters in "deviated" Masonic lodges to invite selected mafia bosses to join the Freemasons and participate in coups; and (probable) mafia access to weapons stockpiled in support of the NATO "Stay-Behind" project, known in Italy as Gladio (see Ganser 2005; Schneider and Schneider 2003).

Thanks to these developments, summarized by historian Francesco Renda (1987, 1993) as "that wicked deal," the Italian state was unresponsive to the escalation of the Mafia's power over Sicily's modern urban growth, which took off chaotically in the 1960s generating a litany of real estate and construction scandals. More shockingly, the state turned a blind eye as two great factions of mafia *cosche* competed for control of the global traffic in heroin in the 1970s, both assisted, when it came to money-laundering, by "deviated" Masonic bankers. Like the honor and shame trope discussed above, "amoral familism" is a gatekeeping concept that obfuscates understanding such social forces and relations. And yet, the "myth of Sicily" persists, as illustrated by Robert Putnam's MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK; CIVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY, published in 1993, a decade after the first stirrings of *antimafia*.

For Putnam, Sicilians resist change for cultural reasons that are rooted in a "very deep" history. From the 13th century the Island's governments, at once feudal, bureaucratic, and absolutist, did little but attempt to impose "hierarchy" over a potent "latent anarchy" (Putnam 1993: 123-130). As a consequence, Sicilians have continued to "lack" civil consensus, public faith, a "spirit of association," and to be prey to inept and arbitrary justice, factionalism and corruption. Putnam was aware of, but seemed indifferent to, the fact that his assessment is reminiscent of Banfield's text, by then subject to multiple trenchant criticisms, two of which he cites: (political scientist) Sydney Tarrow's of 1967 and (anthropologist) Sydel Silverman's of 1968.

Banfield Back Home

Banfield is remembered by scholars on the left (for example, his student, Francis Fox Piven) as a decent but extraordinarily cranky conservative whose early history as a New Dealer in the Farm Services Administration paved the way for his deeply disillusioned critique of government interventions against poverty. Hardly an urban intellectual elite, he had grown up on a farm in Connecticut, and studied animal husbandry, then literature at a state college in advance of obtaining his political science doctorate from the University of Chicago (see Kertzer 2007). He and his wife lived in agricultural communities in the American West, which is where they encountered 1930s assistance programs that seemed to produce more harm than good, an experience that colored his approach to urban poverty. By 1955, this erstwhile New Deal Democrat had become what was later called a neoconservative, arguing, for example, in a book of that year, POLITICS, PLANNING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, that public housing risked contributing to a rising crime rate. All this baggage went with him to Montegrano.

Upon his return from Italy to the U.S., where he took up teaching positions in political science at Chicago and Harvard (with an interlude at Penn), Banfield became an evermore outspoken opponent of redistributive policy, railing retrospectively against the New Deal and, as it unfolded, the Great Society. His book of 1968, THE UNHEAVENLY CITY, THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF OUR URBAN CRISIS, is a classic in the "culture of poverty" literature, arguing that the class culture of poor black Americans, not the racism to which they were subjected, explained their "low achievement." President Richard Nixon made him head of his presidential task force on model cities, in which role he counseled on the futility of welfare programs. Increasingly a public intellectual, he also participated in neoconservative networks, institutions, and think-tanks.

For what it is worth, in 1963, the American Enterprise Institute published a 65 page essay by Banfield analyzing foreign aid doctrines. The text (revised from an earlier, 1961 article in PUBLIC POLICY) is a lengthy diatribe against both the doctrine of "indirect influence," according to which aid can be expected to democratize the outlook and institutions of the recipient society by raising per capita income, and the doctrine of "direct influence," aimed at fostering pro-American good will among business or political or intellectual elites, and through them with their governments. Neither doctrine held water, he argued, any more than did doctrines unrelated to national security, such as those that rested on concepts of altruism or community in world affairs. To Banfield, the promotion of the welfare of other nations was a novel idea in political thought, and a silly one, too, because "doing good," despite the best intentions of the do-gooders, may well make things worse. Preserving liberal democracy in the West is best accomplished, he argued, not by foreign aid, whatever its justification, but by military action. This, or its credible threat, is the only realistic and efficacious way to hold back the advance of the Soviet Union, and communist domination (Banfield 1963: 28; 31-34).

To dramatize the point, Banfield imagined that even if all the underdeveloped countries were to fall into communist hands, robbing the U.S. of missile sites, military bases, and listening posts near the Soviet border, longrange missile technology would save the day. "So long as our enemies cannot prevent us from exploding a large number of nuclear weapons on their territory, we shall be safe from any attack that might threaten our national existence (as safe, that is, as anything we could do would make us) and if we maintain large conventional forces in Western Europe we can probably prevent an attack there too" (Banfield 1963: 34). Given that America's existence as a nation was not dependent upon giving aid, "possibly we should rely entirely upon military assistance, rather than upon aid, to check Soviet imperialism" (Banfield 1963: 36).

Banfield's pessimism rested on several of his prejudices: that in underdeveloped countries, any gain in the standard of living was likely to be immediately offset by population growth; that aspirations rise faster than incomes, creating frustration and instability when unmet; and that some societies are incapable of development because their culture is an obstacle. Citing the Navajo as a prime example of the latter, he goes on to argue that "underdeveloped countries which are not primitive may (also) lack certain cultural or other prerequisites of development," such as "a small class of persons having talents and incentives that lead them to organize, innovate, and take risks," and a cultural milieu that respects concerted action for the common good. A footnote refers readers to THE MORAL BASIS OF A BACKWARD SOCIETY (Banfield 1958: 9). After all, the people of Montegrano had proved that the redistributive transfer of wealth to those who are culturally ill-suited for "development" promises no rewards. Perversely enough, it is "impossible" to use large amounts of non-military aid with effectiveness (Banfield 1958: 11). In a final reflection on the sorry state of doctrines rationalizing foreign aid, Banfield cites the Marshall Plan as necessary for the reconstruction of war-torn Europe but an unfortunate model for assistance to the underdeveloped world.

I have no idea who read Banfield's foreign policy essay or what influence it may have had. One assumes it resonated with the hawkish conservatives he thanks in the acknowledgements footnote. I am also aware that a group of sociologists and anthropologists in Italy and the U.S. have recently argued for a reappraisal of THE MORAL BASIS OF A BACKWARD SOCIETY. Banfield's descriptions of the everyday values and practices of people in Montegrano were ethnographically valid, if poorly explained. Were they to be recast in terms of Bourdieu's open-ended concept of *habitus* rather than the closed and essentialized notion of ethos, they would constitute an avenue for better analyzing the role of culture in social and political life. More to the point, we could cease sidestepping politically uncomfortable questions surrounding the role of Italian culture in Italian politics and society (Kertzer in Santoro et al. 2007: 708-709). Like it or not, the revisionists further point out, historians of the Italian family have discovered Banfield and found him useful (Viazzo in Santoro et al. 2007). We are reminded of Horden and Purcell redeeming the ethnography of honor and shame.

In conclusion, it remains intriguing to put ourselves back in the early 1960s: in Greece, Peristiany was raising funds for the encounters that would lead to the "honor and shame" volume; neither he nor Pitt-Rivers took an interest in the dark ideological struggles of their respective field sites. In Sicily the Christian Democrats were weaving the *intreccio* that would so empower the Mafia. And in the U.S., Edward Banfield, reassured by his Southern Italian sojourn that some people's cultures are hopeless when it comes to "achieving self-sustaining economic growth or ... governing themselves reasonably well," was proposing that aid to impoverished populations may not "on balance be in the interest of the United States or, indeed, of civilization" (Banfield 1958: 53). A Cold War moment, indeed.

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