



In the Name of
Humanity

THE GOVERNMENT OF THREAT AND CARE

Ilana Feldman & Miriam Ticktin, *editors*

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& MIRIAM TICKTIN,
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INTRODUCTION

Government and Humanity

*Ilana Feldman &
Miriam Ticktin*

WHAT DOES IT MEAN to claim “humanity” as your political constituency? What is it to govern, fight, and care in the name of humanity? These are the questions that this volume grapples with. Surveying the contemporary political scene one finds humanity mobilized in a remarkable array of circumstances. Whether considering the challenge of global environmental destruction, the ethics of scientific research on stem cells, or the identification of genocide and other atrocities, activists on all sides of the issues know that a claim to speak on behalf of humanity stakes out a powerful position. It is one of the few categories that is meaningful across political, religious, and social divides. While people may disagree on the source of its power, almost everyone agrees that humanity should be considered sacred. As a universal subject, the claims of humanity should, it seems, be paramount—and to speak on its behalf should bring discussion to a close, permit action to begin, and enable lives to be saved. And yet, the meaning of humanity is not as clear as its widespread appearance in political and ethical discourse might suggest. The call to humanity often does not have the intended clarifying effects.

There are simply too many understandings of humanity for it to be the final word.

When everyone speaks in the name of humanity, no one can monopolize its meaning. In the debate over stem cell research, for instance, both advocates and opponents speak of saving lives and of protecting the sacredness of humanity. Opponents argue that research on stem cells derived from human embryos violates the sanctity of human life in the name of research; supporters argue that refusing to allow such research condemns humanity to further disease, suffering, and death. This debate remains unsettled, though recent technological advances suggest that the issue may be resolved by the possibility of creating stem cells without humanity. Humanity not only means many different things, its meanings are often contradictory. Environmental conservation efforts can, by displacing people and constricting their livelihoods, clash with the rights claims of local populations, and each can claim to pursue the good of humanity (Veit and Benson 2004; Alley and Meadows 2004). In other words, by identifying certain peoples as the source of environmental degradation, and by understanding environmental degradation as a threat to the future of humanity, conservationists may—in the name of humanity—threaten the basic human rights of local populations to live and to choose their own livelihood.

Similarly, human rights and humanitarian perspectives on how best to protect human life can mandate conflicting courses of action. This conflict is abundantly clear in the debate about what to do about the profoundly tragic—and highly contested—situation in the Darfur region of Sudan. After the outbreak of conflict in 2003, human rights activists called for military intervention to “save Darfur,” to stop what they identify as genocide. Humanitarian workers, in contrast, warned of the catastrophic effects of military action on their ability to deliver relief.¹ They believed that more lives would be lost in the intervention because it would render the presence of humanitarian workers impossible, threatening humanitarian neutrality and aid workers’ lives. All parties to this debate, and many others like it, speak for humanity.

Faced with what sometimes seems a cacophony of competing voices it is tempting to dismiss humanity as an empty signifier—a category that claims universal relevance and to encompass all human beings, but which in fact is so historically, geographically, and politically situated as to have no meaning beyond its particular instantiations. In this volume, however, we take

a different approach. In exploring the importance of universalist claims in making humanity an effective category, we are not principally interested in proving that such claims are in fact particular. While such debunking work is often important, and claims to encompass every person and experience should not be simply accepted at face value, our project here is to explore the effects of the claim-making itself. In so doing, we consider what Anna Tsing (2005: 6) has termed the “sticky engagements” of universal categories. It is through such engagements, through “friction,” Tsing suggests, that “universals become practically effective” even as they “never fulfill their promises of universality” (8). The capacity of humanity to govern so much of the contemporary political and ethical imaginary, and to have such demonstrable and significant effects on people’s lives, is the product of a deployment of universals.

In this collection we bring together essays that consider the configurations of humanity in three different arenas—humanitarianism and human rights, biological technologies, and humans and nature—each of which offers a distinct perspective on this problem. We choose these sites not only to highlight the diversity of spaces and scales at which humanity is articulated but to show that humanity gains its power in the intersection of these different areas. The chapters illuminate the range of governing practices that have been crucial to the production of humanity across a global field. The universalist claims and practices—about justice, about bodily integrity, and about the meaning of the natural world—that fill out the category of humanity are given concrete expression in governmental arrangements that rely on notions of humanity as their foundation.

By looking at the intersections of human rights, environmentalism, and biotechnology we can begin to disentangle the multiplicity of referents in humanity. The domain of human rights and humanitarianism—an area that is marked by an internal tension between rights and needs, between legal forms and ethical practices—offers direct insight into political and legal genealogies of humanity as a universal category that takes the commonalities of human beings as its ground. For practitioners, this “anthropological minimum” (Mehta 1999: 52) serves as the starting point for elaborating the political and social obligations that humans have to each other—the humanitarian connection. Both biological technologies and work on humans and nature elucidate not just human connection but the nature of human beings. Biotech works on the “interior” of humanity—on the bodies of

human beings. These interventions at an often microscopic scale shape human possibility, not first as political beings (though clearly that, too) but as living entities. Environmentalists insist that we recognize the entanglements of humanity—that human life is only possible in and through the broader environment of which it is a part. At the same time, the government of nature—which requires at once the regulation of human behavior and resource management—illuminates how both guarding and effacing apparent boundaries between the human and its outside have been crucial to the formation of this category.

Understanding the category of humanity also requires attention to its complicated relationship with its various cognates. The human, the humane, the humanitarian, and the inhumane are clearly all at play in the elaboration of humanity and they just as clearly lend sometimes contradictory meanings to this category. Thomas Laqueur (1989, 2009) describes the emergence of humanity as “sentiment,” a process he links to a conjoining of the human and the humane. He argues that in the late eighteenth century the human began to be conceived not as a matter of physiological fact but as “the ethical subject—the protagonist—of humanitarian narrative” (2009: 38). Humans, that is, became humane—compassionate, sympathetic, ethical. Humanity is, he suggests, the sensibility that emerges from this development. It was the enlarging circle of moral inclusion, of obligation to treat fellow humans as connected, which made possible the exercise of humanity as ethical sentiment.

In the genealogy that Laqueur traces, humanity as object—a biological fact—is superseded by its elaboration as a category of universal solidarity. We suggest, however, that the continuing life of this category as an object is also crucial to understanding its contemporary operations. As we have already noted, debates about developments in biotechnology are frequently concerned with the fate of humanity as object. Questions about whether it is ethical to intervene in ways that might fundamentally transform the biological conditions of human being exist in the same field of thought that defines humanity as ethics, but the two senses of humanity are distinct in important ways. In both cases, ethics are a matter of crucial importance, but in one case humanity poses ethical questions and in the other it is an ethical answer to problems such as cruelty and the inhumane.

The inhumane is not only a threat *to* humanity, however. Sometimes it is a threat that defines humanity. Humanity is frequently “defined by its

breach” (Teitel 2004), as when cruelty shapes understandings of the humane or when the “essence” of human being is clarified by some people’s subjection to the most degrading and devastating conditions. The inhumane has also been central to the universalist reach of humanity. Part of the reason that human rights, for instance, are so widely seen as globally relevant and important is the horror that violations of these rights evokes in people. To a certain extent, then, humanity is less about a claim to global connection (though it is that also) and more about the identification of universal threats. One of the paradoxes of the centrality of threat to defining humanity is that it is most often other human beings who are identified as the source of this threat. Humanity is linked to sentiments not only of sympathy and compassion but also of fear and insecurity.

GOVERNING THROUGH HUMANITY

How do these competing aspects of humanity find concrete expression? In part through the governing work that operationalizes these ideas to produce order, prosperity, and security. Humanity is not a new concern for governance to be sure. In the contemporary moment it has been especially important to the emergence of new forms of “transnational governmentality” (Gupta and Ferguson 2002) in which nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), corporations, and other international actors are crucial to the government of localities and even states. Rather than focusing on the decline in state power that such governance seems to indicate—a decline that has been clearly overstated—we highlight how it has been made possible precisely by the resurgence of universalist categories such as humanity.²

Inserting humanity into the conversation helps move it beyond the impasse around the state of the state that has characterized some of the literature on globalized governance (Appadurai 2001; Wallerstein 2004; Sassen 1998, 2006; Ong 1999; Hall 1991). Aihwa Ong (2006: 198) has called attention to the ways that NGOs, for instance, become “practitioners of humanity” who identify and make claims on behalf of “different categories of excluded humanity.” It is not just changes in state power that opens the space for NGOs to operate more expansively but also the articulation of their constituency as humanity. Humanity does not replace, but rather sometimes bypasses, other ways of dividing up government (Mitchell 1999; Gupta 1995; Feldman 2008a).³ Nations, states, and borders all continue to

exist and to shape government. And yet, the appeal to humanity—the claim to govern or to intervene on behalf of a universal humanity—permits the growth of governing technologies that operate at a different scale and with different targets.⁴

The emerging global networks of NGOs that operate “without borders” (Redfield 2005; Ticktin 2006a), legal institutions that claim universal jurisdiction (Borneman 2004; Teitel 2005), forms of citizenship that do not appear to match territorial configurations (Ong 2006; Benhabib 2007; Sassen 2006), and varieties of political and security practices that claim humanity as their constituency (Collier, Lakoff, and Rabinow 2004; Masco 2006) are all part of the latest expression of this global category. James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta (2002) suggest that transnational governance constitutes a challenge to the spatial relations and hierarchies on which states depend. Just as important, transnational governance also reconfigures the object of governing work. Not exactly citizen, subject, or even population, it is a resurgent humanity that is the target of these practices. In reinvigorating humanity for the global scene, these new forms of governance are also transforming it.

So what is humanity as an object of governance? It appears as both sentiment and threat—an object of care and a source of anxiety—though the latter often seems more pressing. Claims that humanity is being threatened—whether by environmental catastrophe, moral failure, or political upheaval—provide a justification for the elaboration of new governing techniques. At the same time, humanity is also identified as itself a threat—to nature, to nation, to global peace—which governance must contain. These apparently contradictory understandings of the relation of the threat to the category of humanity coexist and remain in persistent tension. This state of ambiguous yet ever present threat helps maintain the dynamic coproduction of governance and humanity.

HISTORIES OF HUMANITY

Humanity has a long history as a foundational principle for politics and ethics. The question of whether certain sorts of people—slaves, Native Americans—should be considered human and therefore deserving of particular rights and protections was long debated (Aristotle 1998; Sepúlveda 1892; Casas 1972). Humanity, that is, marked a dividing line between those to whom politics and ethics pertained and those to whom they did not. What

distinguishes this older history of humanity from its modern incarnation is precisely the notion of universality. While these earlier modes of distinction have not entirely disappeared—in fact they periodically reappear in discussions about how to deal with “terrorists,” “insurgents,” and other modern “savages”—the discourse of humanity since the Enlightenment proceeds from the assumption that this category has universal valence.

The French Revolution’s Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen is one of the most frequently cited examples of this new belief. The first article of the declaration states the principle: “Men are born and remain free and equal in rights. Social distinctions may be founded only upon the general good.” Distinction, in other words, is a social product rather than a natural condition. Many people have noted, as Hannah Arendt did, that in the Declaration the category of *man* (*human* in our terms) is immediately dissolved into that of *citizen*. Even as humanity is declared a universal status, and a universal basis of rights, its applicability is immediately constrained by the need for other characteristics (national, citizen) to make those rights effective (Arendt 1951; Balibar 2004). Nonetheless, the significance of the claim to universality should not be underestimated. In fact, Arendt suggests that it is precisely universality—specifically the universal organization of humanity into nations—that makes being “merely” human such a vulnerable position. When you are only human and nothing else, then, and only then, can you be expelled from humanity itself.⁵

The philosophical ideal of a universal humanity has been intimately connected to ideologies and practices of governance. Representative government and popular democracy, as declared by the American and French revolutions, both derived from a belief in universal human capacity and were meant to actualize this possibility. This mode of government did away with the privileges of birth in the name of instituting equality between all human beings. It promised—among other equalizing measures—universal suffrage. That the “Rights of Man” proclaimed by the French Revolution were by no means universally applied is often noted to critique this “advance” in human dignity. And it was not only in hindsight that these problems were recognized. Shortly after the issuance of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, Olympe de Gouges answered with a “Declaration of the Rights of Woman and the Female Citizen.” In her point-by-point response to the original declaration, de Gouges both offers women a way into the political body in a manner similar to men—demanding that women be seen as equal before the law, that they have the opportunity to speak in public, and

that they be subject to criminal procedures just as men—and highlights the distinctiveness of what she calls “the sex that is superior in beauty as it is in courage during the suffering of maternity.” This tension in her approach—what has in years since been described as the tension between sameness and difference in feminist thought (Scott 1996, 2001; Weedon 2001; Riley 1988; Ang 2001)—illuminates some of the challenges of responding to exclusions within a universalist frame. Joan Scott calls this the paradox of feminism: exclusion was legitimated by the different biologies of men and women, yet when feminists argued for inclusion in the name of “women” they reproduced the very sexual difference they sought to eliminate.

Just as women responded immediately to their exclusion from the universalism of the French Revolution, slave insurgents in what was the French colony of Saint-Domingue (now Haiti) reacted in the early 1790s by demanding their inclusion in the new National Assembly. Here, colonialism as form of government shaped the production of the category of humanity in different exclusionary and inclusionary ways. Laurent Dubois (2000) argues that the slaves not only demanded inclusion in republican citizenship but in their insurrection and demands for racial equality universalized the idea of rights. Indeed, Dubois suggests that their struggle against exclusion is what produced the political idea of universal rights we inherit today—universality was the product of exclusion. Their ideas “actually outran the political imagination of the metropole” (22), and out of alliances between slave insurgents and republican officials in the Antilles a new colonial order emerged in which universalism took on more concrete meaning, making those in the colonies subject to the same constitution as those in metropolitan France.

We should also remember that although the language of universal humanity provided a way for colonial subjects to make claims for a different political reality, it was also part of colonial logics of governance. The idea of a “civilizing mission,” of colonialism as a humanitarian endeavor, relied on a universal conception of humanity that suggested everyone was in some way part of a shared community. It also relied on a hierarchical understanding of that human community which suggested that European powers and populations had an obligation to assist the colonized in developing their human capacity (Spivak 1988; Colonna 1997; Stoler 1997; Conklin 1997). The idea of humanity was crucial to both the operations of colonial empire and to resistance to that empire, to both the elaboration of nation-states and their apparent decline.

One effect of humanity's universal claim is that, if it is now presumed to encompass every person, then new sorts of work—discourse, technologies—are required to expel people from this category. To be treated as less than fully human—as *homo sacer* as Giorgio Agamben puts it (1998)—people might, for instance, be first denaturalized (Arendt 1951). In the aftermath of the Second World War, which confirmed that people remained willing, even eager, to do the work of expelling people from humanity, new efforts were made to expand the global reach of this universal category. Even as realization of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) remains constrained by the United Nations' commitment to state sovereignty, the UDHR set forth a vision of a global order in which all persons would have access to the same “rights and freedoms . . . without distinction of any kind.” In practice, the application of these universal rights requires making all sorts of distinctions within humanity, as categories of vulnerability are identified and proper subjects of human rights are produced.⁶ Talal Asad (2003: 150) argues that this subject is a specific sort of person—one who possesses bodily integrity, expresses him- or herself freely, and chooses his or her own beliefs. He suggests that as a production—not just a recognition—of similarity, human rights have to be seen as a “mode of converting and regulating people, making them at once freer and more governable” (157).

If the first elaborations of universal humanity required a rethinking of relations among people, humanity is increasingly called on to consider its connections with the wider sentient and nonsentient world. The UDHR outlines universal human “rights,” while more recent documents such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the corresponding Kyoto Protocol describe universal human “responsibilities.” The responsibility for the environment invoked in these treaties suggests that the universalism of the category of humanity both reaches outward beyond its boundaries (though, of course, care of nonhuman nature has clear benefits for human beings) and intersects with other universalist claims.

THE PROBLEM OF HUMANITY

Humanity—its boundaries, its possibilities, and its politics—is widely recognized to be a problem, but how that problem is understood varies considerably. From a humanist perspective, the fundamental question that surrounds humanity is one of justice. The question of justice, in turn, is

frequently understood to require some response to hierarchy and inequality. Karl Marx (1978a, 1978b), for instance, identified the problem of humanity as one of material inequality—he felt there could be no emancipated category of humanity in a system of capitalism, where inequalities are produced by unequal relationships to the means of production. He argued that inequalities grounded in the commodity form keep individuals alienated from each other, from themselves, and, hence, from their very essence, their “species-being” or social nature. Human emancipation, then, requires the abolishment of private property, which will restore the social relations rendered invisible by the commodity form. Marx argued for a collapse of the distinction between civil society and political society, so that human beings are not divided into public (abstract) and private (substantive but egoistic) selves but become a fully materialized, horizontally equal, humanity. Here the production of a real, emancipated humanity involves abolishing private differences, including, ultimately, the nation-state.

If Marx thought the problem of humanity was one of material inequality grounded in capitalist relations of production, postcolonial scholars and activists have further identified the problem as one of the racial exclusions that have accompanied colonialism, what Partha Chatterjee (1993: 18) has called “the rule of colonial difference.” The exclusionary and dehumanizing practices that took place in the name of the colonial civilizing mission are now well known (Elkins 2005; Hochschild 1998; Lazreg 2007; Shepard 2006). To some, the argument against colonialism required exposing the category of humanity itself as exclusionary and racist. As Frantz Fanon writes in *Wretched of the Earth* (1963: 312), “When I search for Man in the technique and the style of Europe, I see only a succession of negations of man, and an avalanche of murders.” While Fanon argued for replacing this restricted colonial humanity with a new and better version, others have rejected humanism altogether and abandoned any hope in the category of humanity. For instance, Louis Althusser (1969) used the term “antihumanism,” by which he and other structural Marxists implied a rejection of the bourgeois individualism that informed humanism. The problem of humanity for him—and, more broadly, for other postcolonial antihumanists—is precisely the imperial attempt to render humanity a universal ethical and political subject, as history shows us that this can result in the monopoly of the category by a few, and the denial of the humanity of others who do not conform. The solution to the problem of humanity in these terms is a proj-

ect to recognize radical alterity, to do away with universality, and to analyze these forms of difference looking at both structures and subjects, and not simply assuming a universal human subject.

So, on the one hand, a Marxist approach might argue for the abolition of the private differences between people in order to forge a coherent humanity; on the other hand, postcolonial scholars and activists argue for the recognition of difference, rather than its extermination, and some have argued for the abolition of the universal political category of humanity altogether, assuming humanism will always be a failed project. Still others call into question the boundaries of many debates about humanity, arguing that the problem of humanity is not simply—or for some even primarily—about relations between people. Jacques Derrida (2008) disrupts the privileging of humanity over animality, not by attributing to animals those capacities they supposedly lack—such as reason, intelligence, language, and sympathy—but by questioning the underlying notion of transcendence that justifies the valuation of human rights above all other concerns. Science and technology studies has been fruitful ground for “posthumanist” inquiries (even as some would reject this label). Donna Haraway (1991, 2007) proposes the cyborg—a hybrid being that transgresses essentialized identities and bounded categories of nature and culture—as a way to decenter the human subject. In her more recent work on companion species, Haraway emphasizes how humanity is constituted through contingency and relatedness. In a similar vein Bruno Latour (1987), Michel Callon (1986), and John Law and John Hassard (1999) offer actor-network theory, which considers humans and nonhumans alike as actants who participate in “networks” that are constantly assembling, falling apart, and reforming. Scholars working in this area reframe the position of the human subject as an integral but not privileged part of a complex web of dependencies between other active organisms, objects, technologies, and landscapes (Strathern 1991; Mol 2003; De Landa 2006; Helmreich 2009; Raffles 2002).

Also seeking to disrupt boundaries, though not necessarily the same ones, are writers who argue in favor of cosmopolitanism as a response to the problems of humanity. The cosmopolitan project recognizes that there are many ways to deal with difference: one can be universalist or relativist; one can divide people up into units based on ethnicity, nationalism, or multiculturalism. Cosmopolitanism tries to make sense of these other understandings of the problem of humanity, bringing them together in a

world in which the nation-state is no longer the primary political unit. Authors reinventing theories of cosmopolitanism (Cheah and Robbins 1998; Breckenridge et al. 2002; Beck and Sznaider 2006) do so precisely because they are responding to the blurring of the global and local, the national and the international, in the contemporary world. Ulrich Beck and Natan Sznaider (2006) identify an increasing set of interdependencies and potential crises associated with them: economic, moral, ecological, and the risk of terrorism. While looking to Immanuel Kant's philosophical notion of "world citizenship," the literature on cosmopolitanism nevertheless responds to the earlier critiques of universalism and humanism by arguing that many global public spheres may exist. There can be many cosmopolitanisms, many universalisms, which could transform risk into possibility and make of our increasing interdependencies new forms of political cooperation. Furthermore, cosmopolitanism need not be the abstract idea that Kant proposed; it is actually being filled out increasingly by habits of thought and feeling. Cosmopolitanism is attentive to threat but optimistic about the possibility of transforming humanity to respond to that threat.

From another perspective, the problem of humanity is neither that it is exclusionary nor that it is incompletely realized but rather that it has successfully become a means of organizing global community. Carl Schmitt, whose ideas have recently been taken up by some on the political Left even though Schmitt supported Nazism in the early 1930s, articulated this view of humanity as fundamental threat particularly clearly. He argued that the replacement of a European law or order (*nomos*) by an international order whose subject was humanity actually leads not to world politics but to a world policing power (Schmitt 1996). Rather than have an order which identifies friends and enemies ("just enemies"), the new international order leads to situations where justice and morality are defined a priori as being on one side of a conflict (the side of humanity), with injustice and immorality on the other (Koskeniemi 2002). Politics is replaced by moralism, which, perhaps paradoxically, removes all limits from international violence. Wars fought in the name of humanity actually "usurp a universal concept against its military opponent" (Schmitt 2007: 54; cf. Koskeniemi 2002: 433), using humanity as a tool for imperial expansion. With humanity identified as the only just cause for war, enemies are denied the quality of being human. Indeed, to be an enemy is to be an outlaw of humanity. It is the claim to fight "in the name of humanity," Schmitt argued, that permits the most extreme acts of inhumanity in war.

Even as the political meaning and effect of humanity is evaluated quite differently in these various literatures, all concur that it is a category with import—whether as a “solution” or a “problem.” The chapters in this volume make clear that humanity not only is perceived as a problem by scholars but is central to debates among actors in each of the fields considered here. Humanitarian workers, environmental activists, doctors, and engineers each grapple with how to understand humanity, what obligations identification of this category may entail, and where the limits of its reach may be. The chapters in the volume let us see these debates in action.

The chapters describe the ways that humanity has been filled out as a category, and how government is intimately involved in this operation. The authors suggest that, rather than being always “too weak a force in itself to generate sufficient solidarity” (Robbins 1998: 4), humanity is sometimes too strong to permit other ways of imagining connection to proliferate. As an object of government, humanity does make new forms of global connection possible, but these connections can be debilitating as well as liberating, threatening as well as a source of protection. Sites explored in the chapters show how, in the name of global peace and security, certain people and political positions are identified as threats to humanity. Although in this introduction we identify the chapters by their thematic areas, this is only one way of seeing their connections. The different order of presentation in the volume is meant to open up other readings as well.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIANISM

Human rights and humanitarianism are areas of practice, law, and discourse that have obvious fundamental connections to ideas about humanity. They have equally significant, though often vexed, relationships with governance. On the one hand, practitioners of each purport to function as outside actors to protect the human from the effects of an absence of proper government or an excess of improper government (Redfield 2005, 2006; Ticktin 2005, 2006b). On the other, each practice is entirely dependent on broader governing structures—whether sovereign states, international laws, or global discourses—to do its work (Feldman 2007a, 2007b). Furthermore, humanitarian organizations often find themselves in the position of governing—managing, servicing—the populations they seek to aid (Feldman 2008b; Malkki 2007; Hyndman 2000; Pandolfi 2003, 2008). Even as practitioners express considerable discomfort in this position, human rights and

humanitarianism have been crucially important forms of action in helping to constitute humanity as a “real” category of central importance to governance (Wilson 1997; Asad 2003; Nussbaum 2004).

Part of the tension around whether human rights and humanitarian actors should accept or refuse involvement in governing practices is connected to the particular ways these fields engage humanity as a category. While in some sense they address each of its guises, both have especially close connection to ideas about humanity as ethical sentiment, a category of universal solidarity (Malkki 1996). While this compassionate engagement may seem sullied by connection to governing work, it is in fact entirely embedded in such practices (Agamben 1998; Ticktin 2005, 2006a, 2006b). The chapters in this book that explore humanitarian and human-rights action highlight the dilemmas and even contradictions inherent in this form of interaction with, and production of, humanity. If Laqueur calls our attention to the positive sentiments that push people to consider themselves part of a global human community, Richard Wilson’s work on the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda reminds us that humanity is just as centrally a negatively defined category. His chapter, “When Humanity Sits in Judgment,” highlights that this category is produced not only by a sentiment of caring but also by one of revulsion at cruelty. The legal apparatus that has developed to respond to genocide and other crimes against humanity, while certainly presuming a universal concern with the suffering of others, compels its participants and audience to engage most directly with the sentiment of universal disgust. Here, humanity is produced as a community in solidarity in part by excluding those it understands as its constituent outside.

Liisa Malkki’s investigation of the place of children—with their presumed innocence and peacefulness—in figurations of universal humanity might seem at first glance to be at considerable remove from the cruelty of mass murder. We suggest, to the contrary, that this appeal to positive sentiment has to be understood as part of the same discursive universe as occupied by the ICTR. In “Children, Humanity, and the Infantilization of Peace,” Malkki suggests that it is in part the focus on the innocence of children as both representations of human goodness and symbols of movements for peace that makes encounters with phenomena such as child soldiers such a shock. As she argues, “the trouble with child soldiers is that they cannot be set apart, made sacred. . . . They are profane, a category mistake that disturbs the poetics of ‘our common humanity.’” As embodied in images

of the child—images that circulate widely in our current mediascape—the sentiment of humanity seems oddly superficial, dependent on decontextualized, uncomplicated notions of human connection. The danger in this superficial humanity, one dependent on children as “generic human moral subjects,” is that without the robustness of located, if imperfect, human subjects, our connections remain tenuous. When only the absolutely innocent elicit care, giving, and empathy—and Malkki shows that such figures are exceptional—our solidarity and ability to create lasting peace remains dependent on a mirage and thus easily thwarted.

Even as humanitarian action is mobilized by sentiments of human connection, it invariably also reproduces hierarchies among human beings. Didier Fassin’s chapter, “Inequality of Lives, Hierarchies of Humanity,” highlights this paradox at the heart of humanity’s sentiment by considering such dilemmas as the decision of Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) to stay in Iraq at the start of the 2003 war and its subsequent choice to leave after three of the six staff members were abducted. As Fassin notes, “not a single Iraqi life had been saved, but six lives of humanitarian agents had been put at risk.” Compassion immediately encounters its limits in the hierarchies of lives within the humanitarian terrain. However troubling to humanitarian actors, there is no way for them to refuse this distinction. As Fassin shows, both an “ideal of universality” and a “practice of difference” lie at the heart of humanitarianism. This dual nature of humanitarianism is produced at the intersection between sentiment and material inequality. Fassin shows the intense emotion of MSF’s discussions of what to do in Iraq; the humanitarians had to decide whose lives to sacrifice—MSF workers? Iraqis?—and why. Unfortunately, this sentiment could not change the fact that Iraqis had no part in this decision. We see that human solidarity can only be fully realized when accompanied by material equality. Such a tension is also fundamental to human rights practice, as Wilson’s exploration of the ICTR confirms. The prosecution of genocide—the gravest crime against humanity—relies on conceptions of both universal humanity and universal jurisdiction. Yet, as Wilson notes, the “collective political actor (‘humanity’) . . . cannot be easily found.” In fact, in order to defend humanity the tribunal moved quickly—and uncomfortably—into the terrain of defining particularities such as race and ethnicity. The sentiment that underpins the subject and practice of human rights and humanitarianism is both variegated—including both attachment and revulsion, ethical connection and

refusal—and hierarchical—unable to avoid incorporating particularities with political import into its universalist worldview.

BIOLOGICAL TECHNOLOGIES AND HUMAN BEINGS

Humanity is produced through not only political and ethical but also technological discourses. Technosciences, with their new sites of investigation of human being, transform the scale on which humanity is produced and regulated. Biological technologies, and the interventions they make possible in and on the human body, produce ethical dilemmas that seem to have a unique capacity to occupy the public imagination, as well as to invite governmental legislation. While humanitarian crises invoke pity (but often little analysis of their political and economic causes), biological technologies frequently incite moralizing and heated debate about their consequences (the Terry Shiavo case, which culminated in 2005, provides a clear reminder of the place bodily interventions occupy in U.S. concerns). In this volume we explore why, and how, these sorts of technologies are so provocative—what notions of human being appear to be at risk when bodies are worked on in these ways? In what ways do these technologies distinguish among human kinds? Alternately, what possibilities for human life and capacity are imagined and invoked by people who champion such interventions?

That biological technologies—including genomics, organ transplantation, cloning, and pharmacology—have tremendous implications for what it means to be human is evident (Dumit 2004; Franklin and Lock 2003). The science of genetics, for instance, creates new knowledge about connections among people and therefore produces previously unimaginable entanglements (Callon and Rabearisoa 2004). What the political, social, and ethical effects of such technologies will be is much less clear. Some scholars find great hope in the ability to manipulate our biology, allowing us to define our own destinies, and they argue against reducing new biomedical and biological technologies to the eugenics projects of the early twentieth century (Rose 2006; Rose and Novas 2005; Rabinow 2002). Others are more skeptical and relate people's increasing tendency to define themselves in biological terms to a broader trend of understanding social and political conditions in medicalized terms, as pathologies that can be "cured" with the right pills (Cohen 2002; Scheper-Hughes and Wacquant 2002; Kleinman and Kleinman 1996). Scholars and ethicists have examined

the processes whereby medications and medical diagnoses come to treat the conditions of everyday existence, often critiquing the role of the pharmaceutical nexus—including big pharma, the state, NGOs, and so on—in dictating, and even creating, categories of illness and health (Healy 2004; Petryna, Lakoff, and Kleinman 2006).

Both hope and skepticism about biological technologies are shaped by concerns about humanity as a biological object. In particular, the first position of hope exemplifies a particular faith in the perfectibility of not only ethical and social capacity but human biology itself. In this view, technological advancement and human improvement are intricately linked. Underlying the second position of skepticism is a wariness that as humanity is increasingly conceived of as a manipulable biological object, individual, social, and political differences will be rendered invisible. S. Lochlann Jain's chapter, "The Mortality Effect," examines the slippery way hope underpins medical versions of humanity in randomized control trials. Taking research on late-stage cancer as a limit case, Jain relates how clinical trials, both as a critical node of last-ditch hope for cancer patients and a hegemonic practice for protocol-driven oncology treatments, understand humanity as an object of scientific research whose parts can be measured and compared. By examining how the randomized control trial structures subject positions for both mortal cancer patients and immortal scientists, Jain analyzes how the everyday injuries of cancer treatments can be erased through cost-benefit analyses of terminal illness and the relentless future orientation of scientific trials. Her chapter suggests that the constructions of both disease categories and the cancer subject through experimental treatments assume the dying subject as a separate category of human, one in which different, often unquestioned, assumptions about ethical standards of injury apply.

In her contribution, "The Politics of Experimentality," Adriana Petryna similarly takes up the issue of humanity as object of scientific research, but she does so from the perspective of a new flexible, transnational regime of human subjects research. This form of governance, which Petryna calls "experimentality," also presumes humanity to be a biological object, one which allows all humans to potentially be both subjects for and beneficiaries of research. Petryna demonstrates how human subjects are created differently under different conditions, despite the underlying biological similarity; certain conditions tamper with humans as pure biological objects—such as the ingestion of too much medication, which renders them "treatment

saturated.” The best human subjects are in fact undertreated, an idea which assumes that humanity as a particular object can be isolated out and protected. In this regime of governance, public health, and commercial interest, the ideal object of research—the human—can be “biologically edited” to include only those who are pure.

As a governing regime, experimentality not only regulates intervention into humanity as object, it helps define which persons “count” as subjects for this object. As Petryna explains, even though many people agree to be research subjects, “humans . . . are in short supply.” Experimentality defines for itself who counts as human. On the one hand, she argues that the variable regulations and ethics of this new regime of experimentality have the capacity to deny or allocate human rights and dignity, giving or denying people protection against certain types of experimentation such as the kind exemplified by the Tuskegee syphilis study that ran in the United States from 1932 to 1972. On the other hand, she shows that it is not always clear whether being treated as an object of research gives one more or less dignity. This is particularly true in contexts where people do not have access to regular health care or live in situations of crisis; here, her chapter joins Jain’s in questioning what it means to be a human with dignity. Petryna leaves open the question of whether to be treated with dignity might indeed mean to be treated as a human subject—or in this case, a member of humanity understood at base as biologically objective. Under certain conditions, this can allow for a form of visibility and inclusion that other understandings of humanity—such as those based on sentiment—have precluded.

João Biehl’s chapter, “Medication is me now,” also stresses the role of government in determining how humanity is constituted as object. He foregrounds the question of when inclusion depends on more than biology—and he suggests in the case of Brazil’s AIDS policies, inclusion is dependent on a very particular *will* to live. AIDS policies give universal access to medication and are built on the notion that medication makes people equivalent—it can fix biological differences caused by illness, allowing for equality. Yet human beings, even as biologically equivalent, only access that equivalence—only become “human”—through particular forms of government and under certain conditions. In the regime of pharmaceutical governance that is exemplified by Brazil’s new AIDS policy, access to medication to attain equivalence is unequal, despite the policy of universality; what is missing is the equivalence in basic conditions of life that allow for treatment. Not surprisingly, then, homeless patients remain outside the sys-

tem, outside the object of humanity. As Biehl states, “the dominant human form” that emerges from this particular economy of life emphasizes individual responsibility and downplays mutual empathy. Those who do not conform are excluded from the biological grounds of equivalence because they are seen as lacking a “will to live.” Turning Arendt’s argument upside down, Biehl shows how exclusions internal to the category of citizens can work to expel people from humanity without expelling them from formal citizenship.

While these chapters highlight ethical gaps that seem intrinsic to approaching humanity as biological object, they also make clear that this approach cannot be easily rejected—since doing so would indeed require refusing potentially life-saving scientific advances in the treatment of disease. Just as sentiment can both produce solidarities and underscore forms of exclusion, so too can approaching humanity as an object be both enabling and disabling.

HUMANS AND NATURE

As we have already seen, the unhuman—as inhumanity, animality, materiality, technology—is in fact foundational for the constitution and elaboration of the category of humanity itself. It is not simply that the unhuman serves as an “other” against which humanity can be defined, a rejected possibility that permits the articulation of better politics, purer morals, more genuine connection (though it is sometimes surely that). Rather, the unhuman also provides the constitutive ground on which humanity is enacted. The unhuman is connected not only to the ethical or social aspects of humanity but also to the biological facts of human being. As the astronomer Carl Sagan famously put it, human beings are made of “star stuff.” The production of the human is always also about production of the social and natural environments in which people live (Tsing 2005; Latour 2004; Kohn 2007; Raffles 2002; Kosek 2006; Moore, Kosek, and Pandian 2006). This is true even in places where the aggressiveness of the built environment can appear to have rendered the natural environment entirely without agency and in circumstances where political practice works to actively obscure this connection (Coronil 1997; Sen 1981; Davis 2001). Whether global, national, or local, the relationship between humans and nature is always mediated by practices of government (Hayden 2003; Subramaniam 2001). Even forms of practice that approach the human as a radically distinctive sort of

being, that insist on a unique human capacity to act, are inevitably forced to confront (even if not head on) the inseparability of human life from other parts of nature. This relationship between humans and nature—or, perhaps better said, the rest of nature—provides an especially clear window onto the multiplicity of sometimes contradictory ways the human and unhuman are co-constitutive and the ways this constitution frequently occurs on the site and in the language of threat (Mitchell 2002).

In his chapter, “Environment, Community, Government,” Arun Agrawal elucidates the ways that transformations in environmental governance produce concomitant transformations in subjectivity and community. In the context of Kumaon, India, colonial control of forests—the regulation of their use to meet the demands of empire—produced a particular sort of threat to the environment, as villagers set the forests on fire as part of their protest against colonialism. Against this backdrop of central control and spectacular resistance, Agrawal traces the more recent emergence of decentralized environmental practices that work through the “governmentalization of localities” and the production of “regulatory communities.” In this practice everyone is supposed to have a say and everyone is held equally responsible for taking care of the forest. Community-based conservation appears to have successfully reconfigured people’s relationships to the forest, and Agrawal finds evidence of considerable local concern about environmental protection. In much of the public debate about the state of the environment and the threat of global warming, humans and nature are presented as opposing categories: humans identified as an unequivocal danger to nature or the protection of nature as a threat to human economic security. Agrawal argues that in environmental governance, and indeed in any government of the nonhuman, “the capacities to be shaped are imagined as uniquely human.” As he suggests, “the category of the human . . . allows the project of government to unfold.”

Agrawal notes that different human beings may be quite differently located in the grid of environmental governance. Rebecca Hardin’s contribution, “Narrative, Humanity, and Patrimony in an Equatorial African Forest,” highlights such distinctions and their political effects with particular clarity. Hardin uses a novel by Etienne Goyemidé—both the “national writer of the CAR [Central African Republic]” and a civil servant in its government—as a way to explore how the humanity of different groups of people in the CAR, particularly Pygmies, is qualified in part by their perceived relationship to the environment. Being seen as close to, even part

of, nature, is a double-edged sword for Pygmies—who were only relatively recently recognized as citizens. The novel, *Le silence de la forêt* (*The Silence of the Forest*), in many ways valorizes Pygmies as unsullied by the corruption of “civilization” and seeks to recognize as “human [those] whom others call an animal.” The effort here is not to undo the distinction between Pygmies and “civilized” people but to invert the values that are typically attached to those categories. In the governing realm which Goyemidé also occupied, no such inversion appears. Pygmies are seen not as close to the forest but as part of it—“grouped with ‘wildlife and plant species’ rather than with ‘various shareholder groups.’” Not only does this association make Pygmies appear less than fully human, and therefore requiring less in the way of government services, it also makes them appear as potentially a threat to national identity, leading one civil servant to argue that “we must put to work all we can to block the segregationist whims of the Pygmy and lead him to blend, despite himself, in the mold of the great Central African nation.” The evaluation of certain humans as closer to, or even part of, nature has significant political impact.

Hardin further demonstrates that there are many models of relationships of humans to the natural world; nature as threat can suddenly be transformed into the threat of humanity to humans, and to nature. While Pygmies may threaten national identity by their close relationship to nature, in the novel, Gonaba, the corrupt African school inspector, ends up leaving behind his “brute-like alienation” when he changes places with the Pygmy, Manga, and goes to live in the forest. Here modernity is seen as a threat to the nature of humanity, which only the natural world itself can remedy. In this view, Pygmies come almost to be a privileged category of persons—as their embeddness in the natural world comes to be seen as a means of undercutting human alienation from nature. This ambiguity between humanity as threat to nature and threatened by nature is further revealed by Hardin’s friend Adolph, who is imprisoned for hunting and shooting an elephant. Nature-based strategies of subsistence and status by people like Adolph are outlawed, now reconfigured as a threat to nature and to an international *patrimoine*; yet ultimately it is unclear whether the threat Adolph poses is to nature or to elites who want to corner the market for wildlife products.

The ambiguity of threat and the uncertain boundary between humans and animals is further explored in Allen Feldman’s chapter, “Inhumanitas.” Feldman tracks the appearance of animals and animal-like figures in

“dehumanizing” contexts, such as those produced by war and other forms of violence. In so doing he challenges the very idea that what is at work here is a process of dehumanization—the taking away of human capacity or identification. Rather, the repeated appearance of animals in these contexts—as figurative descriptions for people, as objects used to threaten enemies, and as artifacts of political violence—reveals that some people and populations “could make few or no claims whatsoever to political humanity.” He thus uses the term *inhumanization* to describe the “ideological projections of humanity’s negations.” An inquiry into the formation and governance of humanity cannot, Feldman underscores, concern itself only with human beings.

In his chapter, “Stealth Nature,” Charles Zerner takes us to the frontier of the government of nature and illuminates the new sorts of threats and possibility that are being produced on this terrain. Exploring such phenomena as the work of the Defense Advanced Research Program Agency on developing “cybugs”—“roboscorpions” for the battlefield, bionic hornets for counterinsurgency, surveillance dragonflies for political events—Zerner shows the dream and the possibility of “instructed” nature being made a weapon against perceived threats. Such weaponization of nature is, of course, not entirely new. Nuclear weapons are a spectacular form of this phenomenon. These more recent ventures are smaller, harder to detect—“stealth,” as Zerner puts it. With these developments, nature comes to be perceived as a new sort of threat—not, as in older visions, because its unpredictable power escapes human control but precisely because it is understood as controllable to invidious, even hideous, ends. We must not forget that these forms of weaponized nature are created to counter the threat of humans. It is not clear which threat is worse. The surveillance dragonflies just mentioned, for instance, were reported by participants at rallies against the U.S. war in Iraq, but whether any such thing was really observing these events is an unknown. What is certain is that the fear is real.

Threat seems to be everywhere. But threat may not be the end of the story. Zerner also offers us a window onto the ways activists and artists are working with the same cyborg possibilities to act against these weapon plans and to imagine yet another—but certainly not a pristine or primordial—relationship of humans and nature. He looks at the work of the artist-engineer Natalie Jeremijenko with children living in areas known—but not sensed—to be replete with toxins, places like the Bronx and the U.S. south-

west. Jeremijenko and her collaborators set robotic toxin-sniffing dog packs loose to identify toxic chemical signatures. The children thus become not simply victims of environmental toxicity and political and economic inequality but “environmental investigators.” Through nonhuman creatures Jeremijenko engineers new social interactions, and new arrangements of humanity.

THE POLITICS OF HUMANITY

The idea of threat appears central to the contemporary problem of humanity. Yet, despite the ubiquity of this language, the nature of the threat and its effect on humanity remains ambiguous. Arjun Appadurai (2006: 104) has argued that there is an increasing confusion of boundaries, suggesting that “today, the insecurities of states and the uncertainties of civilian spaces and persons have become disturbingly intertwined, and terror, terrorism, and terrorists are where we can best see this new blurring.” The concerns that seem to dominate public discussion now—terrorism, torture, and the threat of global war or environmental destruction—at once rely on and seem to undermine a clear notion of what humanity is. How, for instance, do practices of either torture or terrorism—modes of action that have been closely linked in recent years—support a concept of a globally shared humanity? On the one hand, they seem to make a mockery of the idea of a morally inclusive humanity, showing only scorn for human life and bodily integrity. On the other hand, they seem entirely dependent on such a conception of humanity. Terrorism would not have its power to shock without the audience’s conviction both that human life is sacred and that all human beings are in some way connected. Torture techniques rely on an understanding of the threshold of the human capacity to withstand pain—a technical rather than affective approach to humanity, but one no less entangled in universalist understandings. Here humanity as threat and humanity as a category of solidarity blend into one.⁷

This blending of apparently distinct, even opposing, categories is a common characteristic of the contemporary landscape of humanity. As Fassin explores in his chapter, humanitarian action and political insurgency have intersected in the spaces of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Faisal Devji (2008) claims that this sort of connection is more than incidental—that Islamic militants, like humanitarians and environmentalists, speak in the name of a

global humanity. He argues that groups like al-Qaeda first identify Muslims as universal victims—suffering as humans, rather than as specific religious subjects—and then seek to transform that victimhood into agency—again as agents of humanity, not simply of a Muslim community.⁸ Such anchoring discourses of global humanity are—as Wilson, Malkki, Agrawal, and Hardin show—caught in a conundrum of sorting human kinds without seeking to attach ontological significance to these distinctions. Allen Feldman confirms the importance of exploring this kind-making beyond the confines of human beings. Boundary confusion persists not only around the category of the human, but in its effects. As Petryna, Jain, and Biehl show for experimentation, treatment, and policy, violence to human subjects is deeply intertwined with global efforts to save humanity from disease. At the same time, Zerner’s consideration of Jeremijenko’s work offers a glimpse at the efforts of activists, artists, and others to turn governing technologies on their head and reconfigure the effective meaning of humanity.

This sort of multiplicity seems crucial to the ways that threat intersects with humanity. There are two key—and contrasting—analyses of this relation. In the first, political, economic, and ecological threats are seen as increasingly impinging on human possibility, and a new cosmopolitanism is offered as a possible response (Beck and Sznaider 2006). In the second, humanity itself appears as a threat to political order. This understanding is most closely associated with Carl Schmitt, who argued that making humanity the universal subject, and specifically making the cause of humanity the only just cause for war, not only replaced politics with moralizing, but rendered any enemy an “outlaw of humanity” and therefore permitted the most extreme inhumanity in warfare. These two understandings of threat appear to dominate the contemporary political scene, but these models do not—and to our mind cannot—exhaust the possible ways of understanding and responding to insecurity and fear. To uncover the other possibilities people are conceptualizing and enacting, we need to continue to explore the trajectories of humanity across the political and social field.⁹

In contemporary politics, threat and possibility are intrinsically linked. If the early articulations of a universal humanity imagined this category as a means of progressing beyond barbarism and cruelty to offer protection and possibility to an expanding array of persons, the long history of struggling against the exclusions produced in its articulations showed that such progress should not be assumed to follow automatically from a uni-

versalist claim. Indeed, the intersection of diverse universalist claims and projects—intersections that we have argued are central to the production of humanity—ensures that its meaning, boundaries, and effects are always multifaceted and sometimes contradictory. Humanity is a difficult—sometimes dangerous—category. Its promise of universal connection is also its peril of imperial expansion. Its capacity to evoke compassion for others is matched by its tendency to identify these others as threats. We may not be able to do without it—both because there does not seem to be any way to make it go away and because it seems to provide a necessary mechanism for imagining a global condition—but we have to remain uneasy with its deployment. Understanding the effects of humanity in shaping political, ethical, and economic formations is vital to any effort at political and social change. The intersection of government and humanity provides a crucial diagnostic for our time.

NOTES

- 1 For differing views on how to make sense of and respond to the situation in Darfur, see Weissman and Myers 2007; Mamdani 2009, 2007; De Waal 2004; and the Web site of the Save Darfur coalition, www.savedarfur.org.
- 2 While he did not consider the global operations of governmentality, Michel Foucault (1991) argued for analytic attention to the object of government intervention (for him, “population”) and the details of its practice, rather than primarily to its institutional forms. In other words, to understand government, we must understand what is governed (populations or humanity), not simply what is governing (the state, or transnational organizations).
- 3 Neoliberal modes of governance are both transforming practices within states (Rose 1999; Ong 2006; Biehl 2007) and reshaping the landscape of transnational governance. In the process, the universalist qualities of humanity once again become central to political discourse.
- 4 Current conditions of globalization are clearly not the first time that reference to humanity has been important in expanding governmental reach. The history of colonialism is replete with claims to act for the betterment of humanity (Spivak 1988).
- 5 As Arendt (1951: 297) puts it: “Only with a completely organized humanity could the loss of home and political status become identical with expulsion from humanity altogether.”
- 6 The paradox of humanity—that it both seeks to include all and yet is plagued by persistent limits on full incorporation into the category—is directly connected to the sort of individual at the heart of universal humanity. This individual is at once too general and too specific to resolve this tension. Uday Mehta (1999: 52) argues, for instance, that the

basis of liberalism's universalism is an "anthropological minimum"—a set of characteristics deemed common to all people. These characteristics—freedom, rationality, and equality—are presumed to be independent of historical, social, economic, or any other features that would specify people. Mehta argues that although the anthropological minimum makes liberal universalism possible, it also ensures that liberalism will always entail exclusions, as it is in fact precisely those characteristics that fall outside of the minimum that are required for inclusion in political community. See Partridge 2009 for more on the concept of exclusionary incorporation.

- 7 While such phenomenon may appear new, a return to Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* (1963) reminds us that the struggle against colonialism frequently entailed a similar dynamic. Decolonization was, he suggested, always a violent process that involved "the replacing of a certain 'species' of men by another 'species' of men" (35). If colonialism created "the native"—a category of persons excluded from full humanity—decolonization produces "a new language and a new humanity. [It] is the veritable creation of new men" (36). This re-creation of humanity, he argues, cannot occur without acts that appear, and indeed are, inhumane. In Algeria, where Fanon worked as a psychiatrist treating people on both sides of the anticolonial struggle, he describes the devastating effects of fighting this struggle on all participants. Through a series of case studies, he suggests that the rejection of the dehumanization of colonialism, and the formation of a new humanity, requires its own processes of inhumanity.
- 8 For a related consideration of suicide bombing, see Asad 2007.
- 9 These two aspects of threat vis-à-vis humanity underscore that threat is the other side of a discourse of protection. In contrast to Schmitt, Foucault's (1980) account of the trajectory of modern government shows how connected threat and protection are. He argues that the central shift in modern political power from the power to decide life and death (in part expressed through the sovereign's right to kill) to the power to foster life or disallow it (crucially seen in the biopolitics of population) was accompanied both by new protections—"the power to guarantee an individual's continued existence" (137)—and new threats of utter destruction such as genocide and nuclear annihilation—"the power to expose a whole population to death" (ibid.). Schmitt sees humanitarian war as a war of annihilation because in its terms the enemy can only be defined as inhuman, and he thus focuses on what can now be done to those defined as enemies. For Foucault this level of atrocity (and for him nuclear annihilation is the prime example) is enabled by the fact that wars are "waged on behalf of the existence of everyone" (ibid.). He therefore highlights as well the ways that governments put their own populations at risk in these struggles. For Foucault, the two effects of the exercising of power at "the level of life"—threat and protection—do not just exist in the same terrain, they require each other. If government was not concerned with the fostering of life, the protection of people's continued existence, it would not be capable of exposing the population to threat to such an extent.