

Religious parties: Revisiting the inclusion-moderation hypothesis¹ - Introduction

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Abstract

The saliency of religious parties in recent democratic consolidation processes forces the discipline to reconsider key questions on party change: Under what conditions do (radical) religious parties moderate? Is their mere inclusion in the democratic process enough to result in their moderation? If so, exactly what mechanisms are at work here? What roles are played by intervening variables such as coalition politics and electoral systems? And if this is not the case, what other variables may explain the movements of religious parties along the axis between moderation and radicalization? Does religion itself play a role? In the endeavor to answer these and related questions, this introduction to the Special Issue on Religious Parties initially provides some conceptual clarifications and offers an overview of the relevant literature. It is followed by a list of conditions under which the development and shift of religious parties towards ideological and behavioral moderation may be expected. The argument posits that the democratization of the political system and inclusion in electoral competition are not the sole determining factors. Inclusion, indeed, seems to be neither a necessary nor sufficient condition. The four case studies presented after the introduction (by Carolyn Warner, Michael Buehler, Steven T. Wuhs, and Sarah Wilson Sokhey/Kadir Yildirim) analyze this in more depth by working diachronically

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and across parties of different religions. The first article revisits the development of Catholic parties in Italy, while the following set examines religious parties in the third- and fourth-wave democracies of Mexico, Turkey and Indonesia, and in Egypt, which has still not reached the status of a constitutional democracy.

Keywords

Religious parties, party change/adaptation, conceptual analysis, hypotheses, literature review

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1. Religious politics at the ballot box

As the past quarter-century has witnessed the persistence of Christian parties in Europe and Latin America, the inclusion in governmental coalitions of Hindu-Nationalist parties in South Asia and Jewish parties in Israel, and an increased participation of Islamic parties in electoral processes across the Muslim world, the debate over whether religious parties grow more moderate over time when included in the electoral process – known as the ‘inclusion-moderation hypothesis’ (Bermeo, 1997; Huntington, 1991: 165–171; Przeworski and Sprague, 1986) – has experienced a revival. In 1996, Stathis Kalyvas published his seminal work on Christian parties in Europe, which explained the ‘democratization’ of erstwhile illiberal Christian political parties over time. Drawing on the example of 19th and early to mid-20th century Christian parties in Europe, researchers of Latin American, Israeli, Turkish, Indian and Indonesian politics have recently turned to exploring the extent to which Catholic, Jewish, Hindu and Islamic parties have moderated, or can be expected to moderate, the more they are included on even playing fields in the electoral processes of their political systems.

As religious politics at the ballot box have increased, so have the academic reconsiderations of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis. In 2003, Scott Mainwaring and Tim Scully published a volume of studies on party change in Latin America (*Christian Democracy in Latin America: Electoral Competition and Regime Conflicts*), while Jillian Schwedler completed a book-length study on Islamist parties in Jordan and Yemen in 2006 (*Faith in Moderation*), and Sultan Tepe compared religious parties in Israel and Turkey in her *Beyond Sacred and Secular* (2008). Numerous articles in leading Political Science journals deal with the question of the democratic credentials of religious parties.² Some of these studies employ a teleological argument, suggesting that inclusion in electoral politics tends to ‘democratize’ religious actors in their doctrines and practices, and that electoral inclusion is therefore one way to appease the more radical ideological tenets of religious movements. Others caution that moderation, where it appears to occur, may be a temporary strategy to attract voters’ support, so that once power is gained an exclusivist illiberal agenda can be implemented. Still others offer more nuanced accounts, pointing out that ‘moderation’ should not be equated with support for

democracy *per se*, and that analyses must differentiate between realms in which ideological moderation may have occurred and realms in which it has not. Furthermore, recent studies suggest that analyses must try harder to represent the pluralism of positions on goals and strategies within a given religious political party in an effort to better understand who is receptive of strategic and ideological moderation under what conditions and who is not.

2. Key questions and a review of previous research

The saliency of religious parties, especially in recent democratic consolidation processes, forces the discipline to reconsider key questions on party change: Under what conditions do religious parties moderate, and how does such moderation manifest itself? How do intervening variables such as coalition politics, the electoral system, state structure, the existence of regional and local party systems and economic liberalization affect the dynamics of moderation? Which party elites are more likely to opt for change than others? The rise or return of illiberal religious party politics from India to Israel, from Indonesia to Turkey within the past 20 or 30 years forced political scientists to re-examine the conditions under which religious parties are bound to moderate and, conversely, the conditions under which electoral politics empower illiberal parties and put democracy in jeopardy. Which factors force religious parties to make credible commitments to liberal democratic politics? Which, by contrast, insulate illiberal parties against moderating incentives? Most importantly, how can political systems ‘lock in’ moderation processes already accomplished and prevent a reversal towards illiberal party ideologies and voter mobilization based on exclusivist platforms?

Studies of the rise of Christian Democracy in continental Europe and Latin America dominated research on religious parties until two decades ago. Catholic parties emerged in the late 19th and early 20th centuries mainly as the unintended consequence of the Church’s reaction to the liberal and secularizing policies of nation-states (Kalyvas, 1996). For decades, these Catholic parties flirted with authoritarian politics, and even after World War II their commitment to democratic politics was not beyond doubt (Almond, 1948a, b; Kalyvas and van Kersbergen, 2010: 190). Strictly speaking, until the 1960s the Catholic Church espoused views that were clearly anti-constitutional in most European democracies. Societal secularization processes, the emergence of pluralistic public spheres and competitive politics gradually made Catholic parties and their voters more appreciative of democratic politics (Kalyvas, 2003), to a point where Christian parties played a critical role in the consolidation of democracy in continental Europe (Gehler and Kaiser, 2004; Grew, 2003). While some studies of Christian democracy highlight the Second Vatican Council as a pivotal turning point in the moderation of Catholic actors, most studies conclude that institutional constraints and incentives have more power in explaining the political behaviour of these parties than their ideological framework. Some Catholic political parties preceded by decades the dogmatic change undertaken by the Catholic Church with the Second Vatican Council. However, our understanding remains vague of how exactly electoral competition bolsters democratic tendencies at the expense of radical ones within religious parties, and whether other variables play a role – and, if so, which. Which institutional constraints and incentives are

more decisive than others? Are they at all decisive, or do other variables play more important roles? What exactly has brought about the behavioural and ideological change within these parties? Do behavioural and ideological moderation go hand in hand, or is there a sequence or causation of some kind?

Some studies on moderation point to the function of underlying social networks. Most of the time, religious parties emerge out of religious social movements and networks that are tightly connected to constituencies through the provision of welfare and education. While religious parties can use these networks to attract and mobilize voters (Chhibber, 1996; Langohr, 2001; Tessler, 1997), their participation in electoral competition usually leads to a distancing between the movement and the party in the medium term, so that religious parties need to seek voters outside the pool of those who benefit from the movement's services (Clark, 2004). What explains the point at which parties decide to rely more on supporters who share their core ideological principles than those who draw material benefits from the movement? The electoral support of religious parties tends to exhibit significant variance among cases and across time, depending on a host of institutional, historical, socio-economic, international and random conditions.

3. Conceptualizations

3.1. Political parties

Drawing on the party literature, we differentiate political parties according to their levels of organization and institutionalization, and their political function. Beyond the institutionalization of political parties, the institutionalization of the party system – defined as 'structures of party competition and cooperation' (Pennings and Lane, 1998: 5) – has been an important variable in the literature on democratization and democratic consolidation. Thus, Mainwaring and Scully (1995) and Mainwaring (1999), for instance, have shown how the accountability, legitimacy and efficiency in both government and opposition that contribute to democratic consolidation are significantly supported by an institutionalized party system and stable inter-party competition. There exists a trade-off, however, between moderation and party-system institutionalization – both thought to be integral to democratic consolidation. On the one hand, party institutionalization is related to party-system institutionalization and the latter is deemed conducive to democratic consolidation; on the other, party change/moderation is slower the more parties are institutionalized.

Classic works such as Downs' (1957) conceived of party elites predominantly as either 'vote/seat maximizers' or 'office-seekers'. While approaches of party elites as 'vote/seat maximizers' highlight the responsiveness of party elites to the electorate and their willingness to adjust party ideologies to perceived preference changes among voters, conceptions of party elites as 'office-seekers' highlight elites' prioritization of winning elections first over aiming for political change. Such prioritization may be due to either the elites' preference for instrumental benefits or the realization that political influence requires prior wins and that, therefore, parties ought to target winning first before concentrating on the message. Later works on political parties have highlighted the function of 'message-seekers' or 'agenda-setters'. Both are particularly relevant in

multiparty environments where smaller parties exert influence via their role as necessary coalition partners (Mainwaring, 2003: 6–10). They are also pertinent to the case of religious parties, which – often functioning as ‘niche parties’ – are aware that their ability to gain votes/seats and office may be highly limited (Meguid, 2005). In contrast to office-seekers, message-seekers, with a strong degree of ‘ideological rigidity’ (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2004), are thought to work bottom-up in their efforts to effect the social transformation that will aid the party to victory. Rather than moderating through their inclusion in electoral politics, these parties have the potential to ‘unmoderate’ the party systems in which they operate and move illiberal or ‘radical’ policy positions into the centre of political agendas and party politics – when, for example, mainstream parties begin to coopt their policy stances into their own platforms.

3.2. Religious parties

In their work of 2003, Gunther and Diamond present a party typology based on three criteria: (1) formal organization, (2) programmatic commitments, (3) strategy (democratic or proto-hegemonic). The authors differentiate religious parties into those that are ‘denominational’ (these are both democratic and mass-based, such as the German Christian Democrats, the Polish Christian National Union [ZChN] or the Christian and Democratic Union [KDU] in the Czech Republic), and those that are ‘fundamentalist’ or ‘proto-hegemonic’ (i.e. non-democratic, such as, according to the authors, Algeria’s Islamic Salvation Front and Turkey’s Welfare Party) (Gunter and Diamond, 2003: 173).

What differentiates denominational parties from other mass-based parties, such as social democratic ones, is the fact that religious parties do not have unrestricted sovereignty over their programme.

Since the basis of the party’s programmes is a set of religious beliefs that are determined by a combination of tradition and interpretation by clerics and/or a religious institution outside of the party itself, the party is not fully in control of its core ideological precepts whenever they are directly linked to religious values. . . . This can lead to intra-party tensions. (Gunter and Diamond, 2003: 182).

The latter is true for fundamentalist parties, too, but they have even less leeway over changing principles in their party programme. One interpretation of the religious texts is valid, and one alone. Authority relations within the party are hierarchical, undemocratic and even absolutist, and members are disciplined and devoted (Gunter and Diamond, 2003: 183). The inclusion-moderation hypothesis can thus be rephrased as identifying the conditions under which parties move from the ‘fundamentalist’ to the ‘denominational’ category.

In the following, we use the concept of ‘religious parties’ as encompassing parties that hold an ideology or a worldview based on religion (having, thus, a cross-class appeal), and mobilize support on the basis of the citizens’ religious identity (using for this links to pre-existing religious institutions or networks; see Kalyvas, 2003; Kalyvas and van Kersbergen, 2010: 201; religious parties, it should be noted, can also become identity and preference shapers when religious identities are rather fluid than fixed.)

Indications may be that political parties carry religious terminology in their name or use and appropriate religious symbols and rituals (Kalyvas, 2000: 393; 2003: 297); or that religious terminology, ideas and goals are found in the party programme. Non-religious parties may naturally also use or refer to religious ideas, terminology, goals and symbols (as, for instance, the Republican Party in the United States does). For religious parties, however, these are central. A further indication of a religious identity may be international affiliation, such as membership in the Christian Democrat International (Mainwaring and Scully, 2003b: 30 f.) – an organization that has been dedicated to the promotion of Christian Democracy worldwide until today, albeit renamed Centrist Democrat International in 2001 in order to accommodate a broader variety of positions.

Returning to the notion of aims above, religious parties are often more influence-seekers and message-seekers than vote-seekers or office-seekers. In fact, core supporters may punish religious parties if the latter move towards moderation, because it means they depart from fundamental religious principles (see Adams et al., 2006). Supporters expect them to be message-seekers, or to maximize influence by providing a political ‘conscience’ (Green, 2007). Where religious parties are ‘niche’ parties, they are not – or not to the same extent – subject to the centrist moves once prognosticated by Downs for most political parties.

There is one caveat in place here: By analysing the processes of inclusion and moderation of religious parties, we are not saying that all religious parties are necessarily immoderate or radical. They can be moderate from the beginning, not reacting to, or being moderated even more by, factors we will develop in the next two paragraphs. They may belong to the extreme periphery of a given party system, but they can also be mainstream players. ‘Religious’, that is, is not synonymous with ‘radical’. The history of Christian Democracy in Europe and Latin America and the case studies on Italy and Mexico in this volume suggest that religion is not always and *per se* a force for extremism.

3.3. Inclusion

By ‘inclusion’ we understand the legal and political recognition of religious groups, movements or organizations as political actors or electoral contestants, subject to the same regulations as other political actors. Only where religious groups can form parties and participate in elections in the same manner as other groups can are they to be regarded as ‘included’ in the political system, even if they voluntarily refrain from doing so: to be allowed to compete is to be included. By contrast, where religious groups, movements and organizations are recognized as social actors but are legally prohibited from engaging in party politics, they are ‘excluded’. Bans on religious parties can be found in more than 30 countries, including some democracies (Fox, 2008). A priori party bans cannot be justified from a liberal democratic point of view. Constraints on political parties ought only to be imposed after a party, by its actions, is proven to have violated existing laws. According to Linz and Stepan (1996), no social group, including religious groups, should be excluded from the right to found a political party and participate in political decision-making. Hence, not the ethos of a party is decisive, but its compliance with the democratic order, democratic principles, norms and behaviour (Bonotti, 2010).

There are of course radical religious groups that do not participate in elections at all and thus do not want to be included because inclusion would betray their revolutionary or theocratic goals and because, perhaps, they believe the existing democratic regime to be ideologically blasphemous and unacceptable. These radical groups remain radical and anti-democratic. 'Hence, groups that decide to participate are usually not that radical in the first place' (Tezcür, 2010b: 15; cf. 2010a). The presumed mechanism of the shift to moderation through inclusion can only take effect when religious groups are able and willing to constitute themselves as a party and take part in elections.

3.4. Moderation

What precisely 'moderation' is, how one recognizes it when one sees it, how 'true' moderation is to be distinguished from 'strategic' moderation, etc., have all been important analytical concerns for students of religious parties.

A few prolegomena are in order before examining the concept of moderation in more detail. First, moderation may of course vary across issues, and it is important to outline the realms in which parties do moderate and in which they do not. Second, moderation is not irreversible and, as a related issue, new radicalisms may emerge even in long-standing democracies.³ Third, 'moderation' is not a category, but a process. It entails change that should be understood as a movement along a continuum from radical to moderate (Schwedler, 2011: 352). Fourth, political parties are not unitary actors. They may moderate positions at the centre but not in the periphery, or vice versa, the elite may become moderate in its positions but not the larger membership, or vice versa, and there will be differing levels of moderation across party factions. Party change is not necessarily an all-encompassing process and may comprise simultaneous moderation and immoderation processes.

With these caveats in mind, scholars of religious parties have established that parties may moderate principally in two dimensions: ideology and/or behaviour. Behavioral moderation refers to 'the adaptation of electoral, conciliatory, and nonconfrontational strategies that seek compromise and peaceful settlement of disputes at the expense of nonelectoral, provocative, and confrontational strategies that are not necessarily violent but may entail contentious action' (Tezcür 2010b: 10 f.). Ideological moderation can be defined as 'a process through which political actors espouse ideas that do not contradict the principles of popular sovereignty, political pluralism, and limits on arbitrary state authority' (Tezcür, 2010b: 10).

Moderation may manifest itself in changes in party programmes, changing ideological stances espoused in speeches and campaign slogans that are voiced on a particular issue, and in the overall self-presentation of the party, including intra-party organizations. At the same time, a party may not signal its moderation in any of these channels, but may, by virtue of the policies it supports or the coalitions it forms, moderate *de facto*, even if this behaviour is not in line with the party's expressed position in party manifestos. It may develop a more open and tolerant approach towards particular policy issues, and even cooperate or forge coalitions with secular parties whose existence it may not have accepted before. Such discrepancies tend to emerge if moderation has taken place at the elite level

but not the constituency level, and if party elites have decided not to concede or publicize the *de facto* moderation (yet) – knowing that the supporters of ideological parties often punish their party when positions are toned down or diverge significantly from the original agenda. The ideological transformation, however, will in most cases not be a complete reconfiguration of a party's ideology, but a limited yet critical change of some central anti-democratic or illiberal platform planks (i.e. renouncing of violence, accepting the peaceful alternation of power, the rule of law, political pluralism and tolerance or a fuller acceptance of women's rights, minority rights or civil liberties, especially those of non-believers, members of other religious communities, and apostates, etc.). Whether these ideological changes can be sustained in the long term depends on the soundness of the religious justifications given, the consistency of the political message hereafter, and the religious and political positions of the supporters.

It seems that while behavioural moderation (joining the democratic game and accepting its power-sharing rules) is a step towards consolidating procedural democracy, it is ideological moderation that determines whether religious parties accumulate democratic capital towards promoting liberal democracy. The former is a necessary but insufficient condition for a religious party to become democratic (Tepe, 2012).

4. Hypotheses

Moderation or party change may be a discontinuous outcome of specific party decisions linked to party goals. Change, that is, does not merely 'happen', but instead results from leadership change, a change of the dominant faction within the party, and/or an external stimulus (Harmel and Janda, 1994). The motivation for change can be power-oriented or goal-oriented, depending on the predisposition of party elites and on external perimeters such as the party system and incentives to enter coalitions. Change may concern (a) the inner organizational structure of the party and party rules, (b) the strategies and tactics employed, and (c) the ideology/policy positions (Harmel and Janda, 1994: 266).

Depending on the primary goals that parties pursue, their reaction to internal and external stimuli may cause or facilitate moderation. These stimuli include:

1. *Internal factors* (internal structure of the party and the nature of internal decision-making processes)
 - Dominant faction displacement
 - Leadership change
2. *External factors*
 - Demographic change
 - Constitutional and legal changes
 - Electoral competition
 - The emergence or development of a pluralistic public sphere with critical discourses and independent media.
 - Secularization processes (decline of religiously oriented voters) and new social cleavages
 - International contexts and developments.

Ad 1) Parties are only likely to change under pressure, as change uses up resources and is likely to disturb the inner-party factional balance. As Harmel and Janda (1994) establish, the strongest changes are effected by external shocks when they coincide with or cause changes in the leadership and dominant faction(s). Internal factors may cause change without an external stimulus when the leadership or the consistency of the membership changes (Harmel and Janda, 1994: 265): when, for instance, the criteria of party membership are expanded and non-members of religious organizations increasingly enter a religious party, or when the number of dogmatic party members ('believers') decreases and the number of pragmatists or 'careerists' (Panebianco, 1988: 10) increases.

The party bureaucracy may play in favour of party moderation because modern parties are membership (if not mass) organizations with a bureaucratic apparatus, the functionaries of which do not merely live for politics, but actually live from it (Max Weber). The maintenance and increase of an organization's resources and of their own income, prestige and influence are therefore in their interest and are likely to depend directly on election success. The results are bureaucratization, hierarchization and oligarchization of the structures, increasing inertia within which may contribute to the growth of moderation. As Kaare Strøm (1990) has worked out, the state of the recruitment channels, the weight of intra-party democracy and leadership accountability are also major factors determining the possibilities for change in party policies.

Ad 2a) Demographic changes can play a role in the long run when radicals die out.

Ad 2b) In the short and medium term, changes in the structure of constitutional and legal constraints and, especially, the threat of a party ban if proven unconstitutional will be of greater importance. Even the anticipation of a ban can generate moderation. The focus here is on political opportunity structures: 'Are incumbents willing to link moderation with incentives and radicalization with sanctions?' (Kalyvas and van Kersbergen, 2010: 201). Government control and legal restrictions of political actors will lead to their moderation, whereby a U-shaped path can be assumed: a certain level of state repression generates moderation by making a 'radical' party fear prohibition, non-admission to elections or other sanctions. However, beyond a certain level of repression this approach can have the opposite effect and actually encourage radicalism, as the case of Algeria shows ('exclusion-radicalization hypothesis').

Other changes to the political opportunity structure may also have the effect of introducing moderation; these may be the replacement of a majority voting system with proportional representation, the lowering of the national threshold in the latter case, the introduction of state funding for election campaigns (rendering aggressive donation drives unnecessary), or the regionalization or federalization of policies in countries in which conservative religious groups are strongly represented at regional or local level (such as Indonesia).

Furthermore, changes in the intricate power-sharing arrangements between the state and religion (which will regularly fluctuate somewhere between total control on the one hand and independence of religion on the other, between accommodation and separation) (Fox, 2008) will result in or foster moderation or radicalization of parties. For instance, the effects of abolishing state subsidies for religious schools or lifestyles will

be radicalizing, while those resulting from a state's cooptation of a religious movement's or party's core values will be moderating.

Ad 2c) The inclusion in the political process of a liberal, pluralist electoral democracy may lead to moderation because parties and candidates are compelled to compete with others to mobilize voters by developing policies which are acceptable to the majority. In this way, Catholic parties downplayed 'the salience of religion in politics to appeal to broader categories of voters and strike alliances with other political forces' (Kalyvas, 1996: 18). Michels and Schumpeter were the first party theoreticians who assumed that radical parties had to dilute their ideology and downplay their exclusivist message once they enter the electoral arena, in order to attract voters outside of their core constituency and to mobilize majorities or pluralities – radical parties usually being unable to do this (Michels, 1915/1962: 333–341; Schumpeter, 1950/1975: 283). In a strict sense, however, this will only be true in a Downsian world where the median voter attitudes are moderate, the electoral market shows a unimodal distribution of preferences, and the party's elite is office-seeking or power-seeking (but not influence-seeking or message-seeking). But even in these cases, parties may not move closer to the centre. As Schofield and Sened (2005) have shown, when party activists, being more 'radical' than the median voter, have a strong leverage over party leaders, the latter are rather limited in their ability to move the party closer towards the centre.

Where religious parties develop moderate movements towards the centre, this may – depending on the electoral market – allow new religious parties to be created, impact on processes of alignment, and slow down, or even obstruct altogether, processes of moderation (Lucardie, 2000).

Things may be more complex in a federal system, where a party's incentive to moderate at national, as opposed to regional, level – determined by differing institutional incentives, variations in the make-up of the electorate or the power structure within the party – may result in contrary developments, perhaps even extending to the formation of separate regional party systems.

Processes of moderation by religious parties are also likely to be influenced by their inclusion in coalition governments (Elman, 2008; Warner, 2008), particularly where they participate as smaller parties next to larger secular parties (as in phases in India or Israel).

Ad 2d) Where a party is compelled to present its views, proposals and convictions for public discussion and defend them against others' views, proposals and convictions, this may in itself lead to moderation because religious justifications (such as references to holy scriptures) may not be accepted by a pluralist public as adequate political justification. Where internal party discourse is subject to public discourses (and the rival practices, ideologies and systems of symbolism and meanings expressed therein), finding a receptive audience and being able to mobilize agreement may require the development of more moderate positions, the strengthening of already existing moderate tendencies within the party and the evolution of a 'multidimensional' (instead of unidimensional religious) identity for the party. Moderation, in other words, requires that the 'boundaries of justifiable action' are redrawn, 'to include or at least tolerate a wider diversity of actors, practices, and narratives'

(Schwedler, 2006: 152). But if, on the other hand, there are converse sociological developments such as the rise of independent and separate Islamist public spheres (e.g. civil society associations, publishing houses, media outlets, business enterprises), this may foster a radicalization of political rhetoric and ideological localization in the case of Islamic parties. One has to take the characteristics of public discourse, whether it is performed in a single or many separated arenas, into account, as well as shifts in public opinion and, more generally, the zeitgeist under which radical political parties operate.

Ad 2e) In Europe the moderation of religious parties also resulted from a deep secularization process in the respective societies and constituencies. Christian Democrats have only registered success into the 21st century by discarding their initial principles and objectives and becoming secular forces governing secular societies. In Europe it is becoming increasingly difficult to mobilize political support by using religious ideas, symbols and moral concepts. Here, becoming more secular did indeed mean becoming more moderate. However, this is not generally so: becoming more moderate does not necessarily mean less religious. For example, this does not apply to the same extent, if at all, in societies in which religion is still a key identity marker that may be used in politics. Here, democratic elections may make religious parties more religious and/or more radical, especially in societies with larger non-secularized groups (as in Israel) or in the case of strong polarization between religious majority-minority communities (as in India). But, as we have mentioned, a moderate party is not necessarily a less religious one. In our view, moderation and the level of religiousness of a party can be unrelated. Secularists may be highly authoritarian, and religious actors fully committed to democracy and the rule of law. Thus, for the purposes of this publication we are only interested in whether parties become more committed to liberal, constitutional democracy, not whether they become more or less religious. Fielding non-religious candidates, however, can be a sign of moderation, as would be the fielding of candidates of other faiths or women (such as in Indonesia).

Ad 2f) International factors such as the geopolitical context and international developments can also play a role here. The dependence on democratic neighbouring states, which would cut off their support if radical parties came to power, can contribute to moderation, as can the wish to join international or supranational organizations (e.g. Turkey's AKP and the goal of EU accession). Conversely, however, international pressure can also prevent moderation when it appears to be a sell-out of national interests to a foreign power.

The transnational character of a religion may play a role if it is organized in such a way that it can influence national politics: Because of its central power structure and strong hierarchical authority, the Catholic Church may exert a moderating effect on religious, i.e. Christian-Democratic parties. A similar case may be the Muslim Brotherhood, which, although lacking a hierarchical structure, is influential because of its transnational network: it too could have a moderating impact on individual parties that invoke it.

As we see, a whole host of variables can contribute to the moderation process of (religious) parties. At the same time, when analysing individual cases we do not expect to see them all in action at once.

5. Case studies

Drawing on the conceptual literature on party change and party transformation, this special issue reconsiders the inclusion-moderation hypothesis with longitudinal and geographical variation. It examines the effects of inclusion of religious parties in the electoral democracies of Italy, Mexico, Indonesia, Egypt and Turkey. For Egypt and Turkey, a comparison is drawn with Communist parties in Hungary and Bulgaria in an effort to make the conclusions about the effects of electoral politics on political moderation more generalizable. This special issue thereby enlarges the scope conditions of moderation theory to non-Christian-majority and non-religious environments, and sheds light on whether moderation processes work similarly across different environments, or whether the Christian democrats were and are a 'special case'.

The case studies suggest that moderation processes are predominantly driven by institutional incentives (the exception seems to be Indonesia) that influence party goals, but caution against equating behavioural and ideological moderation. The latter is a long-term process that requires not only electoral politics, but a consolidated democratic regime with a functioning judiciary that will prosecute illiberal transgressions. The argument that non-Christian theologies bear more obstacles *per se* to moderation than Catholicism cannot be sustained, the papers suggest. Religions and their interpretations are highly localized. In particular, the developments in Egypt, Indonesia and Turkey over the past 20 years show how, within the same political system, illiberal religious parties exist side by side with moderate religious parties that have generated democratic interpretations of their religion. The task at hand is therefore to identify the conditions under which the latter can electorally outperform their illiberal counterparts.

The case studies present the precise modes of action of the factors and mechanisms specified, and explain why the development of moderation in the countries examined has proceeded at different speeds – in some cases not at all (or not yet) or only in the case of individual parties. While throwing light on the 'inclusion-moderation hypothesis', they certainly also give rise to new issues which will require further case studies to be answered.

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Notes

1. This special issue was commissioned by the Political Organizations and Parties specialist group of the American Political Science Association, to mark the new relationship between POP and Party Politics.

2. Compare, for instance, Robinson (1997), Kalyvas (1998, 2000), Langohr (2001), Clark (2004, 2006), Wickham (2004), Tepe (2005a, b), Green (2007), van Kersbergen (2008), Elman and Warner (2008), Elman (2008), Warner (2008), Woodward (2008), Tezcür (2010a), Kalyvas and van Kersbergen (2010), Schwedler (2011), Tomsa (2012), Tepe (2012).
3. A case in point is that of the Hindu nationalist movement and the BJP in India. The longer democracies exist, however, the smaller the likelihood that such radicalisms can undermine democracy and effect a return to authoritarianism; see Svobik (2008).

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