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Julie Peteet, Camps and Enclaves: Palestine in the Time of Closure, 29 J. REFUGEE Stud. 208 (2016).

ALWD 6th ed.

Peteet, J. ., Camps and enclaves: Palestine in the time of closure, 29(2) J. Refugee Stud. 208 (2016).

APA 7th ed.

Peteet, J. (2016). Camps and enclaves: Palestine in the time of closure. Journal of Refugee Studies, 29(2), 208-228.

Chicago 17th ed.

Julie Peteet, "Camps and Enclaves: Palestine in the Time of Closure," Journal of Refugee Studies 29, no. 2 (June 2016): 208-228

McGill Guide 9th ed.

Julie Peteet, "Camps and Enclaves: Palestine in the Time of Closure" (2016) 29:2 J Refugee Stud 208.

AGLC 4th ed.

Julie Peteet, 'Camps and Enclaves: Palestine in the Time of Closure' (2016) 29(2) Journal of Refugee Studies 208.

MLA 8th ed.

Peteet, Julie. "Camps and Enclaves: Palestine in the Time of Closure." Journal of Refugee Studies, vol. 29, no. 2, June 2016, p. 208-228. HeinOnline.

OSCOLA 4th ed.

Julie Peteet, 'Camps and Enclaves: Palestine in the Time of Closure' (2016) 29 J Refugee Stud 208

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Camps and Enclaves: Palestine in the Time of Closure

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MS received March 2015; revised MS received July 2015

Refugee camps and enclaves share a conceptual family resemblance. In Palestine, what endows these forms of confinement with specificity is their deployment in a modern and protracted colonial context. This article asks how each speaks to the other experientially and theoretically. Further, how are they entangled with historical processes, intent and experience? Each period in Palestinian displacement entails particular immobilizing physical structures and administrative procedures. Can we compare enclaves and camps, and what are the limitations of comparison? What sorts of subjectivities emerge in these spaces? Questions are proposed about temporality, bare life, mobility, discipline and bio-power, and subjectivities. Enclaves compel thinking beyond the 'bare life' sometimes associated with refugee camps to explore other ways of being simultaneously inside and outside a state. Enclaves exist if a grey zone of legal and political indeterminacy that renders life in them is precarious.

Keywords: enclaves, camps, Palestine, closure

Introduction

Maysun and Sahar, 20-year-old girls from the northern West Bank town of Jenin, travelled south by bus to Ramallah to attend a conference on youth and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). They left Jenin at 3:00 a.m. for what should have been a one- to one-and-a-half-hour drive (65 kilometres). When I asked whether they left in the middle of the night because of anticipated waits at the ubiquitous Israeli checkpoints that dot the landscape, they responded exuberantly and almost in unison:

Yes, it is now a long trip, but we also left so early because we want to enjoy every minute we are out of Jenin. We want to re-refresh ourselves by seeing other people and places. We want to breathe!

The Israeli closure of the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip (OPT) severely obstructs Palestinian mobility and has engendered a concentrated and

confined population that feels itself literally unable to breathe. Palestinians often refer to their recently enclaved towns and villages, and Gaza as 'open-air prisons' or 'one-big refugee camp'. Or, as a Palestinian farmer exclaimed: 'We are like a bird in a nest and they are destroying the tree!' Such freighted terms allude to immobility, confinement, suffocation, impending disaster and a threatened relationship to home.

Enclaves and the bureaucratic regimes that structure them signal a new means of containing those excluded from the settler-colonial socio-political order. Their inhabitants are neither refugees nor internally displaced persons (IDPs) and thus highlight the limitations of current concepts. These grey zones, the result of a protracted and multi-pronged strategy of displacement and occupation, call for a reappraisal of extant conceptual categories.

Wedged between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, over the past century, Palestine has been dismembered and reconstituted politically, demographically and discursively. Mass displacement, and more recently closure in the OPT, have acted in concert to contain and dislodge the indigenous Arab population. A colonial geography constitutes a point of departure for understanding the crystallization of enclaves. Palestinian displacement and territorial fragmentation have unfolded against the backdrop of Zionist settler-colonialism's central paradox: its claims of nativeness in already well-inhabited territory. In this particular colonial domain, the bulk of the Palestinian population (around 700,000–800,000) was displaced in 1948–49. Twenty years later, the 1967 occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip brought all of mandatory Palestine and its population of over a million and a half, now 4.5 million Palestinians under Israeli rule.

With occupation, forcible expulsions as occurred in 1948 were not so easily undertaken without arousing international attention and widespread opprobrium. As targeted spaces within territory ruled by an occupying state, the enclaves avoid mass displacement while concentrating and containing the population. Palestinian refugee camps and enclaves are bookends for a historical continuum of displacement. Thus they are spatial arrangements to contain the human detritus of colonialism. While enclaves mimic the camp in certain respects, they are distinguished by their location in occupied territory; in effect, the enclaves contain those included in the territory ruled by the state but denied belonging to it.

Launched in March 1993, closure refers to Israeli restrictions on the movement of Palestinian goods, labour and people into Jerusalem, between Gaza and the West Bank, and between them and Israel, and within the West Bank. Predictably, it has resulted in economic devastation, geo-social and political fracturing, enclavization, impeded mobilities and a deep sense of isolation. Enclaves here refer to territory surrounded by a state, where concentrated and confined populations, often culturally distinct and excluded from the state, are subject to its detailed regulations, which include severe restrictions on and close monitoring of place of residency and, most prominently, the scope and speed of mobility. Enclaved Gaza is a prime example of a single

enclave; the West Bank contains dozens of ambiguously defined enclaves or grey zones which contain smaller micro-units.

With closure, the geographical space of Palestine inhabited by its indigenous population has shrunk into an archipelago—a series of islands adrift in a sea of Israeli-Jewish colonists. Demographically, the bulk of Palestinians (around 9 million)¹ is scattered in Israel, in refugee camps in neighbouring states, in the OPTs, in exile in the region or abroad, in enclaves in the West Bank, or in enclaved Gaza. Each period of Palestinian displacement, as well as specific place of refuge, entailed its own demographic politics, confining physical structures and administrative procedures, and each gave rise to varying legal identities and subjectivities.

The refugee camps in neighbouring states² and the enclaves share a conceptual resemblance and are branches of the family of carceral devices to contain the displaced spatially and politically. Although they share some features, each is a unique spatial device, governed by distinct administrative/bureaucratic regimes, and they occupy different positions in relation to the state. Both work, however, to distance and contain those deemed not to belong to the Israeli state. Refugee camps warehouse Palestinians while enclaves contain and immobilize them. Enclaves in Palestine are hedged with ambiguities as to their spatial parameters, international responsibility for their inhabitants, and sovereignty over them. Unlike Palestinian camps in neighbouring Arab countries, enclaves are inside territory over which an occupying state exercises a form of sovereignty. While Israel has not formally annexed the West Bank, official Israeli maps include all of it as part of the state.

Enclaves bring to the surface questions about spatial devices to concentrate and manage the excluded and undesirable. As spatial devices situated in the specific context of settler-colonialism, they demarcate, render legible and facilitate management of an occupied population excluded from citizenship. They join a coterie of devices of population concentration and management from the colonial era to the present state of asymmetric warfare and counter-insurgency.³ Carceral politics in Israel-Palestine⁴ fit into a larger global pattern of spatially containing those expelled from the social order (see Sassen 2014). Most significantly, enclaves underscore the spatial politics of contemporary conflict management in Palestine-Israel. In the post-Oslo political orbit, the buzzwords have been ‘conflict management’ and ‘separation’ rather than peace. Rather than seeking political solutions, steady low-level conflict is perceived as sustainable. Occasional eruptions of violence can be managed with administrative and disciplinary mechanisms of governance, regulation and pacification to ensure Israeli control over the OPTs.

Are the enclaves a new device modelled on the prison, canton, reservation, Bantustan or ghetto, a new type of confining space for which a vocabulary has yet to emerge? This article explores how these spatial forms, the camp and the enclave, while distinctive, do form a field of analysis bound together across time and space. They are, I argue, in conversation experientially and

theoretically. More explicitly I contend, there is a discernible continuity in intent, effect and experience between refugee camps and the enclave, but also qualitative differences. This continuity, yet distinction, provides an outline of a field of analysis in which to engage with theoretical approaches to displacement and exclusion. After I briefly set out the context of Palestinian displacement and compare enclaves and camps, the article is structured around some challenges they pose to some oft-invoked analytical frames. Questions are then proposed about temporality, bare life, mobility, discipline and bio-power, and subjectivities like enclaves compel us to think beyond Agamben's (1998) 'bare life', the liminal zone that is neither *zoe* (natural or biological life) nor *bio* (political life); it is sometimes associated with camps and explorations of other forms of political life outside the state. It doesn't tell us much about life in camps or enclaves or how refugees and those stranded in enclaves make sense of and live in these spaces.

Enclaves and refugee camps are narratively situated by Palestinians as sharing historical continuity and intent in a settler-colonial project that has displaced and occupied them, repopulated their land, and consigned them to restricted and highly regulated spaces. When then Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon referred to Israeli actions in the OPTs in the 2000s as the 'second half of 1948', he echoed Palestinian sentiment. Palestinians keenly grasp these links between past and present policies and practices, understanding them as a means to further dispossess and render them politically impotent and effectively preclude a geographically contiguous Palestinian territory or state. In a temporal register, past, present and future are conceptualized and narrated as indubitably linked. Camps and enclaves each mark a specific moment in the colonial endeavour. Whereas camps index mass displacement beyond the borders of the state, enclaves are a means of inclusive exclusion, a calibrated regime of control and containment. Thus camps and enclaves share a family resemblance yet they are also distinct places that compel new understandings of containment of those deemed exogenous to the state.

Concentrating and Containing Palestinians: Camps and Enclaves

The spatial parameters of Palestinian camps in neighbouring countries⁵ have fluctuated discernibly over time, depending on host country policy towards the refugees, the strength of the Palestinian resistance movement and its relations with the host country, conflict, and local urbanization and internal migration patterns. Lebanon is illustrative. In the 1950s and 1960s, refugees sometimes required permission to enter and exit the camps and mobility was constrained by military and police checkpoints. Surveillance by the Lebanese authorities was pervasive and state violence kept a lid on political organizing. In the late 1960s, the Palestinian resistance movement gained control of the camps. At the same time, poor displaced Lebanese from conflict-ridden, underdeveloped South Lebanon flocked to the urban margins, melting into the surrounding poverty belt ringing Beirut. The once distinct camp borders

became spatially and socially porous. Hardly sites of ‘bare life’, these were indeed vibrant places as refugees and the Palestinian resistance movement provided protection, organized civic life and organized politically. For a brief period (1968–82), Palestinians in Lebanon enjoyed fairly unrestricted mobility and a high level of internal autonomy.

In a weak and disintegrating host state, the stateless and now empowered and militant Palestinian refugee often seemed to possess some attributes of citizens, especially protection and access to a social safety net. But this period of quasi-autonomy and militancy ended with the 1982 Israeli invasion and the subsequent withdrawal of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from Lebanon. Followed by a series of devastating battles with the Lebanese Shiite Amal militia, the camps once again resembled sites of incarceration. Fearing Lebanese militia violence, many refugees hesitated to tread beyond their borders. In short, dramatically shifting conditions of daily life, in this case, from confinement to armed resistance, and fluctuating spatial borders, as well as an active civil and political life underscore the need for a historical approach to what are often conceptualized as temporary spaces.

The role of host country cannot be discounted in understanding the political life of camps. Agamben’s notion of inclusion/exclusion echoes with the refugees’ excision from a state of origin and spatial and political marginalization from the host state—that is, they are in the territory of the sovereign host state but do not belong to its juridico-political structure. Lebanon is a salient example, especially in its post-civil-war period when once embittered political parties were united in their disdain for the Palestinian refugees and agreed on their containment in their camps. A fragile Lebanon national identity could be juxtaposed to the excluded yet included Palestinian; they were a reviled internal other against which otherwise fractious sects and political parties could form the outline of a national narrative.

Palestinian subjectivities and self-identification fluctuated with changing external conditions, especially configurations of Lebanese power, in a weak and disintegrating state and state and militia violence. In the 1950s, Palestinians did refer to themselves with the detested term ‘refugees’ which, by the late 1960s, with the emergence of the resistance movement, carried less weight than did self-appellations such as ‘strugglers’ (*munadaleen*),⁶ ‘revolutionary’ and ‘returnee’; these discursive turns had a material angle as well. A rising standard of living rendered rations somewhat superfluous. Refugees thought of the camps as microcosms of Palestine, as intimate places with a well-developed sense of identity as particular camps, places where a Palestinian identity and culture could be celebrated. What this historical trajectory suggests is that camps, as well as their inhabitants’ subjectivities and identities, are best understood within a dynamic constellation of ever-changing exterior conditions, but most significantly as a terrain where belonging to a political entity was simultaneously fostered, critiqued and challenged by new ways of imagining a state (in this case, a democratic, secular Palestine). These same camps are now places of intense despair and

vulnerability, excluded from UNHCR's protective mandate, and marked by a decline of communal spirit as refugees are focused on economic survival (Allan 2014). Self-identification as refugees is more of an asset than it was in the pre-resistance era, when it suggested apolitical subjects.

After six decades, these camps in Lebanon remain a primary mechanism of containment of an excised population in a state of perpetual stranded-ness with little prospect of return or local integration with citizenship. In the context of settler-colonialism, the camps signified the severance of direct connections to Palestine. The enclaves in the West Bank perform a similar function at home under occupation. If camps contain those physically excised from the state and mark the severance of population from territory, in the enclaves, the state has imposed physical and administrative devices to immobilize them, in effect, stranding them on shrinking islands in a rising sea of colonies. They are isolated from other Palestinians, not only in Gaza or East Jerusalem and the Arab world, but from their once immediate neighbours.

Turning to the OPT and enclavization, some Palestinians call this the third stage (after 1948 and 1967), a numerical designation suggestive of a temporal/spatial formulation of local history. In the West Bank, the indigenous Palestinian population, refugees from 1948 in 19 camps, as well as over 500,000 Jewish-Israeli colonists, each subject to different juridical orders, make for an array of distinct and unequal legal statuses, rights and protections, multiple, albeit vastly uneven sovereignties and distinct political subjectivities.

A confluence of events (separation and closure) gave rise to the enclaves. Initially incubated by the occupation and consequent colony building, the enclaves, these 'prisons without roofs', were sealed with Oslo's⁷ fragmentation of Palestinian territory into zones A, B and C. In Area A, about 17 per cent of the West Bank comprising urban concentrations, the Palestinian National Authority (PA) has legal and security privileges. In Area B, comprising mainly towns and villages, Israel maintains the right to military incursions. In Area C, about 60 per cent of the area, Israel maintains full control of land management, security and civilian affairs (see Weizman 2007). Ultimately, Israel retains control over land, sea and air space. In other words, there are multiple but disparate sovereignties in the territory occupied by Israel. Where substantial tracts of land and water resources have been expropriated, Palestinians face calibrated immiseration anticipated to compel voluntary migration. A prominent academic architect of separation and closure stated plainly that, with Palestinian immiseration, 'there will be movement out of the area' or voluntary transfer (Soffer and Bystrov 2005). The 1978 'Master Plan for the Development of Settlements in Judea and Samaria' succinctly set out a comprehensive re-ordering of space against the backdrop of a 'race against time'. Strategically sited colonies would constitute facts on the ground, and thus their dismantlement would be off the table in any future negotiations. Moreover, colonies would obstruct Palestinian 'unification and territorial contiguity'.⁸

While most Palestine refugee camps are outside the space of the colonial state, the enclaves are in territory illegally occupied by a state. While the former allows for mobility, however constrained, the latter mimics the claustrophobia of the prison, albeit a moving prison as the frontier continuously expands outwards into Palestinian territory. In the aftermath of Oslo, Israel launched unilateral separation (*hafrada*) and creeping closure. To safeguard the Jewishness of the state, more concrete spatial lines of distinction between insider/outsider and citizen/non-citizen became imperative. For example, in the early 1990s, Israel began denying Palestinians employment in Israel and then imposing 'closure' on the OPTs, severely impacting Palestinian mobility and thus livelihoods. Closure's structural mechanisms and administrative techniques have worked in tandem to generate enclaves. Over 500 checkpoints dot the landscape, a network of Jewish-only by-pass roads fragment it and an ambiguous permit system severely constrains Palestinian mobility. The mammoth 25-foot-high cement separation wall Israel is building juts deep into Palestinian territory, cutting off towns and villages from their agricultural lands. Along with the checkpoints, it maroons Palestinians in enclaves that they experience as confining—as 'open-air prisons'. For example, the town of Qalqiliya, bottle-necked by the wall with a checkpoint and tunnel controlling entry and exit, has seen its population dwindle in the face of land confiscation and economic strangulation. With the enclaves, displacement has entered a new phase. Closure to effect slow-motion ethnic cleansing is anticipated to *remove the land* from the Palestinians and thus, through economic strangulation, encourage emigration. For example, like Qalqiliya, the towns of Beit Sahur and Beit Jala, just outside Jerusalem, had their agricultural lands expropriated but not the towns themselves.

The enclaves were also spurred forward more aggressively in the wake of the 2000 al-Aqsa intifada (uprising) on the one hand and growing Zionist demographic concerns on the other. With Palestinians constituting around 20–22 per cent of the Israel population and an estimated 4.5–5 million Palestinians in the OPTs, demographic anxiety mounted. Around 7 million Jews live in Israel. Immigration has slowed and the Palestinian population continues its high growth rate: Israel's crude birth rate (number of live births annually per 1,000 total population) is 21, with a fertility rate (average number of children born to a woman) of 2.9 (higher among the Orthodox) compared to a Palestinian crude birth rate of 33 and a fertility rate of 4.2.⁹ Palestinians were slated to become a slight majority in the territory ruled by Israel. Policies of separation and closure have undoubtedly been a response to the growing demographic imbalance. By including massive settlement blocs on the Israeli side of the wall and anticipating the slow-motion emigration by the Palestinians from enclaved towns and villages, Israel aims to maintain Jewish demographic superiority within an expanded and fortified state.

Oslo marked a shift to indirect rule or the outsourcing of management to the newly formed PA tasked with limited powers of self-government in areas from which Israeli forces were to withdraw. Assigned to maintain internal order and

protect Israel and the colonies from attacks, realization set in that Oslo had simply garnered Palestinian acquiescence to and legitimization of occupation and colonization. Thus, relations between Israel and the PA would revolve around managing conflict rather than resolving core issues. The stage was now set for the emergence and gradual solidification of the enclaves.

The enclaves are the small towns and villages in between the contiguous spaces claimed by the Israel state (Area C). In these shrinking spaces, mobility beyond their boundaries is intensely surveilled and controlled through the permit system, the multitude of checkpoints, the wall and a segregated road network. In essence, the enclaves are population clusters where Palestinians are concentrated and confined by structural and bureaucratic mechanisms of occupation, closure and colonial expansion. In these spatio-temporal zones, predictability, vital for social life, is a scarce resource. Neither camps nor sites for IDPs, a conceptual and political indeterminacy hangs over the enclaves. What exactly are they? They are places of concentration and confinement in left-over space, the remnants of Palestine after Area C, Jewish colonies and by-pass roads have carved up the West Bank. Their indeterminacy is part punishment, part disciplinary and all immiseration. Residents of the enclaves live with uncertainty, subject to the quasi-sovereignty of the PA in territory which Israel rules but has yet to formally annex. Those living in enclaves are not displaced, but neither are they at home in a compressed set of spaces beyond which they are considered trespassers, foreigners and infiltrators¹⁰—a criminalization of the excluded that resonates globally.

The enclaves are not camps, nor can their residents be categorized as refugees. Instead, they fall into the murky and expansive category of the enclavée or contained. Thus, a new category has emerged: those who stay in their homes but have been stripped of their lands and economic livelihood to literally clear the path for colonial expansion. Residing in spatial remnants or enclaves, they are immobilized and cut off from their exterior. Another category is those who have moved from no longer viable rural Palestine to urban areas such as Bethlehem or Ramallah. Both are those akin to birds without their nests. It is anticipated that the ensuing immiseration will compel voluntary migration.

Unlike camps located outside Palestine, the enclaves are in territory internationally recognized as under foreign occupation. The enclaves, like camps, establish a delimited space for population concentration and the monitoring of movement. As spatial devices, the enclaves are thought to disable unified Palestinian political organizing and resistance. Thus enclavization is more than simply a spatial by-product of settlements, but a tool of expansion and control designed to 'neutralize' political opposition through confinement and strangulation (Falah 2007: 1343). Yet they are also lived spaces where people negotiate unpredictability and carry on with the mundane tasks of daily life despite profound uncertainty about the future. Camps are distinguished from enclaves in a number of ways. Formed as a result of mass

displacement during conflict, camps have a visual presence and, as an aggregate, they trigger humanitarian intervention. They suggest crisis and emergency—concepts that activate intervention in the form of aid, expertise and usually some level of protection.

The crystallization of enclaves compels a search for a new lexicon and interpretative frameworks to capture the specificity of confinement and exclusion from the state while residing within territory controlled by it and other lesser sovereigns. In pursuit of new ways of understanding spatial devices of containment, enclaves and camps provide a lens through which to critically examine associations of sites of refuge and population confinement with notions of time, ‘non-places’, bio-power, formulations of inclusion/exclusion and ‘bare life’. It is to these issues that I now turn.

The Longevity of the Temporary

From the claims of the ‘temporariness’ of the occupation and more recently the wall, the temporal has been critical to the colonial project in Palestine. As a discursive device and psychological weapon, the ‘temporary’ compels an indeterminate, protracted state of uncertainty and anticipation. In international law, occupation itself is an ‘interim measure’ in the period between war and peace (Dugard 2007: 2). Initially declared ‘temporary’, mushrooming colonies soon belied that claim. Likewise, closure, imposed as a temporary measure—‘until further notice’—in March 1993, has yet to be lifted. The wall’s \$3 billion price tag vitiates any notion of its ‘temporariness’, its concreteness conveying a permanency hiding in plain sight.

Like camps, the structural mechanisms underpinning the enclaves (the wall, checkpoints and permits) were cast as temporary. Yet the temporary has a way of morphing into longevity. Whether warehoused in camps or stranded in the enclaves, in a protracted state of waiting and anticipation, for Palestinians the temporary is distorted. To equate camps with Auge’s depiction of ‘non-places’ (1995: 78) as the ‘fleeting, the temporary and ephemeral’ exemplified by spaces of hyper-mobility such as the airport, is belied by the sheer longevity of these camps and the enclaves’ indeterminacy. People *pass* through Auge’s non-places. People *live* in camps and enclaves. With no end in sight, the camps and enclaves may be *permanently temporary*. Indeed, camp residents live in a suspended temporal state, in a built environment that bears hallmarks of permanency. In a temporal sequencing of past/present/future, the vital third component, the future, for many displaced is conceptualized as a black space. Are the enclaves ‘transition points’ akin to Agier’s description of ‘ghettoes’ or ‘grey zones’ with a ‘long life expectancy’ (2011: 39, 45)? In camps, Palestinians have been displaced, whereas in the enclaves they feel they are waiting to be displaced. Enclaves may be the waiting rooms of those designated for displacement but they do remain lived spaces.

The temporal dimension extends in another direction as well. Claims of temporariness have been wielded to manage the occupied population, quell

international opposition and buy time to extend colonies. For example, United States–Israel negotiators have consistently deployed a strategy of interim agreements such as Oslo, deferring to a ‘later’ unspecified time the critical issues of refugees, colonies, borders and Jerusalem. This puts Palestinians politically in a state of perpetual beginnings. In short, as core issues recede to the background, a presentist politics prevails, or what Stoler (2008: 193) calls ‘*states of deferral*’ that mete out promissory notes that are not exceptions to their operation but constitutive of them’.

Bio-Power

Camps are sometimes upheld as exemplary sites of bio-politics—the practices, techniques and knowledge mobilized to manage and govern the life of populations by intervening at the site of the body. Does this formula apply to the enclaves? Closure and the enclaves provide insight into bio-power’s multiple configurations and its expansive potential. Two issues are at stake here: bio-power and the regulation of life and death, and the question of mobility. In 2006, when Dov Weisglass, an adviser to the then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, quipped in reference to the siege of Gaza that ‘The idea is to put the Palestinians on a diet, but not to make them die of hunger’¹¹—a space opened for a critical discussion of bio-power. In enclaved Gaza, Israeli-imposed sanctions form a craftily spun web of restrictions that keeps Palestinian alive, just barely, on a highly restricted diet. Thus, they are suspended in a precarious web of minutely calibrated life and death. When Palestinians respond to the mundane inquiry ‘How are you?’ with ‘I am breathing but not alive’, they speak in the register of the living dead.¹² Rather than resembling bio-powers’ politics of life, the siege and sanctions hold life in calibrated suspension between life and death. Elaborate calculations of the daily caloric intake required to keep Palestinians ‘breathing’ but not thriving guide the sanctions on Gaza. What are we to make of a state that works assiduously to manage, indeed calibrate, life down to a minimum daily caloric intake, an extreme form of bio-power, yet refuses to *officially* extend sovereignty over the territory in which it wields such power over its inhabitants?

Palestine-Israel provides an ethnographic platform for an expansive understanding of bio-power as enacting sovereignty by an occupying power rather than an official sovereign. Gaza provides an opening for Agamben’s probing of bio-power’s relation to bare life. It is the finely tuned calibration and management of life that stands out rather than a clear-cut politics of life or death. The calibration of caloric intake may be a standard practice in the organization of humanitarian food aid for refugees, but the space of Gaza is not technically a refugee camp. Rather, it is under occupation and prolonged siege. Restricted caloric intake and immobility go beyond a minimal bio-power or ‘bare life’ to a calculated politics of deprivation, punishment and incarceration aimed at political containment.

Turning to mobility, bio-power as originally formulated does not directly address the issue of mobility. Yet, as we have seen, a structural and bureaucratic apparatus which closely monitors and regulates Palestinian mobility is integral to producing enclaves. In the new century, ever-mutating surveillance technologies visualize, immobilize and contain surplus people displaced by late capitalism and, in this instance, late-modern settler-colonialism (see Mirzoeff 2011; Magnet 2011). Colonial practices in enclaved Palestine have relied heavily on technologies that compel visibility and a built environment that constrains mobility and spatially confines. Constant surveillance of Palestinian villages from colonies built on higher ground render the Palestinian hyper-visible and yet checkpoints, which do render them visible to the security apparatus, and the segregated road network serve to keep them out of direct contact with colonists. Ensnared in their gated colonies, high on the hills and travelling on Jewish-only roads, colonists are out of the direct line of sight of Palestinians. In other words, closure itself mimics the visual, or pan-optical, politics of the prison.

Thus, the formula of an enclaved present/absent, included/excluded Palestinian pivots on an interlocking regime of mobility and visibility. The immobilized and surveilled Palestinian is intended to engender a self-disciplining subject who can accommodate calibrated levels of chaos and disorder. A (dis)ordered, opaque bureaucracy exemplifies the ambiguities of the permit system. Leila, a professor at Al-Quds University, was invited to give a lecture in Jerusalem. However, as a holder of a West Bank identity card, she required a permit (*tassrih*), issued by the Israeli Civilian Administration, to enter the city. She left her documents at their office and was told to return at 9:00 a.m. on the day of the lecture to pick up her permit. Arriving at the appointed time, she was kept waiting until noon to receive her permit. The lecture was scheduled for 11:00. Another typical example of the ambiguities surrounding the permit system is that of Abed, a 62-year-old Ramallah-based business man. He applied for a permit to enter Jerusalem for a business meeting several weeks in advance. The morning of the meeting, he was called and told to come to pick up his permit. Upon arrival, he was told to wait, which he did for several hours without any explanation. By the time the permit was issued, the meeting had concluded. The clerk handed him his one-day permit with a smirk. The lack of any explanation as to the reasons for delays and denials is standard. With its long waits, inexplicable denials, lack of clarity as to regulations and petty cruelties, the permit system constitutes another wall of sorts—a paper wall of bureaucracy rather than the visible and predictable cement wall. Palestinians seemingly acquiesce to this regime of interdiction and deceleration because they need to move. Yet they constantly analyse minute alterations in the regime of closure that might signify whether they can move or not as they strive to ‘get by’ (Allen 2008). Thus they objectify and then manage rather than simply normalize routine violence. Indeed, they have a keen sense of the purpose of what they

often refer to as 'strangulation' (*khanq*): to produce a subdued, hopeless subject ready to think about emigration.

Due to the unpredictability that surrounds mobility, closure is simultaneously disciplinary and anti-disciplinary, and thus provides a new angle for understanding disciplinarity. It can take hours to travel a short distance with indeterminable waits at checkpoints. The regime of control operates most visibly at the edges of Palestinian space. As the Palestinian body nears Israeli space, where a singular sovereign is not in doubt, Foucault's description of the mechanics of power and disciplined, docile bodies seems apt:

not only so that they may do as one wishes, but so that they may operate as one wishes, with the techniques, the speed and the efficiency that one determines.

The discipline that produces the 'subjected and practised bodies' (Foucault 1979:138) operates within particular spatial arrangements and types of mobility. Order, routine and predictability are foundational to disciplinary regimes whether in the prison or in the camp. With closure and the enclaves, daily life, however, is suffused with unpredictability and routines are disrupted. Prolonged and unpredictable waiting is part of the messiness of colonial rule. Although closure attempts to routinize confinement and subdue resistance, it is equally about rule through the imposition of calibrated chaos. Choreographed conditions of seemingly incommensurable chaos and unpredictability operate hand in hand to craft an atmosphere of anxious anticipation. Disorder ensures a measure of order inside the state and points to the mutual constitutiveness of spaces of disorder and order. The 'essential paradox' of colonial rule noted by Comaroff, graphically played out in Palestine, is the conflation of the rational with the absurd. For example, the pandemonium, yet order, at a large checkpoint underscores that paradox in 'its capacity to be ordered yet incoherent, rational yet absurd, violent yet impotent; to elicit compliance and contestation, discipline and defiance, subjection and insurrection sometimes all at once' (quoted in Feldman 2008: 11). Palestinians face a maze of obstacles as they make their way to work, school, the doctor or simply to visit family. People wonder constantly: Will checkpoints prevent me from reaching work or school today? Will I see my family tonight? Thus, the mobility regime operates with extreme ambiguity. Permits are denied without cause and checkpoints slow down or close without warning. It is hard to predict from one day to the next if one will encounter the same set of obstacles or if they have been re-arranged to present a new set of challenges. This suggests the expansion of disciplinarity's field of analysis to encompass the anti-disciplinary.

The Politics of Inclusion/Exclusion and Bare Life

One of the first things I noticed in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon was the swirl of political talk—a search for signs of significance for their own

precarious and uncertain futures. What is going on politically in the local arena as well as in Israel-Palestine? Are negotiations on the horizon? Do recent elections in the United States, Israel or in the Palestinian political body portend change? What new policies, global and local, are going to affect us? What are the latest actions of the variety of political factions in the camp? Are any demonstrations planned? Who has been killed? Most importantly, camps were overlaid with political party affiliations and networks. People were known by their organizational affiliations such as Fatah or the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Access to resources, from jobs to information, flowed through political networks. Thus, internal Palestinian politics played an outsized role in structuring life and subjectivities in the camps. The resistance movement's embryonic state-like governing structures and personnel, resources and networks gave rise to what Turner (2005) calls 'pockets of sovereignty', pointing to the possibility of sovereignties in the plural.

A similar sort of talk circulates in the enclaves as people exchange stories of checkpoint experiences or discuss up-coming demonstrations. Palestinians in the enclaves also belong to multiple political factions of the national movement. Some enclaved villages hold regular demonstrations, often joined by foreign solidarity activists giving them a bustling cosmopolitan atmosphere.

Comparatively speaking, that the camps in Lebanon were once sites of armed struggle and intense nationalist political organizing and the enclaves are hardly stripped of political life should not be surprising. This intense political atmosphere, as well as camps as places of intense meaning and lived spaces, raises questions about Agamben's formulation of 'bare life'; is it useful or adequate for grappling with political life in camps and enclaves? A question, beyond the scope of this article, is why his philosophical work captures the scholarly imagination on contemporary camps. What answers does he provide and to what questions? Does 'bare life' carry forward anthropological understandings of the nature of camps and their inhabitants? Subject to empirical or ethnographic scrutiny, how does it hold up (see Turner 2010: 6–8)?

Empirically ungrounded arguments about bare life are unsettled by ethnographies of refugee camps which portray them as dynamic lived spaces suffused with politics and, in the case of Palestinian camps in Lebanon, the emergence of state-like institutions. Indeed, empiricism has often been the exception rather than the rule guiding our understanding of camps. The existence of Palestinian refugee camps indexes an Israeli state-territory-citizenship triangulation from which the Palestinian is excluded; a re-configured subjectivity was also part of the exclusion, once underscored by the term 'rehabilitation' in agency titles.¹³ Yet it was in exile and in the camps that new forms of political and social life and new conceptualizations of state, belonging and citizenship have percolated. For example, the initial PLO platform called for a democratic, secular state of all its citizens in the historic space of Palestine—a formulation that challenged head-on exclusivist

nationalism. To refer to camps as sites of 'bare life' may be a freighted misnomer. Palestinian camps challenge characterization of camps as 'bare life' and may provide a window through which to formulate alternative conceptual lens through which to explore 'bare life' or leave it behind.

Refugees may be reduced to 'bare life' momentarily but they quickly reconstitute their social and political worlds in the camps and suggest thinking beyond 'bio', the state and citizenship as sites of political membership and identity. For example, political rivalries were part of daily life and social relationships in the camps in Lebanon. It is also critical to note that humanitarian aid, in the form of UNRWA's deliverance of relief and medical and educational services, operated in a sometimes tense and yet often cooperative fashion with Palestinian political leadership in the camps. Weekly demonstrations of Palestinians, Israelis and foreigners in a number of West Bank villages to protest the wall and enclavization attest to the vigorous political life in these spaces of confinement that suggest alternative conceptualizations of state and belonging.

What does remain useful is Agamben's formulation of inclusion and exclusion: 'Bare life remains included in politics in the form of the exception, that is, something that is included solely through an exclusion' (1998: 11), which echoes the citizen/non-citizen and native/foreigner formula. It does offer a point of departure for exploring displacement and imagined and actual claims of nativeness in an already populated territory. The inclusion/exclusion formula reverberates with colonialism and occupation and their management of the excluded in camps and enclaves. The refugee is integral to the excluding state's political and social composition and identities. A Palestine emptied of its indigenous or native population, who are excluded from the state and concentrated at its margins and its expanding frontier, enables the state to claim sovereignty over territory it is resettling. To demarcate the Israeli citizenry and its relationship with place, traces of the indigenous population were effaced physically and discursively and they were marked as the excluded other. Thus, they are included through their very exclusion. In other words, in the colonial endeavour, both camps and enclaves are less spaces of exception and more spaces constitutive of the Israeli state. The native hovers on the periphery of the state, on its ever-expanding frontier, a constant and often menacing reminder of another presence. Occasionally militant, they serve as the barbarian at the gate of the fluid frontier, lending a sense of a shared national condition in face of the looming other. Palestinians under occupation are included, on the one hand, in the *Israeli* political order largely through their exclusion from rights, citizenship and territory and on the other through the anxieties they generate (see Ochs 2011) as the ever-present Arab-Muslim other. Thus, they are included in the territory of the state but excluded from belonging to it. In this small geopolitical space, sovereignty is complicated. Between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River, there are hierarchically stacked or layered sovereignties (see Shafir and Peled 2002). The PA exercises quasi-sovereignty in some of the

enclaves and the international community does not recognize Israeli sovereignty over the OPT (which it exercises but has not declared). Thus, Agamben can offer some insights into displacement, governance and the state but it may be time to develop conceptual and theoretical frameworks informed by empirical realities and ethnography in camps and enclaves rather than continue to manoeuvre uncomfortably through ungrounded arguments.

Subjectivity

I have argued that, in the camps, refugees' 'culturally grounded practices of ordinary living' crafted meaningful places at odds with their original intent as containment devices (Peteet 2005: 94). Is a similar process at work in the enclaves where new social forms and subjectivities are taking shape as well? For example, a resourceful and creative internal dynamic in enclaved Gaza is evident in the mundane as well as the spectacular, from simply proceeding with daily life in the face of severe sanctions to the infamous tunnelling under the wall which kept alive trade networks and brought in much-needed embargoed items. Camps in Lebanon were once animated by political activity, and belonging to political organizations was a primary component of self-identification and communal organization. People were referred to by political affiliation: 'he/she belongs to, or is with, such-and-such an organization' was a common refrain in referring to someone. What sort of narrative will enclaves develop about these sites where social life has contracted and local, primordial identities may be on the rise? Not surprisingly, spatial fragmentation and immobilities can rupture the possibility of collective action and identity.

What sorts of subjectivities emerge in enclaves? As a particular form of dystopic space, enclaves, like camps, can be paradoxical, fostering intimacy, hope and creativity as well as isolation and despair. The contradictions of enclavization, the isolation yet intimacy they foster, which are redolent of the camp, were captured by Amal, a 50-year-old artist, who sighed wistfully when she told me she had not left Ramallah in five years. In a somewhat defensive mode, she stated:

Ramallah is my little world. I don't have a permit to go to Jerusalem and with so many checkpoints I can't go anywhere in the West Bank. So I have my group of friends here and we are very close. They have become like family to me.

One quickly gets a sense of the 'little world' of physically and socially shrinking space where kin sentiments are extended to friends. Amal's friend Deema, a physiotherapist, confined to Ramallah for the past four years echoes these sentiments when she tells me somewhat cheerfully: 'I am happy in my little cage. I just like to be at home and safe with my family. I refuse the humiliation and hassle of checkpoint.' Fatima, who lives in Jerusalem, remarks: 'When I visit Bethlehem [a mere 10 kilometres away] people ask "how are

things in Jerusalem?’ They haven’t been here in years now.’ Clearly, the banished, confined or quarantined are active subjects creating social worlds however small and contained. Yet the joy at being in open space underscores just how profound is the effect of constricted space and constrained mobility. Like Maysun and Sahar’s exuberance in leaving Jenin, Palestinian writer Raja Shehadeh describes his reaction to open space in the time of closure: ‘We felt euphoric. Being stuck in Ramallah, surrounded as it was with checkpoints at every exit, the experience of open sky, made us giddy with joy’ (2008: 138). Shehadeh writes sadly of past walks (*sarhat*) through Palestine’s hills and valleys: ‘To go on a *sarha* was to roam freely, at will, without restraint’ (*ibid.*: 2).

In an interview with Khaled, a long-time activist he said:

How can we build a movement if we can’t meet? Now there are the Palestinians of Nablus, the Palestinians of Gaza, the Palestinians of Ramallah etc. Each is living in his own area, living his own life.

Khaled’s exasperated utterance captures the fragmentation of closure and the sorts of political subjectivities it may nurture. While the confines of the refugee camps had fostered a vibrant political subjectivity expressed in nationalist mobilization, those stranded in the enclaves find it difficult to have a face-to-face presence in national politics. Attending meetings or demonstrations in towns is a laborious affair requiring hours spent waiting at checkpoints. Participation in national celebrations is likewise difficult. I have argued elsewhere (Peteet 2005) that the bringing-together of Palestinians from multiple places in the refugee camps after 1948 with their collective experiences of suffering, loss and national identity nurtured a cohesive national narrative. Inhabitants of enclaves often expressed feelings of isolation, of a retreat into a constricting world of immediate family and neighbours. As a result, enclaves separate and give rise to concerns like Khaled’s about political fragmentation and fissures in collective Palestinian identity.

The refugee may be an iconic Palestinian national figure but what of the enclave? Can the enclave be identified and what are the parameters of this characterization? Humanitarian organizations, particularly UNRWA, have played a central part in Palestinian refugee subjectivity for over 50 years (Peteet 2005). Not surprisingly, there is no ‘caring biopower’ of humanitarian assistance (Turner 2010: 9) in the enclaves. They are not sites of humanitarian intervention or assistance. Indeed, a profound sense of abandonment pervades the OPTs.

Grey Zones or Lexical Challenges

Palestinian enclaves pose a number of challenges: semantic, comparative and spatial. It is incumbent upon observers to develop a new lexicon that can deploy extant constructs expansively such as bio-power, develop new ones

and move beyond others when they prove of limited value in generating new insights. Derived from geography, the English term ‘enclave’ is widely used to describe the effects of closure and the shrinkage of space. But there has yet to emerge a precise, shared vocabulary to frame the enclaves, their peculiar forms of governance, their indeterminate sovereignty and the experience of their inhabitants. Are they displaced, refugees, internally displaced, deported, exiled, stranded, the warehoused or prisoners? Likewise, how are we to understand sovereignty in the time of occupation, closure and confinement where the official, internationally recognized borders of the state do not match on-the-ground realities of sovereignty?

Comparison may yield insights into camps and enclaves although it, too, like philosophical construct, has limitations. For example, enclaves have been compared to ghettos, reservations and Bantustans. Although they share some general features, these do not quite capture the specificity of the enclaves. ‘Stigma, constraint, spatial confinement, and institutional containment’ are defining elements of the European ghetto (Wacquant 2004: 2); the enclaves are at once similar and dissimilar to the European ghetto. As a geo-spatial term, enclave can embody a more neutral cast unlike the freighted Bantustan or ghettos. Moreover, economic factors limit comparisons with the ghetto. The economic integration, however unequally, of Jews in European ghettos and blacks in the ghettos of the United States and in South African Bantustans is not paralleled in Palestinian enclaves, where circulation beyond their confines is severely circumscribed; they are no longer a reserve labour pool. Institutional containment is another aspect where Palestine departs from comparisons with ghettos; their institutions are being strangled by severe obstacles to mobility and trade, rather than obliterated as were Jewish institutions in Europe. Jews were allowed mobility outside the ghetto, albeit temporally circumscribed, for they played a critical economic role (*ibid.*). Ghetto has been used to refer to African American communities in northern United States cities; these ghettos were maintained by widely observed social patterns of segregation and the potentially violent consequences of transgression, rather than by physical structures. Wacquant argues that the ghetto is a

Janus-faced institution as it serves opposite functions for the two collectives that it binds in a relation of asymmetric dependency. For the dominant category, its rationale is to *confine and control* (Wacquant 2004: 3, emphasis in original)

For the confined, ‘it is an *integrative and protective device*’ (*ibid.*, emphasis in original) that ‘fosters consociation and community building’ (*ibid.*). When the ghetto loses its economic function for the dominant group, the inhabitants run the risk of being warehoused or annihilated.

Comparisons with other colonial formations can lend insight. Native American reservations, a consequence of ethnically driven removals and dispossession, are ‘domestic dependent nations’ exercising a limited form of sovereignty within a larger state. Native Americans were eventually

incorporated as United States citizens. Their natural resources were more coveted by settlers than their labour. In the early 2000s, comparisons with apartheid came to the fore. Organizing society and the polity and allocating resources on the basis of race in one case, and ethnicity and religion on the other, has formed the basis of comparison. Yet comparative projects can be fraught with the perils of oversimplification and historical decontextualization. When Israel depended on Palestinian workers, comparisons with Bantustans worked fairly well. But Palestinians are now expendable, replaced by labour from the global marketplace. The enclaves do resemble Bantustans, yet comparisons must be historicized carefully. Under Apartheid, the actual contact between majority blacks and minority whites was close, in some cases intimate, as blacks cleaned white homes and tended white children. A legal edifice elaborated the parameters of interaction. The Bantustans segregated and controlled cheap black labour. Palestinian enclaves work to separate, control and immiserate in order to propel voluntary migration. Gaza most resembled a Bantustan when Gazan labour daily crossed into Israel in the pre-Oslo period (Li 2008).

Without a publicly circulated plan to carve out and designate enclaves, they constitute legal and political grey zones with ambiguous borders in contrast to the more distinctly demarcated Bantustans, camps and reservations. This indeterminate grey zone makes life even more unbearable and ultimately more vulnerable. For now, 'enclaves', a term packed with ambiguity, will have to serve as point of departure until more precise terms surface, either in the Arabic vernacular or the language of Hebrew policy. Perhaps the very greyness of the term does capture the sense of betwixt and between, neither here nor there, that prevails in Palestine.

Conclusion

To be a refugee is to face loss of home, livelihood, kin and a sense of the future. In the enclaves, a similar sort of subjectivity takes hold as space and mobility shrink and loss becomes central to a sense of self. A shared narrative derived from the intimate and discernable continuities in the settler-colonial endeavour connects the refugee community with the OPT in a world of loss, suffering, injustice and an unforeseeable future. Palestinians are literally stranded in space whether inside or outside of Palestine, in enclaves or camps.

Both enclaves and camps clear space for an expanding state. Rather than displacing the population and generating new refugees with some initial visibility, numerous camps and an international legal status, a policy of slow-motion population dilution through separation and closure with their immiserating effects has been put in place. Indeed, most Palestinians have a firm conviction as to the purpose of 'strangulation': to engender a subdued, hopeless subject ready to emigrate. Closure and calibrated chaos are perceived as a means to propel voluntary migrants rather than refugees. Palestinian resistance, international opprobrium and Jordan's determination

not to accept more refugees make sweeping transfer of the indigenous population, as occurred in 1948, less feasible. Thus, Palestinian population movements as a result of closure are to internal destinations, or enclaves, as well as abroad. As part of this temporarily drawn-out, multi-pronged spatial process, the population of these areas diluted of Palestinians is relocating to urban centres such as Ramallah or Bethlehem, themselves enclaved by the wall and checkpoints. Given the absence of clear pull factors in West Bank towns, enclavization seems to be driving self-deportation and urbanization. The disarticulation between the territory of Palestine and its indigenous inhabitants began during the 1948 war, was furthered as a consequence of the 1967 occupation, and continues apace today.

In this orbit of enclaves, 'voluntary' migration and immobilizing mechanisms, it behoves us to move beyond invocations of bare life to explore new conceptual frameworks arising out of ethnographic and empirically grounded work. It may be more fruitful to engage in comparative analyses based on ethnographies of camps and refugees that craft theory from the ground up rather than becoming mired in ungrounded theories. Ultimately, a divorce between theory and some sort of empiricism will leave us spinning our wheels. There is a pressing need to pursue new historically situated, ethnographically rich paradigms to make sense of spatial devices to contain the displaced. In other words, the enclaves point to the need for new theoretical, empirical and lexical categories that well exceed our current frameworks. These grey categories of indeterminate legal and political status should without a doubt be on the list of categories to explore.

That refugee camps hardly risk disappearance, a scenario on the horizon when the mass displacement of Iraqis unfolded without camps, one need only look at Zaatari camp in Jordan. With a capacity for 120,000 Syrian refugees, it ranks among the world's largest refugee camps. Palestinian camps are 60 years old with no end in sight. Yet camps undoubtedly have been joined by an assortment of new greyish spatial devices such as the enclave arising from slow-motion ethnic cleansing. This form of displacement avoids a refugee crisis but still produces displacement. Ultimately, enclaves, or grey areas, join a historically long list of spatial devices to contain displaced populations.

Acknowledgements

Research for this article was funded by an American Center for Oriental Research (ACOR) and Council of American Overseas Research Centers (CAORC) Senior Fellowship Award; a Palestinian American Research Center (PARC) Research Grant; and funding from the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Louisville. I would like to extend my thanks to Simon Turner for his judicious advice as this article developed and that of the two anonymous reviewers.

1. According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Palestinian population figures for the OPTs in 2012 were about 4.29 million: 2.65 million in the West Bank and 1.64 million in Gaza Strip. http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/int_Pop_2012e.pdf. Around 4–5 million reside in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan and in other Arab countries or abroad. Nearly 2 million are citizens of Israel. Total population estimates hover around 9–10 million.
2. Aside from Palestinian camps in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, there are 19 camps in the West Bank and eight in Gaza housing refugees from 1948.
3. See Khalili (2013) for a history of modern forms of asymmetric warfare and mass confinement.
4. This includes imprisonment. Since 1967, around 650,000 Palestinians have been arrested (Rosenfeld 2011: 3–4). In the first decade of the new century, around 69,000 young males were incarcerated. Given the size of the Palestinian population in the OPTs (1 million in 1967 and around 4.5 million in 2012), this is a phenomenally high rate of arrest, detention and incarceration.
5. One-third of registered Palestinian refugees reside in 58 camps. Palestinian refugees and camps are distributed as follows: Lebanon: 436,154 registered refugees/12 camps; Jordan: 1,979,580 registered refugees/10 camps (three unofficial camps); Gaza: 1,167,572 registered refugees/8 camps; Syria: 486,946 registered refugees/9 camps (3 unofficial camps); West Bank: 727,471 registered refugees/19 camps. All figures describe areas of 1 January 2012, www.unrwa.org.
6. The word derives from the verb ‘to struggle’ in Arabic: *naadala*.
7. The 1993 and 1995 United States-brokered Palestinian-Israeli Accords, usually referred to as ‘Oslo’, are a set of interim agreements. They set up the Palestinian National Authority (PA) and detail protocols for security and economic relations.
8. cosmo.ucc.ie/cs/1064/jabowen.IPSC.
9. http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/israel_statistics.html; http://www.pcbs.ps/Portal/pcbs/PressRelease/pop_06e.pdf.
10. To be caught without an identity card is to risk arrest, a heavy fine and possible deportation. In October 2009, Israel issued Military Order 1650, an amendment to 1969 Military Order 329 ‘Order Regarding Prevention of Infiltration’, which expanded the definition of an ‘infiltrator’ to encompass ‘a person who entered the Area unlawfully following the effective date, or a person who is present in the Area and does not lawfully hold a permit’. The penalty can be seven years imprisonment or deportation. ‘Area’ is not defined, although the title of the amendment includes ‘Judea and Samaria’ (Israeli terms denoting the West Bank) nor is what type of permit detailed. In essence, deportations have been legalized.
11. The ‘diet’ was supposed to dry up support for Hamas. Conel Urquhart, ‘Gaza on the Brink of Implosion as Aid Cut-Off Starts to Bite’, *The Observer*, 15 April 2006.
12. See Mbembe (2003) on necropolitics.
13. UNRRA and early UNRWA included the term ‘rehabilitation’ in their names, suggesting the need for remaking both socially and politically.

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