

The multi-faceted role of religious actors in democratization processes: empirical evidence from five young democracies

Mirjam Künkler^{a*} and Julia Leininger^b

^aPrinceton University, NJ, USA; ^bDeutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), Bonn, Germany

(Received April 2009; final version received August 2009)

The article comparatively investigates the role of religious actors in the democratization processes of five ‘young’ democracies from the Catholic, Protestant, Christian-Orthodox and Muslim world: West Germany after World War II (1945–1969), Georgia and Ukraine post-1987/9, Mali (post-1987), and Indonesia from 1998. The analysis provides an overview of the roles religious actors played in the erosion of authoritarian rule, the transition to democracy and subsequent democratic consolidation processes, as well as de-democratization processes. Our three paired comparisons, including one in-country comparison, show that the condition which most affected the role of religious actors in all three phases of democratic transitions was the de facto autonomy they enjoyed vis-à-vis the political regime as well as the organizational form these actors took. Their aims, means, and the political significance of their theology were highly dependent on the extent to which they benefitted from de facto autonomy within the state.

Keywords: democratization; religion; Germany; Georgia; Indonesia; Mali; Ukraine; paired comparisons

Introduction

Little systematic research has been undertaken that examines the influence of religious authorities and organizations on the erosion of authoritarian regimes and on the success of transitions to democracy. Despite the fact that transition theorists also speak of the Third Wave of Democracy as ‘The Catholic Wave’,¹ few attempts have been made to systematize the factors that determine the contributions of religious actors to democratization processes and de-democratization processes.²

An important large-N study that addresses this lacuna is the Harvard Research Project on Religion and Global Affairs.³ The research project examined all democratic transitions that occurred between 1972 and 2000, and discovered that in about a third of all 82 identified cases, religious actors played a significant and

*Corresponding author. Email: kuenkler@princeton.edu

constructive role towards democratization. In contrast to what one might expect, crucial factors that appeared to facilitate a largely constructive impact of religious actors were not particular liberal theologies, gender-egalitarian values or the existence of democratic internal organizational structures of religious organizations. Rather, the research project concluded that religious actors and institutions exerted a positive role towards the erosion of authoritarian power and a democratic transition, when they enjoyed substantial freedom from state control and possibilities to avert state co-optation. This was particularly the case where they benefited from: (1) some legal autonomy which allowed them to become a platform for dissent somewhat immune to state intervention, and (2) transnational linkages which made them financially less dependent on domestic sources of income.⁴

In this article, we comparatively present the findings of six case studies that investigate the role of religious actors in the democratization processes of five 'young' democracies: West Germany (1945–1969), Georgia (1987–2007), Ukraine (1989–2007), Mali (1987–2007), and Indonesia (1991–2007). Each case study examines the role of religious actors in all three phases of democratization: the opening of the authoritarian regime, the democratic transition, and the processes of democratization and de-democratization once the formal-institutional transition to democratic rule had been achieved. The case studies are contributions to a volume we recently edited that presents in three paired comparisons evidence from the Catholic, Protestant, Christian-Orthodox and Muslim world.⁵

How did religious actors in these five societies support or impede the erosion of authoritarian rule, the transition to a democratic order and the consolidation of democratic politics? Did the extent to which they could politically influence these processes hinge primarily on their legal and financial independence from the state, as the Harvard research project found to be the case in its studies? If not, what were other factors conditioning the influence of religious actors on processes of (de-)democratization?⁶ And finally, through which means did religious actors exert their influence?

By investigating the role of religious actors in democratization processes, we assume religious actors exert an impact on such processes. While we show that religious actors did not determine democratic outcomes, we illustrate the variation with which they have affected processes of regime change and elucidate the political, legal and institutional conditions under which their role has been significant. Finally, the article revisits the democratic compatibility debate – that suggests Protestantism is more conducive to democratization than other religious dominations – and clarifies whether our case studies render credence to arguments about Christian-Orthodox and Muslim exceptionalism.

In the following, we will first give a brief overview of the analysed cases, preceded by a note on methodology. In the subsequent empirical section, we showcase the variety of influences exerted by religious actors on democratization processes. In the third analytical section, we examine the reasons behind these different influences. This will lead to concluding reflections on common patterns that have prompted religious actors to support or obstruct democratization across the six cases.

1. Case selection and methodology

In our case selection we prioritized three criteria. First, we looked for overall variance in religious denomination and therefore chose cases that involve churches from Western Christianity, churches from Eastern Christianity, and organizations and authorities from the Muslim world. Secondly, we designed the comparison to show variance within each of the three sets: from the Western Christian world we chose the Protestant and Catholic Church in West Germany, from the Christian-Orthodox world we chose Orthodox churches in Ukraine and Georgia, and from the Muslim-majority world we chose Islamic actors in Indonesia and Mali. Thirdly, we selected countries that have undergone a transition to democratic rule and have experienced at least a decade of consolidation without reversal to autocracy – countries which, in the words of Freedom House, can be considered free or at least partly free (see Table 1).

1.1 Democratization

Democratization processes are classically thought of as a three-stage process, divided into the phase of ‘the opening’ during which authoritarian rule is sufficiently eroded so as to make way for a sustainable oppositional challenge; the phase of the transition itself, during which a fundamental change in the nature of power takes place; and the phase of consolidation, during which democracy becomes the ‘only game in town’.⁷ In *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996) conceive of a transition as ‘complete’ when four requirements are met: there is sufficient agreement about political procedures to produce an elected government; the government is a direct result of universal, free and fair elections; the government has the *de facto* authority to generate new policies; and there is no *de jure* power-sharing outside the executive, legislative, and judicial branches.⁸

A democracy is consolidated when, *behaviourally*, ‘no significant political groups attempt to overthrow the democratic regime or secede from the state’; *attitudinally*, the overwhelming majority of the people believe that any further change should take place within the perimeters of ‘democratic formulas’, even in the face of severe economic and political crises; and *constitutionally*, all ‘governmental and non-governmental forces’ become both subjected and habituated to the resolution of conflict within specific laws, procedures and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic regime.⁹ Consolidated democracies need to have in place five interacting and mutually reinforcing arenas, each with its own organizing principle: a state apparatus (rational-legal bureaucratic norms), rule of law (constitutionalism), political society (free and inclusive electoral contestation), civil society (freedom of association and communication), and economic society (an institutionalized market).

Finally, in the spirit of Charles Tilly, we fully acknowledge that democratization processes may be accompanied by simultaneous de-democratization processes and that democratization processes are always reversible, although over time that possibility decreases.¹⁰

Table 1. Countries of the 'fourth wave of democratization' by their majority religion and the development of their Freedom House status (1989–2009).^a

Majority religion	Freedom House status ^b	
	'Free' in 2009	'Partly free' in 2009
Predominantly Catholic/Protestant	Benin (10), Chile (5), Croatia (5), Czech Republic (11), German Democratic Republic (10), Estonia (9), Guyana (4), Hungary (5), Latvia (8), Lesotho (6), Lithuania (9), Marshall Islands (0), Mexico (2), Micronesia (0), Namibia (3), Panama (10), Poland (5), Slovenia (7), Slovakia (11), South Africa (7)	Burundi (4), Kenya (5), Liberia (4), Madagascar ^c (2), Malawi (5), Mozambique (7), Nicaragua (3), Zambia (5)
Predominantly Christian-Orthodox	Bulgaria (10), Romania (10), Serbia (4), Ukraine (6)	Georgia (3), Moldova (3), Montenegro (3), Macedonia (3)
Predominantly Muslim	Indonesia (5), Mali (7)	Albania (8), Bangladesh (0), Bosnia-Herzegovina (2), Burkina Faso (3), Gambia (-5), Guinea-Bissau (4), Niger (6), Nigeria ^d (2), Senegal (1), Sierra Leone (5) ^e
Predominantly Hindu		Nepal (1)
Predominantly Buddhist	Mongolia (10) Taiwan ^f (4)	Thailand (-4)

^a Following Schmidt, *Demokratietheorien. Eine Einführung*, the 'Fourth Wave' comprises countries that started democratic transitions after 1989. McFaul similarly dates the beginning of the Fourth Wave in the early 1990s. See McFaul, *The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship*. Only countries with a minimum population of 1 million are included.

^b Since 1972, Freedom House has annually classified the status of political rights and civil liberties in most countries around the world on a scale between 1 (free) and 7 (unfree). We replicate the methodology of Schmidt 2008 and indicate in brackets the points countries improved in their Freedom House Status since the beginning of the fourth wave in 1989. For instance, '5' indicates a country has improved five points on the freedom scale (i.e. has become 'more free') between 14 (most unfree: 7 on the political rights scale plus 7 on the civil liberties scale) and 2 (most free: 1 on the political rights scale plus 1 on the civil liberties scale). As the table indicates, between 1989 and 2009, out of all the countries that started a transition towards democracy, only in Gambia and Thailand did the degree of freedom citizens enjoy substantially deteriorate.

^c In Madagascar, 41% of the population is Christian, whereas the majority of 52% adheres to local religions.

^d In Nigeria, 50% of the population is Muslim, 40% is Christian.

^e For the Muslim-majority set, it should be noted that beside Indonesia and Mali listed as 'free' here, Albania, Senegal and Turkey are all scored as democracies in other authoritative indices, such as Polity IV and the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, at least since the mid-2000s. On a scale between -10 (authoritarian) and +10 (democratic), the last issue of Polity IV has scored Albania at 9, Indonesia and Senegal at 8, and Mali and Turkey at 7.

^f In Taiwan, 93% of the population is Buddhist/Taoist.

Source: Schmidt, *Demokratietheorien. Eine Einführung*, World Fact Book (2009), and Freedom House (2009). For the CIA World Factbook 2009, see <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook>. For Freedom House ratings, see www.freedomhouse.org

We conceptualize the nature of the influence religious actors exert on democratization processes with three attributes: religious actors play a *constructive* role, where they directly or indirectly contribute to one or several of the three phases of democratization: the erosion of authoritarian rule, ensuring the democratic outcome of the transition, or the consolidation of democratic norms, modes of behaviour and attitudes. Examples of direct constructive influence include mass mobilization by Islamic actors against the continued reign of President Suharto in New Order (authoritarian) Indonesia, while the willingness to subject one's religious schools to state oversight and cooperate in curriculum development with a young democratic administration, for instance, would be an indirect constructive influence.

Secondly, religious actors play an *obstructive* role, where they directly or indirectly obstruct the erosion of an authoritarian regime, the democratic outcome of a transition or the consolidation of democratic norms, modes of behaviour and attitudes. Thirdly, religious actors play a *destructive* role, when they pro-actively and directly inhibit the internalization of democratic norms, modes of behaviour or attitudes. As will be seen below, religious actors may simultaneously render legitimacy to new democratic governments and thereby decrease the likelihood of authoritarian reversal, while also preventing the diffusion of egalitarian norms due to their incompatibility with certain tenets of their creed. There may be cases, in other words, where religious actors (like other actors) contribute directly and indirectly to both democratization and de-democratization processes at the same time. As we will see below, whatever is the majority religion may be reluctant to support an expansion of equal rights to religious minorities and agnostics and to give up state-endowed privileges enjoyed during the previous authoritarian regime. Similarly, religious actors may overall exert a positive role in one phase of democratization, while their actions may have adverse effects to democratization in another phase. Finally, one should note that while religious actors may contribute to the erosion of an authoritarian regime in the opening phase, this need not imply that they share democratic convictions or advocate a democratic (as opposed to a theocratic or otherwise authoritarian) alternative.

1.2 Religious actors, secularism, and religion–state relations

Drawing on Peter Berger's classic, *The Sacred Canopy* (1969), we think of religion as a 'set of beliefs that connects the individual to a community, and in turn to a sense of being or purpose that transcends the individual and the mundane'.¹¹ In the following, we use the phrase 'religious actors' as encompassing, on the individual level, religious authorities and intellectuals, and on the societal level, institutions and associations. On the individual level, religious authorities are those who have acquired the theological qualifications that prevail in a given religion or denomination. This usually involves several years of theological training with the subsequent licence to interpret the religious sources and to express normative and behavioural recommendations on the basis of these sources.

Religious institutions are those that address the spiritual, social, economic and/or political needs and interests of a religious group. These institutions vary with regard to their: (1) level of *organization* (how many of the potentially religious are *de facto* organized?); (2) level of *institutionalization* (how regularized is the protocol, how regulated are the competencies within the organization?); and (3) their *political function* (which function does the institution perform vis-à-vis society, beyond its core constituency?).¹²

Who are the religious actors in our five ‘young’ democracies and which organizational form did they take? In West Germany, the units of analysis are: the Catholic Church and the Protestant Church (*Evangelische Kirche Deutschland*, EKD), which in 1950 ‘organized’ 44% and 51% of all German citizens respectively.¹³ In our Christian-Orthodox set, we are dealing with the Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Georgia, several autocephalous Orthodox churches in Ukraine as well as several other organized religious groups in Ukraine. In Georgia, between 1996 and 2007, 70%–86% self-identified as nominally Christian Orthodox.¹⁴ In Ukraine, about 60% of the population are Christian-Orthodox, but less than 20% were declared members of churches in 2006.¹⁵ Finally, which religious organizations are we dealing with in the case studies from the Muslim world? Many analysts make a point of underscoring the extent to which religion in Muslim-majority countries is much less organized than is the case in most Christian-majority countries. This is however only partially true and varies from country to country. The religious landscapes of both Mali and Indonesia are dominated by well-structured institutionalized religious organizations. In the case of Mali, these are local and decentralized Sufi orders¹⁶ as well as strong administrative mosque committees, which in total organize about 40% of the population.¹⁷ In the case of Indonesia, they are multi-million member Islamic organizations, of which about 35% of the 206 million Indonesian Muslims are members.¹⁸ The large Islamic organizations of Indonesia also have their own training institutions in place (mosque and school networks) to educate and certify new generations of theologians who reflect the same school of thought and law (*mazhab*). Besides theological training, they run about 13% of Indonesia’s primary and secondary schools and administer a significant part of the health system by providing hospitals, clinics and health centres adjacent to their schools.

To sum up, in our case studies of West Germany, Ukraine and Georgia, the churches are the primary religious actors under review, while in Mali and Indonesia it is Islamic organizations and individual religious authorities which are our focus.

1.2.1 *Secularization and religion-state-relations*

In the study of democratization, institutional secularism (understood as strict separation between religion and state) has been widely seen as a precondition for democracy.¹⁹ Recent research clearly challenges this assumption.²⁰ Although we cannot go into the details of this academic debate here, we will shortly introduce our understanding of key concepts, as the question of (secular) religion–state

relations is important to the behaviour of religious actors in the transition phase, in particular with regard to which normative understanding of democracy they would support in constitutional drafting or reform processes.

The debate around the concepts of secularism and secularization has involved a myriad of different notions of these terms. While we agree with José Casanova (1994) that secularization is best understood as a process of differentiation of the secular spheres (state, law, economy, science) from religious institutions and norms, i.e. the transfer of persons, things, meanings, etc., from ecclesiastical or religious to civil or lay use, possession or control,²¹ we believe that for the purposes of this article, the descriptive-institutional notion of 'religion–state relations' is sufficient to provide the background to the legal and political environment in which religious actors operate vis-à-vis the state.²² Therefore, the following analysis is based on the assumption that democracy needs the 'twin tolerations',²³ but does not require secularity in the sense of a strict separation of state and religion. Recent research has shown that such a separation can rarely be found *de jure*, and is *de facto* nowhere present in contemporary democracies.²⁴ In his examination of comparative institutional religion–state relations, Jonathan Fox concludes that:

only one state in the study [of 152 countries surveyed], the US, has absolute SRAS [separation of religion and state]. The explanation for this cannot be found in any uniqueness in the US constitutional structure. Of the 128 states in this study for which I was able to obtain an English-language copy of their constitution, 50 of them (including the US) have constitutional clauses or the equivalent that declare SRAS. Yet the majority of these states do not have SRAS. What seems to differentiate the US from other states with constitutional SRAS clauses is not the clauses themselves but, rather, the enforcement of those clauses. The US court system traditionally strictly interprets the establishment clause of the US Constitution. Based on these results, this policy appears to be the exception rather than the rule.²⁵

1.3 Presentation of the cases

Our first paired comparison examines the role of the Catholic and the Protestant Church in the democratic consolidation process of West Germany 1945–1969 (compare overview in Table 2).²⁶ West German democracy, as the most long-standing democracy in our set, and one often referred to as a 'success story' of democratization in light of the pervasiveness of its totalitarian past,²⁷ generates insights into broader patterns and forms of interaction between the state and religious actors. Given the nature of West Germany's democratization process as based on an *intervention* where the erosion of the previous authoritarian regime was achieved primarily from outside rather than within (as opposed to Huntington's *replacements*, *transplacements* and *transformations*), our discussion of the German case focuses on the phases of transition and consolidation.²⁸

The second paired comparison analyses the role of the Christian Orthodox churches in the stagnating transitions before and after the Orange Revolution in

Ukraine²⁹ and before and after the Rose Revolution in Georgia.³⁰ In these two states, the transition to democracy involved cooperation between incumbents and the opposition at the beginning of the 1990s and thus took the form of a *trans-placement*. Our third paired comparison examines the role of Islamic leaders and organizations in the erosion of authoritarianism, transition to democracy and its consolidation in Mali after 1987³¹ and Indonesia after 1991, two cases of democratization from below (*replacement*).³²

2. The constructive, obstructive and destructive influences of religious actors in democratization processes

In all six case studies, religious actors did not effect the democratic outcome of political transformation processes. However, with variation in the context, the constructive impact of certain religious actors outweighed the obstructive or destructive influences of the same or other religious actors. Religious actors buttressed existing democratic developments and tendencies through their engagement in public life, for instance through civil society activism, social movements, lobby organizations, or political parties.³³

While it is not possible to summarize the findings of all six case studies in a way that would do all justice, we will highlight the defining characteristics of the processes under review in the following sections of the article, examining the influence of religious actors in each of the three phases of democratization. We provide additional findings in the tables in order to generate a more complete picture of the cases under review (see Tables 3–5).

2.1 Opening phase: the role of religious actors in the erosion of authoritarianism

In four of our six case studies (Indonesia, Ukraine, Mali, and Georgia), religious actors had a constructive role to play in the opening phase, particularly so in Ukraine and in Indonesia (see Table 3).³⁴ In Indonesia, the two largest Islamic organizations in the country, the modernist Muhammadiyah and the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), contributed to the erosion of authoritarian power in the 1990s and more importantly, to the acceptance – among grassroots as well as elites – of a democratic alternative.³⁵ Significantly, the NU, the largest organization in the country, had argued as early as 1984 that Islam was compatible with the equality of non-Muslim citizens and that Indonesia, the largest Muslim-majority state in the world, would not need to adopt Islam as the official state religion or expand the jurisdiction of religious law in order to protect or promote the Muslim identity of its citizens. According to the NU position, the protection of religious diversity on part of the government was legitimate (or perhaps even warranted) from the viewpoint of Islam. Amien Rais, the chairman of the *Muhammadiyah*, furthermore, played a crucial role in holding together anti-regime coalitions between pro-democratic and anti-democratic students groups, whose demonstrations

Table 2. Overview of case studies: democratic assessment and regime types.

	Pre-democratic regime type ^a	Type of transition ^b	Transition-phase	Freedom House (2009) ^c				BTI (2008) ^e		
				Political rights	Civil liberties	Degree of freedom	Polity IV (2008) ^d	Democracy Index (rank)	Management Index (rank)	Status Index (rank)
Germany	Totalitarian regime	Intervention	1945–1949	1949 n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1949 10			
				2009 1	1	free	2007 10			
Georgia	Post-totalitarian regime	Transplacement	1991–1995	1995 4	5	partly free	1995 4	6,9 (42)	6,63 (23)	6,6 (38)
				2009 4	4	partly free	2007 6			
Ukraine	Post-totalitarian regime	Transplacement	1990–2004	2004 4	4	partly free	2004 6	7,4 (35)	5,21 (55)	6,93 (35)
				2009 3	2	free	2007 7			
Indonesia	Authoritarian regime	Replacement	1998–2004	2004 3	4	partly free	2004 8	6,5 (54)	5,27 (53)	6,17 (48)
				2009 2	3	free	2007 8			
Mali	Authoritarian regime	Replacement	1991–1992	1992 2	3	free	1992 7	7,3 (36)	6,25 (26)	6,16 (49)
				2009 2	3	free	2007 7			

^a Typology based on Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, 5–6, see endnote 9.

^b Transition type as defined by Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Chapter 3. see endnote 29.

^c The first year refers to the end of the transition phase in each country. Since 1972, Freedom House has classified the status of political rights and civil liberties in most countries around the world on a scale between 1 (free) and 7 (unfree). Countries with an average score of political rights and civil liberties between 1 and 2.5 are considered 'free', those with an average score between 3 and 5 'partly free'.

^d Polity classifies countries on a scale between –10 to +10 annually. Ratings capture the degree of contestation and transparency of political systems. Countries with a score of +7 and above are generally considered to be democratic.

^e The Bertelsmann-Transformation-Index comprises a Status-Index (which captures the status of the transformation towards both democracy (in the Democracy-Index) and a market economy (in the Market Index)) and a Management-Index (which captures the success of political elites to manage the transformation considering varying levels of difficulty). The Status-Index is the mean of the Democracy-Index and the Market-Index (the latter is not shown here). The Democracy-Index measures the progress towards democracy along five criteria (stateness, political participation, rule of law, stability of democratic institutions, political and social integration) and 20 indicators. The Management-Index measures management performance along four criteria (steering capability, resource efficiency, consensus building and international cooperation). Scores given along each of the 18 indicators range from a minimum 1 to a maximum 10. 'Rank' reflects a given country's rank among the 125 countries covered in the index, with 1 being the most successful, 125 being the least successful.

Sources: Freedom in the World Country Ratings 1972–2007 (www.freedomhouse.org); Polity IV Project (<http://www.systemicpeace.org>); Transitionphase: Germany: Wolfrum, Wolfrum, *Die geglü ckte Demokratie*; Georgia: Jawad, *Democratic Consolidation in Georgia after the 'Rose Revolution'?*; Ukraine: Birch, *Elections and Democratization in Ukraine*; Indonesia: Liddle and Mujani, *Indonesian Democracy. From Transition to Consolidation*; Mali: Leininger, *Die ambivalente Rolle islamischer Akteure im malischen Demokratisierungsprozess*.

Table 3. The role of religious actors in the erosion of the authoritarian regime.^a

	Constructive	Obstructive
Georgia (1987– 1991)	Religious actors play virtually no role, and have an indirect influence, if any. They give tacit support for anti-regime demonstrations in April 1989. Emphasis is placed on subversive potential of Georgian nationalism against Soviet state.	
Ukraine (1989– 1990)	Religious actors appeal to the state to expand civil liberties (specifically freedom of association and press) and thereby contribute indirectly to opening of regime.	The Russian Orthodox Church functions as the only official church of the country and serves as an arm of Soviet influence in Ukraine.
Indonesia (1991– 1998)	NU formulates democratic alternative from Islamic perspectives in 1980s; Abdurrahman Wahid founds <i>Forum Demokrasi</i> in 1991. <i>Muhammadiyah</i> mobilizes thousands of members for demonstrations against Suharto in 1997 and 1998. Islamist student movement KAMMI meets with military generals who implicitly advocate non-democratic future regime. ^{b,c}	ICMI founded in 1991, represents sectarian interests and channels potential opposition activists into regime-sponsored organization. UN chair Abdurrahman Wahid calls for end to anti-system demonstrations.
Mali (1987– 1991)	<i>Salafiyya</i> groups and Imams support idea of a multi-party system through public statements and newspapers. <i>Hizboulla al Islamiya</i> members participate in anti-regime demonstrations but do not support democratization. ^c	Bala Kalé, Imam of the <i>Grande Mosque</i> in Bamako and head of AMUPI prompts Muslims to support the authoritarian regime.

^a Since Germany's totalitarian regime ended abruptly with the country's defeat in World War II, the role of religious actors in the erosion of Nazi Germany is not considered here. Generally, it must be said that the churches were *gleichgeschaltet* during the Nazi regime, and except for very small pockets of resistance such as the Protestant 'Bekennende Kirche' (Confessing Church), supported, legitimized, or at least did not actively oppose, Nazi rule.

^b Although the Indonesian KAMMI and the Malian *Hizboulla al Islamiya* did not favour a democratic alternative, they contributed to the erosion of the authoritarian regime.

^c Eroding an authoritarian regime is distinct from participating in the construction of a democratic alternative. Whether the democratic option prevails over theocratic and authoritarian alternatives, is a question settled in the transition period, and therefore dealt with in the section below.

and street protests ultimately induced President Suharto to resign.³⁶ The actions of some religious leaders and organizations contributed to the erosion of this authoritarian regime, even though they did not necessarily fully endorse a democratic alternative at the time. The Islamist student movement, Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa

Islam Indonesia (KAMMI), met several times with certain military generals who likely envisioned a non-democratic future regime. If this alliance had prevailed over other groups, it would have likely replaced the New Order³⁷ by another kind of authoritarianism.³⁸ The prevailing of democratically-minded Islamic leaders and groups over movements like KAMMI was therefore crucial.

In Ukraine, many anti-communist activists were themselves religious authorities in the lower ranks of the ecclesiastic hierarchy or had been socialized in a highly religious environment. They were motivated by the desire both to resist state suppression (all indigenous religious organizations were prohibited; only the Russian Orthodox Church that was locally installed by the Soviet Union was legal), as well as to create a common Ukrainian national church. Especially the illegal Greek-Catholic Church in West Ukraine, which operated in the underground, indirectly rendered support to the emerging democratic opposition with its calls for the legalization of alternative sources of information and the toleration of discursive spaces insulated from state intervention.³⁹

Although partly constructive, the role of religious actors in the opening phase remained minor in both Mali and in Georgia. During the authoritarian regime of Moussa Traoré (1961–1990) only one Islamic organization was legally recognized, the *Association Malien pour l'Unité et Progrès d'Islam* (AMUPI), which predominantly consisted of Sufi orders. Being mostly co-opted by the state and financially dependent upon the regime, AMUPI remained largely apolitical. Only the *Salafiyya* fringe groups (with which about 5.5% Malians identify) openly criticized the Traoré regime and called for a multi-party system and a secular order⁴⁰ that would guarantee an independent space for religious actors.⁴¹ Although the *Salafiyya* were able to contribute to the opposition's democratic debate and gathered support particularly in rural areas, unlike Indonesian religious actors they lacked the mass support and capacity to mobilize that would have permitted them to have a significant role to play in the ousting of President Moussa Traoré.⁴² Only a small, anti-democratic group, the *Hizboulla al Islamiya*, is known to have participated in the mass demonstrations in late March 1991, which finally led to the overthrow of the Traoré regime.

In Georgia, the Orthodox Church decided to sanctify national hero Ilja Tschawtschawadse in the midst of *glasnost* and thereby bolstered Georgian nationalism against the Soviet regime.⁴³ The Orthodox Church generally, however, shied away from taking explicit oppositional stances. The political significance of its actions was tacit at best.

Some religious actors also exerted an obstructive effect on the erosion of the New Order in Indonesia, the pre-democratic regime in Mali, and Soviet rule in Ukraine. An Association of Islamic Intellectuals (ICMI) was founded in Indonesia in 1991 which became an important vehicle for Muslim sectarian interests. Although internally diverse in its ideological orientations, ICMI took the wind out of the sails of that part of the anti-Suharto opposition that felt Muslims were not adequately represented in the army and state bureaucracy. By giving Muslim elites the sense that Suharto's New Order was now more responsive to their

interests, the establishment of ICMI co-opted parts of the opposition and obstructed the democratic opening. The leaders of the two largest Islamic organizations, *Muhammadiyah* and NU, also played ambiguous roles during the breakdown of the New Order. The disdain of NU's chairman Abdurrahman Wahid for street protests and demonstrations and his (unheeded) public call for an end to the seizure of the national legislature could have put an end to the public uprising. In Mali, Bala Kalé, the Imam of the *Grande Mosque* in the capital city, Bamako, and the head of the only legalized Islamic organization at that time, called for members to support the authoritarian regime rather than join the emerging democracy movement.⁴⁴ In Ukraine, the engagement of religious actors in the underground was outperformed by the strong involvement in authoritarian politics of the Russian Orthodox Church – itself a major pillar to Soviet rule.⁴⁵

Overall, the influence of religious actors in contributing to the erosion of the authoritarian order remained minor in Mali, Ukraine and Georgia, in contrast to Indonesia. These findings reflect the results of the Harvard Research Project on Religion and Global Politics, in that religious actors in the former three countries were far less independent financially and legally from the regime. While NU and the *Muhammadiyah* in Indonesia functioned as relatively autonomous civil society organizations that could to some extent resist the meddling of the regime into its internal affairs and its activities, the Ukrainian illegal churches' political involvement was by far outweighed by that of the Russian Orthodox Church. The more independent religious actors were in organizational terms – such as the Greek-Catholic Church in West Ukraine and the lower-ranking clergy of the underground autocephalous churches – the more significant was their contribution to the erosion of authoritarian rule. The autocephalous Orthodox Church of Georgia and the only legally recognized Muslim organization in Mali, AMUPI, were tightly intertwined with politics. They were both effectively co-opted by the state.

2.2 Transition phase: the role of religious actors in the establishment of democratic rule

As a result of the democratic transition, all five countries under review either passed new constitutions, or substantively revised their extant one (see Table 4).⁴⁶ The contribution of religious actors to these processes varied, depending on their organizational form and the legal space in which they could operate.⁴⁷ In all cases, the nature of religion–state relations during the preceding regime exerted a strong impact on the design of religion–state relations in new or revised constitutions.

The German Basic Law of 1949 in many respects reflects provisions from the Constitution of the Weimar Republic, including those of church–state law and the cooperative nature of religion–state relations.⁴⁸ Article 4 of the Basic Law corresponds to the guarantees of positive religious freedom as defined in the Weimar Reichsverfassung (WRV) of 1919. Article 140 of the Basic Law explicitly incorporates articles 136–9 and 141 of the WRV into the new constitution. While religious freedom is guaranteed, churches enjoy a privileged position in

Table 4. The role of religious actors in the transition phase.

	Constructive	Obstructive	Destructive
West Germany/ Catholic Church (1945–1949)	Catholic Church influences constitution-building through Christian politicians, particularly of the CDU.		Catholic Bishops and lay councils threaten not to recognize the Basic Law.
West Germany/ Protestant Church (1945–1949)	EKD legitimizes the young democracy's first democratic elections by explicitly asking members to vote.		
Georgia (1991–1995)		The Orthodox Church of Georgia nearly succeeds in negotiating for itself the status of an established church.	The Orthodox Church of Georgia retains the connection of ethnicity to religion, thereby exacerbating ethnic conflict.
Ukraine (1990–2004)	Religious organizations actively lobby during the constitutional drafting process for the non-establishment of any church and the legal equality of all religious organizations in the country. Religious authorities run for elections. Religious organizations endorse newly founded religious parties.	The Russian Orthodox Church increasingly becomes a tool for Russia to secure its interests in Ukraine and maintain its influence in both civil and political society.	
Indonesia (1998–2004)	Amien Rais (<i>Muhammadiyah</i>) leads four rounds of constitutional revisions. Abdurrahman Wahid (NU) abandons prohibitions against Confucian practices.	Religious parties (unsuccessfully) advocate the establishment of a religious quota system in the public administration and government, and a stronger role for Islamic law.	Religious leaders, including Amien Rais, incite inter-religious and anti-Chinese violence.
Mali (1991–1992)	Islamic associations contribute to constitution-making in National Conference (NC). Parts of <i>Salafiyya</i> and others who favoured an Islamic order accept results of NC and submit to democratic rule.	Some Islamic associations, under the leadership of <i>Hizboullah</i> , create an umbrella organization to counter democratic order, but fail due to lack of popular support.	

comparison to other civil society organizations by virtue of being recognized as public corporations that may collect taxes. Accordingly, the churches strongly advocated the preservation of their privileges granted in the Weimar Constitution and ultimately succeeded in having their pre-1933 legal status restored. Yet substantive disagreement ensued over the role of religious instruction in public education. Catholic Bishops and Catholic lay councils threatened not to recognize the new constitution, unless parents were granted the right to instruct their children in religious matters.⁴⁹ Eventually, voluntary religious instruction in public education was agreed upon.⁵⁰

The Georgian Constitution of 1995 provides for religious freedom in article 19 (1); and article 19 (2) prohibits persecution and discrimination based on speech, thought, conviction and belief. Article 9 grants freedom of belief and religion, but also acknowledges the Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Georgia for its historic role in the struggle for independence and self-determination of the Georgian people. Article 9, and in particular this acknowledgement, was a compromise between those advocating an established state church, on the one hand, and those insisting on the separation of church and state, on the other. While the Orthodox Church of Georgia failed to negotiate for itself the status of an established church, it was granted extraordinary privileges and exclusive access to material and immaterial resources of the state: Only the Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Georgia and no other church/religious organization is recognized as a public corporation and is exempt from paying taxes. Only its priests are exempted from military service and only they qualify to serve as chaplains in hospitals and the military.

The Ukrainian Constitution of 1996 explicitly stipulates the separation of religion and state, and emphasizes that no religion may be imposed by the state (Article 35). Religious communities maintain their own houses of worship and organize the training of the clergy in their own private institutions of higher learning. Religious organizations collect their own dues and receive no financial support from the state. However, religious non-devotional instruction is provided as an obligatory school subject in all public schools from grades 1–12 under the rubric of ‘Christian ethics’. All major holidays that are celebrated by the Orthodox and the Greek-Catholic Churches are recognized as public holidays by the state. Religious organizations other than the Russian Orthodox Church had a strong incentive to actively lobby during the constitutional drafting process before 1996 for the non-establishment of any church and the legal equality of all religious organizations in the country.⁵¹

Simultaneously, the Russian Orthodox Church increasingly became a tool used by Russia to effect certain Russian influences in civil society, and in political society through the association of religious parties with particular churches and the (unsuccessful) public calls on part of Russian Orthodox clergy to elect a Russia-friendly presidential candidate in 2004.⁵²

In Indonesia, the most defining characteristics of religion–state relations were not changed when the 1945 constitution (with the pan-religious, neither Islamist

nor secularist national ideology of *pancasila*) underwent four rounds of revision between 1999 and 2001. Beside the recognized official religions of Islam, Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism, the country officially recognized Confucianism as one additional 'religion', but did not allow for the disconnection of citizenship and religion. Indonesians continue to need to identify themselves as members of one of the official religions on identity cards and state documents, and those who profess none or other religions (such as Judaism or local religions), need to falsely declare themselves adherents to one of the official creeds.

Remarkably, the most important product of the transition, the reformed constitution, was heavily shaped by the involvement of leading Muslim politicians and representatives of Islamic interests, who steered the country through renewed discussions about the expansion of Islamic law and the introduction of a quota system in parliament and the public service based on religion. However, none of these proposals won majority support. The constitutional revisions were started during the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid, the former chairman of the largest traditional Islamic organization, *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU), and were undertaken under the leadership of the then parliamentary speaker Amien Rais who until 1999 had been the chairman of the country's largest modernist Islamic organization (the *Muhammadiyah*). The two leaders of the most important Muslim organizations in the country were therefore centrally involved in the constitutional reforms, and it was under Wahid in 2001 that Confucianism was recognized as an official religion by reversing earlier restrictions against its recognition.

Finally, in Mali, the post-transition constitution of 25 February 1992 reaffirmed the laicist character of the state and stipulated the latter's immutability. There is no religious instruction in public schools in Mali, and no state funding for private religious schools. Citizenship is not tied to religious affiliation. Through Article 128 religious parties are prohibited. Out of the five countries studied here, Mali maintains the strongest formal institutional separation of religion and the state.⁵³ This result did not suit the interests of all of the ten Islamic organizations that had actively participated in the constitution-drafting process as official members of the National Conference (August 1992).⁵⁴ With the exception of the largest organization, AMUPI, the small and ad-hoc organizations advocated two chief demands: the abolition of the laicist orientation of the state, its replacement by Islam as an established religion, and the right to found Islamic political parties. However, these demands remained unheeded when the National Conference voted for a laicist constitution. Justifications against the religious party ban were twofold: Democracy-minded organizations such as the *Association Islamique pour le Salut au Mali* (AISLAM) viewed religious parties (just as any type of party) as part of liberal democracy. Others, the so-called *intégristes*, to which the *Hizboullah* and dissenters of AMUPI belonged, advocated Islamic law as providing a blueprint for a just social order and believed religious parties to be the natural vehicle for an Islamic agenda. When the National Conference ratified the new constitution in August 1992, most Islamic organizations accepted their defeat and ultimately consented to the document. Even though nine Islamic organizations founded the

umbrella *Comité de Coordination des Associations Islamiques du Mali* to promote an Islamic model of society, the *Comité* was never able to exert noteworthy influence on politics due to a lack of popular support and mobilizational capacity.

Comparing the six cases, the following observations stand out: Considering the output of the examined constitution-drafting processes, all five countries exhibit historical continuities with the previous order of religion–state relations. Everywhere, the democratic transition led to constitutional guarantees of the positive right to religious freedom, and everywhere, the majority religion could gain certain privileges not afforded to smaller religions.⁵⁵ Whereas the role of religious actors is relatively similar within each paired comparison, their role differed amongst the three religions: unlike the majority religions in our other cases, the officially recognized Orthodox churches contributed little to the democratic content of the emerging normative consensus. In Germany, the role of the Catholic and the Protestant Churches was more varied once they had achieved guarantees for the preservation of their privileges granted under Weimar, and the churches' ambitions to influence the constitutional process focused on matters of education rather than religious freedom. In the two Muslim-majority countries, religious actors decisively legitimized new or reformed political institutions, and sometimes were even pivotal in safeguarding and expanding legal bases for religious pluralism and diversity.⁵⁶

2.3 Consolidation phase: the role of religious actors in (de-)democratization

2.3.1 The reorganization of the religious sphere

Liberalized politics that accompany democratic transitions typically involve the deregulation of civil society as a result of the expansion of civil liberties. This deregulation may bring to light all sorts of societal groups previously suppressed by the authoritarian regime, including those of a shady nature. We observed the phenomenon of a reorganization of the religious sphere in all our case studies, where the transition period initially witnessed the mushrooming of religious organizations. In Ukraine, Mali and Indonesia, this included illiberal ones, which, however, remain until today politically marginal.

Overall, religious organizations became more diverse and multi-vocal after the democratic transition (see Table 5). In Ukraine, the national (Ukrainian) autocephalous Orthodox Church, prohibited during Soviet rule, was revived, and the Orthodox establishment split in two, with the majority re-entering the national church and a minority remaining under the Moscow patriarchate.⁵⁷ Since then the creation of one single Ukrainian Orthodox Church is a highly politicized topic that dominates the public discourse. The politically influential Greek-Catholic community re-emerged as a vocal actor, and numerous other religious organizations have since taken hold in the country, to the effect that Ukraine is recognized today among sociologists of religion as the most religiously diverse country in Europe.⁵⁸ By contrast, the religious landscape of Georgia has hardly changed as a result of

Table 5. Role of religious actors in consolidation phase.

	Constructive	Obstructive	Destructive
West Germany/ Catholic Church (1949–1969)	Largest centrist party CDU founded predominantly by Catholics. In civil society, church fulfils important social functions and services (schools, hospitals, etc.). Mobilization of constituents in political demonstrations against re-militarization and against diplomatic alliances that would make German unification less likely and involve Germany in East–West polarization.	It is only at the Second Vatican Council in 1964–1967 that the Catholic Church officially recognizes the principles of religious freedom and a democratic state based on the rule of law. However, the anti-democratic stance of the church translates into anti-democratic action in Germany only in terms of the controversy over religious instruction in public schools.	
West Germany/ Protestant Church (1949–1969)	In civil society, church fulfils important social functions and services (schools, hospitals, etc.). Mobilization of constituents in political demonstrations against re-militarization and against diplomatic alliances that would make German unification less likely and involve Germany in East–West polarization.	Leading theologians are sceptical of liberal democracy and publicly oppose multi-party democracy.	

(Continued)

Table 5. Continued.

	Constructive	Obstructive	Destructive
Georgia (1995–2003/ 2003–)			Church contributes to polarization along ethnic lines and the promotion of particularist over national identities.
Ukraine (2004–)		Russian Orthodox Church is perceived as a tool used by Russia to meddle in Ukrainian domestic affairs.	
Indonesia (2004–)	The mainstream Islamic organizations speak out against domestic terrorist attacks and are generally supportive of inter-faith toleration and democracy.	State Ulama Council issues <i>fatwa</i> in 2005 against secularism, liberalism, pluralism.	Terrorist Islamist groups repeatedly bomb targets in the capital and major tourist destinations in 2002–2005.
Mali (1992–)	Most Islamic actors respect democratic rule and support it through their democratic behaviour. HCIM is democratically organized. Islamic actors are the most accepted mediators in local conflicts and contribute to social peace.	Islamic associations are veto players in specific policy fields, especially family law and the abolition of the death penalty. They succeed in hindering the passing of a new, more liberal family law.	

democratization. The Orthodox Church of Georgia continues to be the dominant religious force in the country with the highest – and since the early 1990s even increasing – share of members (1993: 65%; 2007: 87.7% of the population).⁵⁹ Moreover, on the national question, the Orthodox Church of Georgia retained its implicit connection of ethnicity and religion and did nothing to alleviate the country's conflict with Abchasia. If anything, the church's ethno-nationalist rhetoric exacerbated the exclusionary character of Georgian Orthodox identity.

In Mali, Islam was for the most part organized either in Sufi orders or in marginal *Salafiyya* groups before the opening phase. After the opening, these two groups disintegrated and numerous offshoots emerged. Today, between 135 and 190 Islamic organizations are registered in the country.⁶⁰ Although Indonesia has always been quite diverse, radical groups suppressed under the New Order and exiled into neighbouring Malaysia emerged into the open after the transition. Protestant congregations, especially those of American origin, have also mushroomed in the capitals of Java and the Eastern parts of the country.⁶¹

2.3.2 *The religious politics of consolidation*

In our two Muslim-majority societies, religious actors supported and strengthened civil society activities as well as a more democratic political society (behavioural dimension). At the same time, they normatively hindered the expansion of certain liberties, especially in the realm of family law, and more generally, gender equality (Linz and Stepan's attitudinal dimension). Certain religious actors have exerted an illiberal influence on legal reform in the realm of personal status and morality laws (which in Mali and Indonesia they feel should be regulated according to some notion of Islamic law). In Mali, rights advocacy groups have striven since the late 1990s to liberalize the family law of 1962. Various civil society actors, including religious authorities, participated in *Concertations Regionales* (regional consultation meetings) to deliberate over counter-drafts to the law, none of which have passed the legislature. Islamic organizations and authorities adhere to the democratic procedures, but take positions that are consistent neither with the notion of liberal democracy as laid out in the 1992 constitution, nor with the international conventions that Mali has signed and ratified. Parliamentarians are reluctant to pass a more egalitarian family law, in light of probable resistance from Islamic organizations and authorities, who beyond their mosque network have immediate access to believers by way of radio and television shows, as well as the 'prayer economy'.⁶² Despite these efforts, Islamic actors have failed so far to influence various political decisions concerning morality laws. For instance, bars remain open during Ramadan despite protests from Islamic organizations, and the national lottery remains legal. Recently, Mahmoud Dicko, chairman of the *Haut Conseil Islamique* (HCIM) has publicly argued against the abolition of the death penalty.

While the two large Islamic organizations of Indonesia (and their chairmen) had pivotal roles to play towards the erosion of the New Order and the success of the transition, their direct political impact on consolidation processes is harder

to identify. Internally, the organizations have diversified normatively, and differing – and often contradictory – voices emanate from their debates about religious freedom, family and morality laws. Both organizations initially founded political parties, which however have remained small and on the political margins (with 4–6%). At the same time, the state *ulama* council (MUI) has become one of the most important religious actors in the democratizing polity, with statements and *fatwas* on all major issues discussed in the legislature. As a council founded in 1975 primarily to rubberstamp the New Order's developmental policies, the council should have been abolished with the end of the Suharto era. However, fearing that such an act might strengthen critics of the newly emerging polity, the council was left intact and has since been able to consolidate its role as the authority on questions of Islamic law. In 2005, the council published a statement against secularism, liberalism and pluralism which seemed to bode ill for intra-Islamic debates on democracy and human rights norms, because it declared the three values as essentially un-Islamic. One of the two Islamic organizations eventually spoke out against the MUI statement, but it was a half-hearted affair.

In Ukraine, religious actors maintained their political influence through informal and public channels such as the media. Religious parties founded during the early transition period in the 1990s did not gain ground among voters. Instead, individual religious leaders were more socially and politically influential. In November 2004 shortly after the Orange Revolution, the representatives of the six largest religious groups wrote an open letter to President Kutschma to remind him of his duty to protect the constitution. In a standoff between the prime minister and the president, the letter tipped the balance in favour of the prime minister and thereby helped prevent a political escalation and possible slippage back into authoritarian politics.

The Orthodox Church of Georgia impeded consolidation by contributing to a further polarization along ethnic lines and the promotion of particularist over national identities. Sermons and speeches by the Katholikos-Patriarch Ilia II during the fighting in separatist regions emphasized ethnic affiliations rather than the common faith as a marker of national identity.⁶³ Particularly in Abchasia, this contributed to the ethnicization of the conflict between 1991 and 1995, and the later territorial disintegration of the Georgian state. Moreover, the Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Georgia is the most trusted institution of the country. Surveys from 2006 showed that 93% of the population approve of the work of the church, followed by the military (86%) and the media (83%). Although the church has a limited political function so far, it has an extraordinary potential to mobilize the population for or against the deepening of democratic norms and attitudes.

In Germany, similar to the Ukrainian case, some religious groups were highly involved in founding political parties and ran for political office. Both the Catholic and the Protestant Church periodically intervened into politics by functioning as a 'public conscience', and by encouraging citizens to participate in the electoral processes. Most important was perhaps the contribution of the religious academies that held public conferences and workshops designed by the occupying forces to strengthen civic and liberal norms.⁶⁴ It is interesting to note, however, how

much theologically-motivated resistance existed at the time even within the Protestant Church against a governmental system many perceived to be imposed from abroad and not a home-grown product reflecting German cultural, social and political norms.

The most outstanding insight that emanates from the comparison is that religious actors became more diverse and multi-vocal after the democratic transition and their actions harder to identify as constructive, destructive or obstructive with regard to democratizing processes. Where theological reservations against the nascent democracy existed, their invocation became less and less frequent over time, suggesting a cautionary note against over-interpreting the political significance of theology. As Asef Bayat articulates,

Resorting to mere literal readings of scripture to determine the democratic thrust of a religion will not take us very far, not only because ambiguity, multiple meanings and disagreement are embedded in many religious scriptures, but because individuals and groups with diverse interests and orientations may find their own, often conflicting truths in the very same scriptures. . . . We need to examine the conditions that allow social forces to make a particular reading of the sacred texts hegemonic. And this is closely linked to groups' capacity to mobilize consensus around their 'truth'. . . . The challenge is to give democratic interpretation material power, to infuse them with popular consciousness.⁶⁵

In light of the above quote, we feel that the Christian-Orthodox Church of Georgia has been quite successful in linking an ethnic reading to the religious text and the history of Christianity in Georgia. In Mali, religious actors based their anti-liberal public discourse against the reform of the family law on religious texts. By contrast, the NU of Indonesia was able during the 1980s to link inter-faith tolerance to the reading of their text, even if not democratic or liberal values *per se*.

In some contexts, the actions of certain religious actors had a destructive impact on democratic consolidation, but where the state enjoyed autonomy and capacity, and the society had behaviourally and attitudinally accepted democratic norms, the state was generally able to deal with such actors and their societal influence in ways not different from other (non-religious) radical opponents to the regime.

3. Factors conditioning the role of religious actors

Two factors stand out in explaining the variation of religious actors' influences across our cases and in the different phases of transformation. The first is the organizational form of religious actors, the second the extent to which they enjoyed *de facto* autonomy from interference by the state.

3.1 Organizational form of religious actors

In Germany and Indonesia, where religious organizations are mass-based, religious actors had a high mobilizational capacity,⁶⁶ which in the latter case became a

crucial vehicle in sustaining high levels of public contestation to effect regime change.⁶⁷ In Germany, the churches mobilized their constituents in political demonstrations during the consolidation phase, against re-militarization as well as against diplomatic alliances that would make German unification less likely and involve Germany in East–West polarization.

In Mali, where, like in Indonesia, a Huntingtonian replacement of power took place, Islamic actors had only a small role to play during the opening of President Traoré's authoritarian regime. While religious organizations other than AMUPI had been prohibited before 1991, a heterogeneous landscape of Islamic organizations developed in the early 1990s. In particular, small associations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with socio-political aims lobbied for particular interests in policy fields such as social security and family law. They also supported – and in the rural areas very often formed a substitute for – the state's welfare security system, for instance in regards to maternal healthcare and health education. Highly dependent on funding from abroad, these organizations function as small-scale enterprises.⁶⁸ Overall, Mali's heterogeneous religious actors possess low mobilizational capacity.

In Ukraine, where all indigenous religious organizations were prohibited before 1989 and the Russian Orthodox Church installed in their place, religious actors could hardly influence the political process. Their impact depended largely on the personal influence of individuals. After 1989, the religious landscape changed dramatically: it was revived and it spectacularly diversified. But this had little effect on the capacity of religious actors to exert political influence, as religious organizations became fragmented and their mobilizational capacity limited. Attempts to create one unified Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine were highly politicized and have thus far been unsuccessful.

The Georgian Orthodox Church retains its monopolistic hold on the 'religious market', which endows it with remarkable ideational power. With its high levels of legitimacy in the eyes of Georgian citizens, it could easily mobilize members for political causes. So far, it has limited itself to rhetoric from the pulpit.

Religious organizations in all six cases function as important providers of social welfare, running schools, kindergartens, hospitals, retirement homes, and the like, and thereby remain closely in contact with the grass roots. As such, they are invaluable to the state and thus enjoy an important bargaining chip they can use to influence certain policy-making.

3.2 The legal position of religious actors vis-à-vis political regimes

Our case studies showed that religious actors' legal position vis-à-vis the state is one of the main factors that influences their impact and the scope of their political and social engagement towards (de-)democratization. We identified the following areas that could be found in almost all of our paired comparisons and are thus relevant independent from specific religious denominations (see Table 6).

Table 6. Organizational forms of religious actors and their significance for their roles in political processes.

	Organizational form	Political significance
West Germany/ Catholic Church	Homogeneous, large organization, rooted in political and civil society Network of Catholic academies for adult education; Mass-based church fairs (' <i>Katholikentag</i> ').	Close connection to political elite and established lobby organizations; institutionally part of social security system; civic education programmes foster 'responsible citizens'; high capacity to mobilize.
West Germany/ Protestant Church	Homogeneous, large organization, rooted in political and civil society; Network of Protestant academies for adult education; Mass-based church fairs (' <i>Kirchentag</i> ').	Close connection to political elite and established lobby organizations; institutionally part of social security system; civic education programmes foster 'responsible citizens'; high mobilizational capacity.
Georgia/ Georgian Orthodox Church	Homogeneous organization with extraordinarily high level of legitimacy in population.	Potentially high capacity to mobilize.
Ukraine/ Ukrainian Orthodox Church	Fragmented organizations.	Diverse political positions result in low level of political influence; low capacity to mobilize.
Indonesia/Islamic Organizations	De-centralized and mass-based organizations, close connections to grass roots.	High capacity to mobilize.
Mali/Islamic Organizations	Heterogeneous 'landscape' of Islamic organizations: De-centralized and specialized associations and NGOs with close connections to grass roots in specific areas; Sufi centres with low level of formal institutionalization; administrative committees of mosques. Individual charismatic Muslim leaders.	Overall low capacity to mobilize; influential in specific policy areas (social and family policies) and social security function. Indirect political influence through consultations of national politicians with individual authorities (Sufi centres). Usually, no political aims (religious authorities are charismatic more than political).

Special status of majority religion. In most cases, majority religions were able to negotiate during the democratic transition a special status or at least no deterioration of their position as compared to the pre-democratic regime. For example, the Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Georgia enjoys substantive privileges that are not granted to

minority religions and, thus limit religious freedom and the scope of manoeuvre of other religious groups in the country. The German churches were able to secure their place as major officially recognized providers of social welfare and succeeded in their insistence on Christian (voluntary and non-devotional) instruction in public schools.

Formally institutionalized dialogue between state and religion. In all cases, the special status of the majority religion is reflected in the establishment of formal institutional arrangements, initiated by the state in order to enhance relations between state and religion. These institutions give the religious actors space to manoeuvre and make them an institutionalized part of national politics. Examples include the *Haut Conseil Islamique* in Mali; the state-instituted *ulama* council in Indonesia; and the Commission on Relations between State and Religion in Ukraine. These institutional provisions foster the self-organization and strengthen the formal influence of Muslim organizations beyond their diverse informal alliances with political and civil society.

Formal intermediary institutions: religious political parties. Only in one case was a religious party, the German Christian Democratic Union (CDU), successful in becoming a long-standing majority party. Whereas the party disassociated from its religious social base over time, it constituted a platform for the German Catholic Church to influence German democratization on the level of the political elite. In Ukraine, Georgia and Indonesia, where religious actors founded political parties shortly before the first post-transition legislative elections, these parties remained at the margins of politics and slowly dissociated from the religious institutions and core constituencies. Comparatively, the Malian case stands out because the constitutional ban of religious parties led to a strong channelling of political interests into a social organization in the first half of the 1990s. Today, the overall weakness of the party system in Mali, and thus the absence of a formally institutionalized intermediary level, further strengthens the Islamic organizations' role in politics through informal and formal institutions such as consultations with national politicians or the *Haut Conseil Islamique*.

4. Conclusions

We have summarized the major findings of a research project that examined the role of religious actors in democratization processes in five countries and six case studies: the Catholic and the Protestant Churches in West Germany after 1945, the Orthodox Churches in Ukraine and Georgia shortly before and after the fall of the Iron Curtain, and Islamic organizations in Mali before and after 1987 and Indonesia before and after 1998.

Overall, our comparison across religious, geographic and temporal variance showed that the role of religious actors in all three phases of democratic transitions was most influenced by the *de facto* autonomy they enjoyed vis-à-vis the political regime as well as the organizational form these actors took. Their aims, means, and

the political significance of their theology were highly dependent on their legal status within the state.

If we consider the means through which religious actors influenced (de-)democratization in our case studies, they made foremost use of *ideational* means (in the constitution-drafting processes of the transition; also in granting or withholding legitimation of political elites in all phases) and *institutional* means (as important providers of social welfare in the transition and consolidation phases). Large-scale anti-system *mobilization* was only possible in Indonesia, where the Islamic organizations enjoyed popular support among communities to call for participation in anti-system protests and benefited from the legal space to engage in sustained anti-regime activities.

With respect to the opening phase, our case studies confirmed a previous large-N research project,⁶⁹ which found that religious actors can only contribute to the erosion of an authoritarian regime where they enjoy some legal independence from the regime and a legal space in which to manoeuvre. This was the case in particular in Indonesia.

In the phase of transition, the newly emerging normative consensus was often reflected in a new or substantively revised constitution. We have summarized the findings regarding the involvement of religious actors in the constitution-drafting and ratification processes. Here religious actors' advocacy for special privileges was usually contingent upon the nature of previously extant constitutional or legislative clauses regarding religion–state relations. In all six cases, religious actors could secure certain privileges, while having to compromise on the question of religious freedom and non-establishment. In none of the five countries was the majority religion officially established as a state religion after democratization, and in all protection of religious pluralism and positive religious freedom became new constitutional norms, or were retained as such.

Finally, in the consolidation phase, a restructuring of the religious sphere took place in all five countries, with the consequence that fringe groups were able to emerge and claim space for themselves where civil society was less regulated by the state than it had been before. Some established religious actors founded political parties and thereby attempted to institutionalize their access to the legislature and important policy debates. Over time, however, the connections between these political parties and the religious actors severed and religious political parties, not unlike non-religious parties, emancipated themselves from their original social base. Equally important, religious radical groups over time presented a challenge to state authority not unlike other radical or anti-constitutional groups and a state that managed to democratically consolidate found ways to deal with such groups through conventional instruments of the rule of law. Post-transition developments in our cases studies indicate that the extent to which religion presents the exception to politics dramatically decreases over time in democratized systems of government, and religious politics (so often portrayed as inherently dangerous to democracy) became not unlike regular politics.

In the context of the debate on the compatibility of religion and democracy, it is noteworthy that leading Protestant theologians – like their Catholic counterparts – opposed democracy during the West German democratic consolidation process on theological as well as attitudinal grounds, arguing that the system prioritized individual rights over duties (which did not cohere with ‘Christian values’), that it was a foreign imposition, and that corporatist representative institutions were much closer to ‘German culture’ with its strong history of corporatist arrangements than the newly established liberal parliamentary system. This sheds a different light on the long cultivated view of Protestantism as the denomination most inclined of all towards liberal democratic norms. More importantly, it underscores once more the contextual nature of the ‘democratic compatibility’ debate.

Against the background of our findings, three questions in particular merit closer attention in academic research on religious actors in democratization. First, there is a need for systematic, both large-N and case-based, comparative research on the influence of religious actors in (de-)democratization processes, so as to improve our understanding of the conditions that shape their engagement with political and social actors and, through the latter, their impact on democratization and de-democratization processes. Second, future research should examine more closely the effect on regime legitimacy where religious actors provide crucial social services. How does the fact that religious organizations perform important welfare functions *in lieu* of the state affect the state’s legitimacy in all three phases of the transition, in particular in contexts of sheer lack of state capacity (such as Mali)? Third, the role religious actors play in the formation and reform of religion–state relations, either at constitutional moments, or in times of ‘normal politics’ when pertinent legislation is being passed, merits closer research. When and when not are religious actors able to define the agenda, to protect particularist interests, to safeguard ecclesiastical privileges? This is of interest especially in democratizing Muslim-majority countries (such as Indonesia, Mali, Senegal) when legislative proposals of personal status law are on the agenda that may qualify liberal rights and equal citizenship.

Acknowledgements

We thank Ipek Gencel Sezgin, Alfred Stepan and Jeff Haynes for their close readings and invaluable comments, as well as Maryam Rutner and Allison Wood for their research assistance.

Notes

1. Casanova, ‘Civil Society and Religion: Retrospective Reflections on Catholicism and Prospective Reflections on Islam’, 1041; Philpott. ‘The Catholic Wave’.
2. Actor-centred analyses, which are popular in the study of democratization, pay little or no attention to religious actors, see e.g. O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*. Also Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist*

Europe. Exceptions for individual case studies include Mainwaring, *The Catholic Church and Politics in Brazil, 1916–1985*; Kalyvas, *The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe*; Cheng and Brown, *Religious Organizations and Democratization: Case Studies From Contemporary Asia*; Maser, Peter, *Kirchen in der DDR*.

3. While the Harvard research project focuses on the opening and transition phases of democratization, it does not, however, examine the role of religious actors in deepening and consolidating democratic rule. More detailed findings of the Harvard research project are forthcoming in Philpott, Toft and Shah, *God's Century: Religion and the Future of Global Politics*. For an audio summary, listen to the podcast <http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/media/2007/6-21-07.mp3> (accessed March 26, 2009).
4. Examples of condition (2) can be found in numerous (pre-dominantly Latin American) countries as well as Poland and the Philippines, where the Catholic Church played a constructive role towards democratization. An example of condition (1) is, for instance, East Germany, where due to a Soviet-imposed 1953 regulation, inter-church communication could not be intercepted by the state security (STASI) and where, as a consequence, dissidents in the 1980s who otherwise were little concerned with religion and the church used church communication channels to plan protests and demonstrations. See Peter Maser, *Kirchen in der DDR*.
5. Künkler and Leininger, *Zur Rolle religiöser Akteure in Demokratisierungsprozessen*.
6. The forms and means of exercising influence are also captured in our research. For the results, see Künkler and Leininger; *Zur Rolle religiöser Akteure in Demokratisierungsprozessen*.
7. Phases of democratization were introduced by O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*. For a discussion of democracy as 'the only game in town', see Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, 5.
8. Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, 3.
9. *Ibid.*, 5–6.
10. In the words of Charles Tilly: '... democratization and de-democratization occur continuously, with no guarantee of an end point in either direction'. See Tilly, *Democracy*, 24; also Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, 6; Svobik, 'Authoritarian Reversals and Democratic Consolidation'.
11. Lundsckow, *The Sociology of Religion. A Substantive and Transdisciplinary Approach*. Peter Berger, in his *The Sacred Canopy*, identifies four questions that drive all 'religions': Who am I? Why am I here? How should I live? What happens when I die? Berger, *The Sacred Canopy. Elements of a Sociology of Religion*.
12. Religious actors are usually part of civil society, which we understand, in the spirit of Thomas Janoski, as '... a sphere of dynamic and responsive public discourse between the state, the public sphere consisting of voluntary organizations, and the market sphere concerning private firms and unions'. Compare Janoski, *Citizenship and Civil Society*. Janoski's concept is based on Jürgen Habermas, *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft*, where he divides social entities into four areas: state, private sphere, market and the public.
13. See the homepage of the German Federal Office of Statistics (Statistisches Bundesamt) www.destatis.de (accessed June 14, 2009).
14. See Boeckh, 'Orthodoxie und demokratische Transformation in der Ukraine'.
15. Ukraine. International Religious Freedom Report 2007, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2007/90205.htm> (accessed February 18, 2009); World Values Survey 2006 (compare www.worldvaluessurvey.org).

16. Sufi orders, also 'brotherhoods' or *tariqas*, are groups of students of Islam who gather around a spiritual leader ('cheick' or 'sheikh'). In Mali, the Sunni *Qadiriyya* and *Tijaniyya* are the two main orders. They associate themselves to the Maliki School of Islamic jurisprudence (*mazhab*). In contrast to neighbouring Senegal, Malian Sufi orders are loosely organized.
17. Afrobarometer, *Summary of Results. Round 3 of Afrobarometer Survey in Mali*, 13.
18. van Bruinessen, 'Islamic State or State Islam? Fifty Years of State–Islam Relations in Indonesia'.
19. The most prominent and representative work for this argument is Samuel Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*.
20. For instance see Fox, *A World Survey of Religion and the State*. For a summary of the academic debate and its political implications see Elshtain, 'Religion and Democracy'.
21. Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World*, see in particular pp. 211–15. Casanova distinguishes three different notions of secularization (differentiation of secular spheres; decline of religious beliefs in modern societies, and privatization of religion). See also Künkler and Leininger 'Säkularisierung' in Dieter Nohlen and Rainer-Olaf Schultze (eds), *Lexikon der Politikwissenschaft, Theorien, Methoden, Begriffe*.
22. The case studies summarized here aim to capture the role of religious actors in democratization processes, that is, their empirical contribution or obstruction to the dissemination and realization of democratic values and modes of behaviour.
23. The concept of the 'twin tolerations' was developed by Stepan, 'The World's Religious Systems and Democracy: Crafting The 'Twin Tolerations''. Stepan argues that state and religion are *de facto* not strictly separate in most long-standing democracies, but instead are institutionally intertwined in a system of mutual toleration. What is important from the viewpoint of democratic theory is that the two spheres ought not infringe on each other's competencies. The 'twin tolerations' model only works in a democratic state that upholds the separation of religious and political authority, and strives to take an equidistant approach towards different religious communities as well as towards religious vis-à-vis non-religious citizens.
24. Fox, *A World Survey of Religion and the State*. Also Künkler and Meyer-Resende, *A Missing Link: Why Europe Should Talk about Religion when Promoting Democracy Abroad*.
25. Fox, *Do Democracies Have Separation of Religion and State?*, 12.
26. Based on the articles by Klein, 'Die Rolle der evangelischen Kirche Deutschlands im Demokratisierungsprozess nach 1945', and Liedhegener, 'Der deutsche Katholizismus und seine konstitutive Rolle im Demokratisierungsprozess Westdeutschlands nach 1945'. When we refer to (West) Germany in the following, we always refer to Germany in the confines of the case study, i.e. West Germany 1945–1969.
27. Wolfrum, *Die gegläuckte Demokratie: Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von ihren Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*.
28. Samuel Huntington (1991) distinguishes between democratic transitions from below (which he calls *replacements*), from above (*transformations*), through cooperation between incumbents and the democratic opposition (*transplacements*) and through foreign *intervention*. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Chapter 3.
29. Boeckh, 'Orthodoxie und demokratische Transformation in der Ukraine'.
30. Jawad and Reisner, 'Die Nationalisierung der Religion in der Orthodoxen Apostolischen Kirche Georgiens – Begünstigung oder Hindernis im Demokratisierungsprozess?'.
31. Leininger, 'Die ambivalente Rolle islamischer Akteure im Demokratisierungsprozess Malis'.
32. Indonesia and Mali are two of five Muslim-majority countries that according to major political science indices qualify as democracies today (Freedom House: <3 in civil and

- political rights score; and >7 on Polity IV). Senegal experienced a transition to democracy in 1990, Mali in 1991, Albania in 1989/2005, Indonesia in 1998, Turkey gradually since 1961, and has been classified as a democracy without interruption since 1989.
33. For a discussion of three different types of 'public religions' see Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World*; and Casanova, 'Rethinking Public Religions'.
 34. Since West German democratization occurred not as a result of an opening but foreign intervention, the West German case is not considered in this phase.
 35. The *Nahdlatul Ulama* claims a membership of about 35 million, the modernist *Muhammadiyah* about 30 million members.
 36. Künkler, 'Zum Verhältnis Staat-Religion und der Rolle islamischer Intellektueller in der indonesischen Reformasi', 'Politische Theologie und Soziale Bewegungen: Die Roll Islamischer Organisationen in der indonesischen Reformasi'.
 37. The 'New Order' was the presidency of General Suharto (1965–1998) that defined itself against what later became known as the 'Old Order' under Indonesia's first post-independence president Sukarno (1945–1965).
 38. Scott, 'Indonesia Reborn?'. Similarly, *Muhammadiyah's* chairman Amien Rais' occasional use of sectarian rhetoric to unify Muslims against alleged Christian and Chinese conspiracies in politics and business could have easily tipped support towards a sectarian rather than democratic future.
 39. Boeckh, 'Orthodoxie und demokratische Transformation in der Ukraine'; Bociurkiw, 'Politics and Religion in the Ukraine: Orthodox and Greek Catholics in Ukraine', 136. The Greek Catholic Church accepts the authority of the Pope in Rome and therefore is not part of the Christian-Orthodox denomination. The exception Rome made for the Greek Catholic Church (one made to only very few religious congregations, such as several Oriental Christian communities), is to allow it to submit itself to the authority of the Pope while maintaining much of the Orthodox liturgy.
 40. Salafiyya (or Wahabiyya) are context-specific terms for a Malian Islamic minority that appeared in the 1950s as a countermovement to Sufism. They refer to themselves as 'reformists' and are not as exclusionary as Salafi groups in most other countries.
 41. This turn towards pro-democratic arguments occurred only in the third generation of the Salafiyya in Mali.
 42. Soares, *Islam and the Prayer Economy*.
 43. Ilia Tschawtschawadses was a leading figure of the national 'Tergdaleulebi' *intelligenza* who advocated a modernization of the Georgian nation in the late nineteenth century. He was killed in 1907. In 1987, the Georgian Autocephalous Orthodox Church acknowledged his efforts by beatifying him. In doing so, the Orthodox Church connected the Georgian dissidents' movement to intellectual elites to work jointly towards the erosion of Soviet rule.
 44. Leininger, 'Die ambivalente Rolle islamischer Akteure im Demokratisierungsprozess Malis'; Hock, *Fliegen die Seelen der Heiligen? Muslimische Reform und staatliche Autorität in der Republik Mali seit 1960*, 145.
 45. Boeckh, 'Orthodoxie und demokratische Transformation in der Ukraine'. Sysyn, 'The Third Rebirth of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Religious Situation in Ukraine, 1989–1991', 192.
 46. In the following we focus on constitution-drafting processes and their output, because a constitution establishes the basis for the legal-formal[0] relations between state and religion in a democracy.
 47. The effect of *de jure* and *de facto* autonomy on the capacity of religious actors to exert an impact on political transformation processes differs from phase to phase in the following manner. In the opening phase *de facto* autonomy is decisive: even where *de jure* religious organizations may be relatively independent, authoritarian regimes usually find extra-legal ways to incapacitate and/or co-opt them, like other civil

- society organizations. In the transition phase, *de facto* autonomy increases the likelihood that religious actors can use their legal status during constitutional drafting and reform processes to bargain for *de jure* autonomy. In the consolidation phase, *de jure* autonomy is only extant where no religion is officially established as the state religion.
48. The West German constitution of 23 May 1949 was called 'Basic Law' rather than 'constitution', because only a document regulating all of Germany (beyond West Germany) was to function as a constitution. For the sake of comprehensibility, we use the term constitution here, even though it would be more accurate to speak of it only as the 'Basic Law'.
 49. Catholic interests were well-represented in the 'Parlamentarischer Rat' (constitutional drafting committee) through delegates of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU).
 50. The Protestant Church of Germany (EKD), its representatives and politicians closely associated with it, did not exert a unified and identifiable influence on the constitution-drafting process. Rather, the EKD played an important role in legitimizing the young democracy's first democratic elections by explicitly asking members to vote with the slogan: 'A Christian citizen supports parliaments'. See Klein, 'Die Rolle der evangelischen Kirche Deutschlands im Demokratisierungsprozess nach 1945'; *Rundschreiben*, July 16, 1949; Evangelisches Zentralarchiv Berlin 2/278.
 51. Moreover, during the 1990s, Christian-Orthodox groups founded political parties such as the *Ukrainska christjansko-demokratitschna partija* (Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party, UCDP) or *Respublikanska christjanska partija* (RCP, Republikanische Christliche Partei) and religious authorities ran in elections, thereby endowing the nascent democracy with some degree of legitimacy.
 52. Boeckh, 'Orthodoxie und demokratische Transformation in der Ukraine'.
 53. Mali's strong separation of religion and state is a legacy of French colonial rule (1883–1960). A political culture of publicly emphasizing the laicist character of the state, created during colonial rule, carried on in the First (1960–1968) and Second Malian Republic (1968–1992). The Constitution of 1992 is based on the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic of 4 October, 1958.
 54. The Malian National Conference is considered to be one of the most participatory constitution-building processes in West Africa. More than 1,800 participants from politics, civil society, and the military took part.
 55. *Georgia*: article 9 (1) and article 19 (1) of the Constitution of 1995; *Ukraine*: article 35 of the Constitution of 1996; *Indonesia*: Article 29 of the revised 1945 Constitution of Indonesia; *Mali*: article 4 and article 12 of the Constitution of 1992; *Germany*: article 4 of the Constitution of 1949.
 56. Although the positions of some Malian Islamic organizations during the National Conference were likely to be interpreted as 'obstructive', one must note that they behaviourally followed democratic rules during the transition and accepted the democratic outcome of the National Conference. Moreover, due to their small size and *ad hoc* character, they were by far outweighed by the traditional and strong AMUPI. Anti-democratic thought did not emerge as a significant element in the public discourse on the new democratic order.
 57. Today there are three Orthodox churches with different leadership in the Ukraine: one that responds to the Moscow Patriarchate (this was the only legal Orthodox Church during Soviet rule), one that responds to the Kiev Patriarchate, and also the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, which was founded in 1918, prohibited by the Soviets in the early 1930s and revived after 1989. Both the Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church tended to support the Orange Revolution whereas the Moscow Patriarchate did not.
 58. Casanova, 'Between Nation and Civil Society: Ethnolinguistic and Religious Pluralism in Independent Ukraine', 203–28, 215.

59. International Republican Institute, 'Georgian National Voter Survey (21 August–10 September 2007)', <http://www.iri.org/eurasia/georgia/pdfs/2007-11-08-georgia.pdf> (accessed March 26, 2009).
60. Le Vine, 'Mali: Accommodation or Coexistence'.
61. Examples include the Christian Evangelical Church in Minahasa (GMIM), the Protestant Church in the Moluccas (GPM), the Protestant Evangelical Church in Timor (GMIT), the Protestant Church in Western Indonesia (GPIB), the Indonesian Protestant Church Gorontalo (GPIG), the Indonesian Protestant Church Donggala (GPID), the Indonesian Protestant Church Baggai Kepulauan (GPIBK), the Indonesian Protestant Church Papua (GPI-Papua), the Indonesian Protestant Church Buol Tolitili, the Christian Church Luwuk Banggai (GKLB), the Evangelical Christian Church Talud (GERMITA), and the Indonesian Ecumenical Christian Church.
62. Through this prayer economy politicians seek purchased advice from religious authorities on particular policy questions. Soares, *Islam and the Prayer Economy*.
63. For instance, the patriarch declared that every single murderer of a Georgian would be damned as a traitor to the Georgian nation and would be noted in a special register and damned forever, see Jawad and Reisner, 'Die Nationalisierung der Religion in der Orthodoxen Apostolischen Kirche Georgiens – Begünstigung oder Hindernis im Demokratisierungsprozess?'.
64. Compare Springhart, *Aufbrüche Zu Neuen Ufern: Der Beitrag Von Religion Und Kirche Für Demokratisierung Und Reeducation Im Westen Deutschlands Nach 1945*.
65. Bayat, *Making Islam Democratic. Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn*, 5.
66. Mobilizational capacity encompasses the degree of organization of the society (how many of the citizens are mobilizable by the organization?) and the organization's ability to mobilize (whether organizations do decide to call for mobilization or not, how intensively, for how long, etc.).
67. In Germany this was not the case, because the country's democratization after World War II was initiated from the outside.
68. Recent developments in mass media (especially radio, internet and to a limited extent also television) have fostered the emergence of individual *charismatic* Islamic authorities as Cheick Soufi Bilal or Chérif Haïdara. Mostly they have no political aims.
69. See endnote 3.

Note on contributors

Mirjam Künkler is Assistant Professor in Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University.

Julia Leininger is Researcher at the German Development Institute/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE).

Bibliography

- Afrobarometer. *Summary of Results*. Round 3 of Afrobarometer Survey in Mali, 2005.
- Bayat, Asef. *Making Islam Democratic. Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007.
- Berger, Peter L. *The Sacred Canopy. Elements of a Sociology of Religion*. New York: Random House, 1990 [1967].
- Birch, Sarah. *Elections and Democratization in Ukraine*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000.
- Bociurkiw, Bohdan. 'Politics and Religion in the Ukraine: Orthodox and Greek Catholics in Ukraine'. In *The Politics of Religion in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed. Michael Bourdeaux, 131–62. Armonk/London: M.E. Sharpe, 1995.

- Boeckh, Kathrin. 'Orthodoxie und demokratische Transformation in der Ukraine' ['Orthodoxy and Democratic Transformation in the Ukraine']. In *Zur Rolle religiöser Akteure in Demokratisierungsprozessen*, ed. Mirjam Künkler and Julia Leininger. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2009.
- Casanova, José. *Public Religions in the Modern World*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994.
- Casanova, José. 'Between Nation and Civil Society: Ethnolinguistic and Religious Pluralism in Independent Ukraine'. In *Democratic Civility: The History and Cross-Cultural Possibility of a Modern Political Ideal*, ed. Robert W. Hefner. New Brunswick, NJ: Transactions Publications, 1998.
- Casanova, José. 'Civil Society and Religion: Retrospective Reflections on Catholicism and Prospective Reflections on Islam'. *Social Research* 68, no. 4 (2001): 1041–80.
- Casanova, José. 'Rethinking Public Religions'. In *SSRC Handbook on Religion and World Affairs*, ed. Tim Shah, Alfred C. Stepan, Monica Duffy Toft, 203–28. New York: The Social Science Research Council, forthcoming 2010.
- Cheng, Tun-Jen, and Deborah Brown, eds. *Religious Organizations and Democratization: Case Studies from Contemporary Asia*. Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 2005.
- Elshtain, Jean Bethke. 'Religion and Democracy'. *Journal of Democracy* 20, no. 22 (2009): 5–17.
- Fox, Jonathan. *A World Survey of Religion and the State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Fox, Jonathan. 'Do Democracies Have Separation of Religion and State?'. *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 40, no. 1 (2007): 2–25.
- Habermas, Jürgen. *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft* [*The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*]. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2006.
- Hock, Carsten. *Fliegen die Seelen der Heiligen? Muslimische Reform und staatliche Autorität in der Republik Mali seit 1960* [*Do the Souls of the Saints Fly? Muslim Reform and State Authority in the Republic of Mali since 1960*]. Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1999.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.
- Huntington, Samuel. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.
- Janoski, Thomas. *Citizenship and Civil Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Jawad, Pamela. *Democratic Consolidation in Georgia after the 'Rose Revolution'?* PRIF Reports No. 73. Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, 2005.
- Jawad, Pamela, and Oliver Reisner. 'Die Nationalisierung der Religion in der Orthodoxen Apostolischen Kirche Georgiens – Begünstigung oder Hindernis im Demokratisierungsprozess?' ['The Nationalization of Religion in the Orthodox Church of Georgia – Fostering or Hindering Democratization?']. In *Zur Rolle religiöser Akteure in Demokratisierungsprozessen*, ed. Mirjam Künkler and Julia Leininger. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, forthcoming 2009.
- Kalyvas, Stathis. *The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996.
- Klein, Michael. 'Die Rolle der evangelischen Kirche Deutschlands im Demokratisierungsprozess nach 1945' ['The Role of the German Protestant Church in the Process of Democratization after 1945']. In *Zur Rolle Religiöser Akteure in Demokratisierungsprozessen*, ed. Mirjam Künkler and Julia Leininger. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, forthcoming 2009.

- Künkler, Mirjam. 'Zum Verhältnis Staat-Religion und der Rolle islamischer Intellektueller in der indonesischen Reformasi' ['On Religion-State Relations and the Role of Muslim Intellectuals in the Indonesian Reformasi']. In *Religion in Diktatur und Demokratie – Zur Bedeutung von religiösen Werten, Praktiken und Institutionen in politischen Transformationsprozessen* [*Religion in Dictatorship and Democracy – On the Relevance of Religious Values, Practices, and Institutions in Political Transformation Processes*], ed. Stephanie Garling and Simon W. Fuchs, 84–102. Villigster Profile. Wuppertal. 2007.
- Künkler, Mirjam. 'Politische Theologie und Soziale Bewegungen: Die Rolle Islamischer Organisationen in der indonesischen Reformasi' ['Ideas and Social Movements: The Role of Islamic Organizations in the Indonesian Reformasi']. In *Zur Rolle religiöser Akteure in Demokratisierungsprozessen*, ed. Mirjam Künkler and Julia Leininger. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, forthcoming 2009.
- Künkler, Mirjam, and Julia Leininger. 'Säkularisierung' ['Secularization']. In *Lexikon der Politikwissenschaft, Theorien, Methoden, Begriffe* [*Encyclopedia of Political Science. Theories, Methods and Concepts*], 3rd edn. ed. Dieter Nohlen and Rainer-Olaf Schultze. München: Beck Verlag, forthcoming 2009.
- Künkler, Mirjam, and Julia Leininger, eds. *Zur Rolle religiöser Akteure in Demokratisierungsprozessen* [*On the Role of Religious Actors in Processes of Democratization*]. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2009.
- Künkler, Mirjam, and Michael Meyer-Resende. *A Missing Link: Why Europe Should Talk about Religion when Promoting Democracy Abroad*. Democracy Reporting International. Discussion Paper No.1, June 2009, revised 2nd edn. <http://www.democracy-reporting.org/papers.html> (accessed July 15, 2009).
- Leininger, Julia. 'Die ambivalente Rolle islamischer Akteure im Demokratisierungsprozess Malis' ['The Ambivalent Role of Islamic Actors in Mali's Democratization']. In *Zur Rolle religiöser Akteure in Demokratisierungsprozessen*, ed. Mirjam Künkler and Julia Leininger. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, forthcoming 2009.
- Le Vine, Victor. 'Mali: Accommodation or Coexistence'. In *Political Islam in West Africa. State–Society Relations Transformed*, ed. William F.S. Miles, 73–99. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007.
- Liddle, Bill, and Saiful Mujani. 'Indonesian Democracy. From Transition to Consolidation'. In *Indonesia, Islam and Democratic Consolidation: Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Mirjam Künkler, Azyumardi Azra, and Alfred Stepan. Columbia University Press, forthcoming 2010.
- Liedhegener, Antonius. 'Der deutsche Katholizismus und seine konstitutive Rolle im Demokratisierungsprozess Westdeutschlands nach 1945' ['The German Catholicism and its Constitutive Role in the West German Democratization Process after 1945']. In *Zur Rolle religiöser Akteure in Demokratisierungsprozessen*, ed. Mirjam Künkler and Julia Leininger. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, forthcoming 2009.
- Linz, Juan J., and Alfred C. Stepan. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.
- Lundskow, George. *The Sociology of Religion. A Substantive and Transdisciplinary Approach*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2008.
- Mainwaring, Scott. *The Catholic Church and Politics in Brazil, 1916–1985*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1986.
- Maser, Peter. *Kirchen in der DDR* [*Churches in the German Democratic Republic*]. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 2000.
- McFaul, Michael. 'The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship. Non-Cooperative Transitions in the Post-communist World'. *World Politics* 54, (January 2002): 212–44.

- O'Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, eds. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.
- Philpott, Daniel. 'The Catholic Wave'. *Journal of Democracy* 15, no. 2 (2004): 32–46.
- Philpott, Daniel, Monica Duffy Toft, and Tim Shah. *God's Century: Religion and the Future of Global Politics*. New York: Norton Press, forthcoming 2010.
- Schmidt, Manfred G. *Demokratietheorien. Eine Einführung [Theories of Democracy]*. 4th edn. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2009.
- Scott, Margaret. 'Indonesia Reborn?'. *New York Review of Books* 45, no. 13 (1998).
- Soares, Benjamin. *Islam and the Prayer Economy. History and Authority in a Malian Town*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005.
- Springhart, Heike. *Aufbrüche zu neuen Ufern: Der Beitrag von Religion und Kirche für Demokratisierung und Reeducation im Westen Deutschlands nach 1945 [Departure to New Grounds. The Contribution of Religion and Church to Democratization and Re-Education in West Germany after 1945]*. Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2008.
- Stepan, Alfred C. 'The World's Religious Systems and Democracy: Crafting the "Twin Tolerations"'. In *Arguing Comparative Politics*, 213–54. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- Svolik, Milan. 'Authoritarian Reversals and Democratic Consolidation'. *American Political Science Review* 102, no. 2 (2008): 153–68.
- Sysyn, Frank E. 'The Third Rebirth of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Religious Situation in Ukraine, 1989–1991'. In *Seeking God. The Recovery of Religious Identity in Orthodox Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia*, ed. Stephen K. Batalden, 191–219. DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University, 1993.
- Tilly, Charles. *Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- van Bruinessen, Martin. 'Islamic State or State Islam? Fifty Years of State-Islam Relations in Indonesia'. <http://www.let.uu.nl/~Martin.vanBruinessen/personal/publications/State-Islam.htm> (accessed February 18, 2009).
- Wolfrum, Edgar. *Die geglickte Demokratie: Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von ihren Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart [The Successful Democracy: The History of the Federal Republic of Germany from its Beginnings to the Present]*. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2006.

Copyright of Democratization is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.